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Abstract
With the rapid development of information systems and our increasing
dependency on computer-based systems, ensuring their dependability be-
comes one the most important concerns during system development. This
is especially true for the mission and safety critical systems on which we
rely not to put significant resources and lives at risk.
Development of critical systems traditionally involves formal modelling
as a fault prevention mechanism. At the same time, systems typically
support fault tolerance mechanisms to mitigate runtime errors. However,
fault tolerance modelling and, in particular, rigorous definitions of fault
tolerance requirements, fault assumptions and system recovery have not
been given enough attention during formal system development.
The main contribution of this research is in developing a method for
top-down formal design of fault tolerant systems. The refinement-based
method provides modelling guidelines presented in the following form:
• a set of modelling principles for systematic modelling of fault toler-
ance,
• a fault tolerance refinement strategy, and
• a library of generic modelling patterns assisting in disciplined inte-
gration of error detection and error recovery steps into models.
The method supports separation of normal and fault tolerant system be-
haviour during modelling. It provides an environment for explicit mod-
elling of fault tolerance and modal aspects of system behaviour which
ensure rigour of the proposed development process.
The method is supported by tools that are smoothly integrated into an
industry-strength development environment.
The proposed method is demonstrated on two case studies. In particular,
the evaluation is carried out using a medium-scale industrial case study
from the aerospace domain.
The method is shown to provide support for explicit modelling of fault
tolerance, to reduce the development efforts during modelling, to support
reuse of fault tolerance modelling, and to facilitate adoption of formal
methods.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
This chapter initially describes the motivations behind the thesis and the main topics
related to this work. Research questions and hypothesis that we validate in this thesis
are formulated next. Finally, the research methodology, contributions and the thesis
structure are stated.
1.1 Motivations
Computer-based critical systems dependability
Our society is becoming increasingly dependent on computer-based systems due to
the falling costs and improving capabilities of computers. There is a class of systems
called critical that operate with resources of the highest value. Defects in such sys-
tems, unlike commercial day-to-day products, can have a significant impact on the
environment, assets, and human life. Critical systems have to be dependable [Avi+04],
so that they can be justifiably trusted to provide the required services.
Adoption of formal methods
One of the prominent solutions to ensuring systems dependability by fault prevention
and/or fault removal is the inclusion of formal modelling in the development process.
Even though formal methods are not always used in developing industrial systems,
their use in development of dependable systems is increasing and is proven to be cost-
effective [Woo+09]. Among the main current obstacles to adopting formal methods
by industry are the lack of tools and engineers’ experience in formal development. The
latter can be significantly improved by teaching of examples, development patterns,
and modelling practices.
Modelling fault tolerance
It is well-known that one cannot produce a faultless system functioning in a perfect
fault-free environment [LA90]. This is due to many reasons including changing envi-
ronmental conditions, hardware failures, and inevitable mistakes during development.
In order to achieve sufficient levels of dependability, systems need to mitigate faults
during execution by employing fault tolerance mechanisms. While it is theoretically
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possible to formally produce a system free of bugs, developers cannot assume system
environment to be fault-free. Deterioration of physical components makes it neces-
sary for systems to tolerate low-level errors, such as sensor and actuator failures, to
provide an acceptable level of dependability.
There are a number of safety analysis techniques for modelling low-level errors
and error propagation paths and analysis of system-level effects. However, there is
limited support for high-level design of fault tolerant systems using formal methods.
Top-down development methods have to support fault tolerance modelling at higher
levels of abstraction, where the overall critical system behaviour inherently contains
error recovery procedures.
1.2 Research Hypotheses
The aim of this research is to validate the following hypotheses:
1. It is feasible to develop systems in which fault tolerance is correctly designed.
2. Design of fault tolerance can be integrated into a formal top-down development
process.
3. It is possible to develop a combination of modelling techniques, refinement
strategies and guidelines that facilitate the development of fault tolerance in
a structured, reusable, and tool-supported way.
4. The refinement-based Event-B method supports formal development of fault
tolerant systems.
1.3 Research Methodology and Contributions
The main approach taken in this research is to propose and evaluate a method for
a top-down rigorous development of fault tolerance in critical systems via formal
modelling of faults and system behaviour. The development method relies on two
major contributions:
• a formally introduced concept of fault tolerance (FT) modelling views, accom-
panied by guidelines for its practical application, and
• a set of principles and practices for modelling fault tolerance in state-based
formal methods.
This work binds the two parts together into a single consistent method for modelling
fault tolerance. The approach is exemplified for the Event-B formal method. Two
case studies are developed to evaluate the method and demonstrate its applicability.
The research methodology relies on the following concepts:
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• Industrial applications and experience. The method benefits from the analysis
of a number of industrial requirements documents within a range of problem
domains including automotive, aerospace, transportation, and business sectors.
The method is targeting industrial scale application.
• Tool support. The method is tool-supported and integrated into an industry
strength modelling environment. The case studies used in this work for evalua-
tion are developed and proved in the Rodin toolset.
• Conservative extension. Modelling of fault tolerance does not alter the original
top-down development method. The proposed method is built on existing formal
semantics and tools used by industry.
• Top-down development of fault tolerance. The method addresses fault tolerance
at all levels of abstraction and provides a hierarchical approach to modelling.
1.4 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 contains an overview of the research areas relevant to this work. The
concept of Modal and Fault Tolerance Views is described in Chapter 3 as a self-
contained approach to modelling modal and fault tolerance aspects of systems. The
method for refinement-based formal modelling of fault tolerant systems is proposed in
Chapter 4. The method consists of a number of refinement-based modelling solutions
which are used according to a refinement strategy, and a practical application of modal
views. The method is evaluated in Chapter 5 by modelling a second case study from
the aerospace domain. We draw conclusions and discuss limitations of the method in
Chapter 6.
3
Chapter 2. Background
This chapter provides a thesis background and a current state of the art in relevant
research areas. This thesis contributes to the three areas each described in its section:
an overview of the relevant aspects of formal methods is given in Section 2.1, fault
tolerance is addressed in Section 2.2, and the current state of research in multi-views
development is discussed in Section 2.3. We identify the key problems that we intend
to address by this study in Section 2.4 and we draw our conclusions in Section 2.5.
2.1 Modelling and Formal Methods
Modelling is a process of creating an abstraction of (some aspect of) a system with
the purpose of gaining confidence and deeper understanding of the resulting be-
haviour of the system. Different modelling frameworks provide different means of
such assurance. A number of XML-based frameworks such as UML [JBR99; Amb04]
and AADL [AADL] today are widely used by industry engineers to represent the
domain knowledge and system architecture. Known as model-driven engineering
(MDE) [Amb04], such an approach increases the quality of the end products and
the predictability of their behaviour which generally improves systems dependability.
Although there are works on extending semantics and using external analysis tools
for model validation [RSH11; HLV11], the original frameworks do not provide formal
development facilities.
2.1.1 Usage of formal methods today
Formal methods provide high level of assurance by applying mathematical rigour
during the modelling process. Various formal techniques are used at all stages of
system development including requirements engineering [Eas+98; CDV98; Ham+95],
software specification [BS03; Abr96; Abr10; WD96; Jon90], high-level architectural
design [All97; AADL], software design [Jon90; Bac80], implementation [Ros95], and
testing [HBH08]. The thesis focuses on using formal methods at the early phases of
specification and design.
The purpose of a formal specification of the system is to arrive at a correct model
shown to satisfy the requirements. The formal specification is then used at later
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stages of development to ensure the correctness of the implemented system. Formal
specification may be also used for certification or to validate the correctness of an
already deployed system post factum. There are several types of formal approaches
which differ in their ways of assuring the model correctness.
Model checkers [Cla08] ensure the correctness of a model by executing the be-
havioural part of the models and checking, at each state or a group of states, whether
the required properties hold. Model checkers typically accept properties expressed in
a temporal logic. This allows developers to check liveness properties of the models.
Although various optimisations have provided major improvements in model checking
capabilities, the approach lacks of scalability due to state space explosion on real-world
problems [Pel09].
Another formal approach used in software engineering is test case generation
[Bro+05]. It consists in comparison of the formal specification of a system and its ex-
ecutable implementation. The specification is used to derive test cases which are run
against the implemented code. Thus, the implementation is guaranteed to conform to
the specification with respect to the test case coverage. The derivation of test cases
is typically automated, and the process of implementation can follow the test-driven
development approach [Bec03].
Other approaches closely related to test case generation are assertions and design
by contract. The assertions [Ros95] are properties expressed on the local state of
the programming unit checked statically or at run-time. Some assertions are state-
ments over factual parameters of methods. They represent assumptions about the
parameters passed by another block of code. The assertions can be statically anal-
ysed (proven) given that the guarantees of the caller are also defined. Such pre-
and post-conditions are used during design by contract. There are a number of li-
braries and programming languages supporting the design-by-contract approach such
as: MS Code Contracts [MSCC], MS Spec# library [MSSP], Eiffel programming lan-
guage [Int06], and Java Modelling Language [Cha+06]. In these languages, a formal
specification of the system behaviour is essentially intertwined with the implementa-
tion and is expressed at the same level of abstraction. The mentioned libraries are
language-specific, and are used in practice for finding common programming bugs.
Theorem proving is a rigorous approach to formal assurance of the intended system
behaviour. In proof-based methods [Abr96; Abr10; WD96; Jon90], one specifies the
behaviour of the system and a set of safety properties. A developer is responsible for
showing that the model satisfies the properties by proving proof obligations generated
by the methods. Thus, when the system is implemented according to the specification,
it will maintain the properties during execution. No actual execution of the model is
performed during the formal development. Automatic theorem provers [RV01] may
be also used to prove (a part of) the generated proof obligations. By proving the
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obligations one guarantees the full coverage of the model state space against the
safety properties specified [WD96; Abr96]. Typically, liveness properties can also be
verified using an external model checker that supports the notation of the method
being used [LB08].
2.1.2 Success stories and problems
A number of surveys [Woo+09; HB95; BH06] report on an industrial uptake of formal
methods during the last 20 years with an increasing use at early phases of specification
and design. The surveys show a generally positive effect of using formal methods on
time and cost of development, and quality of the final product.
Although formal methods are not widely used for developing day-to-day commer-
cial software, the necessity of their use for building highly dependable systems is
evident [Rus89; HG93; HBV10; HB99]. There are a number of successful industrial
projects where formal methods were applied and the resulting systems are now in
operation. In transportation sector, Siemens Transportation Systems [STS](formerly
Matra Transport) heavily uses B as a high-level design language for specification
and proving correctness of the control logic of train systems. Line 14 of the Paris
underground metro [Beh+99] and a train shuttle for Roissy Charles de Gaulle air-
port [BA05] were developed using the company’s established development process
based on B. Notably, both systems are driverless. The B and Event-B methods have
been also used for the development of train signalling systems in Brazil conducted by
the AeS Group [RL12; D15.5].
In microchip design, validation plays a crucial role due to sheer complexity of
microprocessors. Verification and theorem proving have been the major techniques in
validating the instruction set specifications [PJB99; Mur+08; Hun89; Win94]. One
example of a successful application of formal methods is a formal validation of the
instruction set architecture of the XMOS XCore using Event-B [Yua+11].
Some other examples of applications of formal methods include the design and
verification of embedded medical devices [GO11; QNX], subsystems of satellites in
the aerospace domain [Ili+10], voting algorithms [Bry11], and distributed systems
coordination [ASAA09].
The increasing complexity of critical systems make them an appropriate target
for a top-down development approach. The success of applying refinement-based for-
mal methods mainly comes from the ability to design a system incrementally starting
from an abstract representation. By defining an abstraction, the top-down methods
allow developers to capture the essential functions of the system without spreading
the modeller’s attention on details. At each step, the model is formally refined thus
introducing lower-level concepts and behaviour. However, refinement is also an en-
gineering process where design mistakes are inevitable. The process of arriving at
6
a detailed model of a system can be described as a traversal of a tree of models.
A modeller starts from the root, and by refining the initial model he/she traverses
through the tree until he finds an acceptable detailed model. At some point while
verifying the required properties, a modeller can realise that he has made a mistake or
some abstract formal elements prevent from modelling the desired system behaviour.
Then, he needs to rollback and make a change to an abstract model. This leads to
changes in the rest of the already modelled refinements. Therefore, the modelling and
proof efforts for redevelopment of abstract behaviour is generally higher than that of
concrete models due to proofs associated with refinement. To minimise such costs,
there is a need for an effective way to cut out those models and modelling decisions
which are known to be unacceptable a priori.
Despite the success stories and increasing use of formal methods, they are not yet
the rule for developing dependable systems. Among the main problems of adopting
formal methods are a steep learning curve for engineers and a general lack of tool
support [Woo+09]. An effective solution to the former can be a set of principles,
practices, and patterns that teach engineers the right ways to model certain aspects
of the systems within a particular domain or formal method. In object-oriented
software engineering, such approach is now widely used and is known as design pat-
terns [Gam+94].
2.1.3 System context
A formal method is a flexible tool for specifying what a system should do omitting
the details of how it should be done. However, the specification of what a system
must do is a complex task in itself due to a significant semantic gap between informal
language of requirements and a formal language of specification.
The purpose of any artificial system is to bring about changes to its problem
domain. The part of the problem domain that can be observed and changed by a
system represents the system environment, or its context. It can include a part of the
physical world or another technical system or both.
The idea of the system context and analysis of its phenomena is given attention
in the Problem Frames requirements analysis approach [Jac01]. In Problem Frames,
after defining the context of the system, one gradually decomposes both the system
and the environment until a sufficient level of requirements granularity is achieved.
The HJJ approach [HJJ03] builds on the Problem Frames thinking and focuses
on the interface between a control system and its environment. It shows that speci-
fications of many systems may be derived from those which include the context and
its physical phenomena. The process of defining system requirements and its context
provides insights into its intended behaviour, and helps in identifying requirement
ambiguities and inconsistencies [D1.1].
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Even at the finest level of details, requirements are still informal and have to be
formalised for a concrete specification language. One solution to requirements for-
malisation can be a user-defined explicit mapping of requirement terms into formal
specification terms [JHL11]. Thus, formal reasoning may reveal mistakes and omis-
sions in requirements during modelling. With such a solution, the separation of the
system from its context remains informal.
Different formal methods may provide different means for modelling environments.
The common issue here is a semantic gap between the language used to express an
environment and the formal language for specifying a system behaviour. For example,
a physical environment of a control system may have continuous-time nature that is
expressed using differential equations, and the high-level logic of the system may
require discrete-time modelling. A number of solutions can be used to bridge this
semantic gap: the system model and the environment model may be expressed using
different languages and used during co-simulation [Fit+10], or an abstraction of the
environment can be defined in the target formal language used to specify the system
behaviour [HH11]. In both approaches, the system model has to contain definitions
representing the relevant part of the system context.
2.1.4 Event-B
The development method described in this thesis is exemplified on Event-B formal
method [Abr10]. Event-B is a state-based formalism closely related to Classical
B [Abr96] and Action Systems [BS89]. The step-wise refinement approach is the
corner stone of the Event-B development method. A combination of model elabo-
ration, atomicity refinement and data refinement helps to formally transition from
high-level architectural models to detailed, executable specifications ready for code
generation [EB].
An extensive tool support makes Event-B especially attractive. An integrated
Eclipse-based development environment [ROD] is under active development now and
is well-supported. It is open for extension using the Eclipse plug-in mechanism [ECL].
The main verification technique is theorem proving and the development is sup-
ported by a collection of theorem provers [ATB] while there is also a capable model
checker [PROB].
An Event-B model is defined by a tuple (c, s, P, v, I, RI , E) where c and s are
constants and sets known in the model; v is a vector of model variables; P (c, s) is a
collection of axioms constraining c and s; I is a model invariant limiting the possible
states of v: I(c, s, v). The combination of P and I should characterise a non-empty
collection of suitable constants, sets and model states: ∃c, s, v ·P (c, s)∧I(c, s, v). The
purpose of an invariant is to express model safety properties. In Event-B an invariant
is also used to deduce model variable types.
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RI is an initialisation action computing initial values for the model variables; it is
typically given in the form of a predicate constraining next values of model variables
without, however, referring to previous values - RI(c, s, v
′).
E is a set of model events. The general form of an event in Event-B notation is
name = any p where H(c, s, p, v) then S(c, s, p, v, v′) end
where p is a vector of event parameters, H(c, s, p, v) is an event guard, and
S(c, s, p, v, v′) is an event action expressed as a before-after predicate. An event may
fire as soon as the condition of its guard is satisfied and no other event executes at
the same time. In case there is more than one enabled event at a certain state, the
demonic choice semantics is applied. The result of an event execution is some new
model state v′.
The semantics of an Event-B model is usually given in the form of proof semantics,
based on Dijkstra’s work on weakest precondition. A collection of proof obligations
is generated from the definition of the model and these must be discharged in order
to demonstrate that the model is correct. For an abstract model (a model that is not
a refinement of another model) two such proof obligations are the invariant satisfac-
tion and event feasibility. A new state produced by an event must satisfy the model
invariant:
I(c, s, v) ∧ P (c, s) ∧H(c, s, p, v) ∧ S(c, s, p, v, v′)⇒ I(c, s, v′)
An event must also be feasible, in a sense that an appropriate new state v′ must
exist for some given current state v:
I(c, s, v) ∧ P (c, s) ∧H(c, s, p, v)⇒ ∃v′ · S(c, s, p, v, v′)
There are also proof obligations to establish deadlock freeness, enabledness condi-
tions and a collection of proof obligations for demonstrating Event-B forward simu-
lation refinement [MAV05].
The traces of Event-B machine M are defined as follows. Let us denote the uni-
verse of machine states as Ω. Then Ω is the set of all safe states of a machine:
Ω = {v | I(v)}. For each machine event e ∈ E consider a relational interpretation
[e]R ⊆ Ω× Ω:
[e]R = {v 7→ v′ | ∃p · (H(v, p) ∧ S(v, p, v′))}
where H, S and p are, respectively, the guard, the body and parameters of event
e. There are two special cases of relational interpretations. The relational form of
initialisation is [INIT]R = id(init) where init ⊆ Ω is the set of initial states for
a machine. The relational form of skip (a stuttering step event of a machine) is
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[skip]R = id(Ω).
Now, consider set Q of finite sequences of event identifiers, Q = P(seq(E)). Us-
ing relational forms of events, one can convert a sequence q ∈ Q into a relation
ψ(q) ⊆ Ω × Ω. Let 〈〉, 〈e〉 and q a t denote, correspondingly, an empty sequence,
a sequence containing event e and a sequence concatenation of q and t; ψ(q) can be
then obtained using the following procedure:
ψ(〈e〉) = [e]R
ψ(q a t) = ψ(q);ψ(t), q 6= ∅ ∧ t 6= ∅
where ; is the relations composition operator: (f ; g)(x) = g(f(x)). Let us consider
now the sequences contained in set Q. Some of them initiate with an event other
than initialisation, and we need to reject such sequences. Also, some sequences may
represent an empty relation, an event ordering that cannot be realised due to restric-
tions expressed in event guards. We define the traces of machine M as those event
sequences that start with initialisation and represent non-empty relations:
TR(M) = {q | q ∈ Q ∧ ∃t · t ∈ Q ∧ q = 〈INIT〉 a t ∧ ψ(q) 6= ∅}
2.1.5 Usage of Event-B in industrial and academic settings
This thesis is mainly based on results of the FP7 DEPLOY research project [DEP].
The overall aim of the project is to improve the development process for dependable
systems by using formal methods. One of the project outcomes relevant to this study
is a number of pilot developments modelled by four industrial partners [D1.1; D2.1;
D3.1; D4.1]. During the pilot developments, Event-B has been used for achieving high
system dependability by applying it in a number of different ways: it has been used
as a development method with heavy use of functional refinement, as a specification
language, and as a requirements engineering tool. Based on that experience, this
work focuses on improving the usage of Event-B as a refinement-based specification
language.
Event-B has a flexible notation which allows developers to express and refine sys-
tem behaviour in various ways. Researchers and industrial practitioners have proposed
a number of approaches to modelling in Event-B depending on the goal of modelling
and the target domain. The original approach in J.-R. Abrial’s models [Abr10] mostly
follows a top-down development of reactive systems, and heavily uses data refinement.
Another refinement technique that is given attention mainly in industry is atom-
icity refinement. In atomicity refinement [FBR12], the abstract event is refined by a
group of concrete events. While all the concrete events represent the abstract state
transition, only one concrete event formally refines the abstract event. The group of
events thus represents a series of transitions which refines the abstract atomic action,
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hence the name. At the concrete level the system becomes sequentially decomposed
which limits the expression of system-level safety properties. The sequential decom-
position of the model has a major influence on further refinements which is discussed
in Chapter 4.
The problem of the semantic gap between the formal expressions of the system and
its context (see Section 2.1.3) also impacts the modelling practices in Event-B. The
properties that the modellers are typically interested in declare relationships between
the system and its environment. Thus, the event guards have to reference system vari-
ables in order to re-establish the invariants. If an event represents the environment,
such a reference in its guards would mean that the environment is aware of the system
state. This is used in [SB11] to model the “tick” event which represents the flow of
time. The event ensures that the system properties hold before advancing the time.
In [But12] the same situation holds for events that represent the environment. The
events representing the physical context refer to the controller state in their guards.
This ensures that the environment changes its state only when the controller has fin-
ished the current control cycle. Such techniques should only be used under explicitly
stated assumptions about the environment and the implementation context. Other-
wise, they may implicitly introduce such assumptions through modelling the system
behaviour. In particular, fault assumptions are essential for specifying system fault
tolerant behaviour which is discussed in the next section.
2.2 Fault Tolerance
Critical systems’ complexity grows along with the societal demand for such systems.
Many systems operate on resources of highest value such as health, lives, time, and
money. We rely on critical systems and thus require developers to apply appropriate
development techniques to ensure safety and efficiency [Kni02]. This essentially means
minimisation of faults contained in the final system.
2.2.1 Definitions and taxonomy
In this work, we follow the terminology and taxonomy of dependable computing
[Avi+04]. Fault is an internal flaw (or an external cause) of a system which re-
sides dormant until certain circumstances arise. When the fault becomes active, it
causes an error, a runtime deviation from a correct system state. An error which
reaches the external interface of the system is considered as a failure of the system
to provide its service. The concepts of error and failure are relative to the hierarchy
under consideration: a failure of an internal component of a system can be considered
as an error within the system.
There are a number of techniques to enhance the system dependability. Fault
11
prevention and fault removal techniques reduce the amount of faults in the product
through enhancing the development process. Rigorous specifications, formal methods,
software verification and testing all target the goal of producing an ideal system that
does not fail.
However, any computer-based system also contains an interface with the physi-
cal world. That interface cannot be ideal due to physical deterioration. Even under
the assumption of running a fault-free software (and especially without such assump-
tion), any system eventually suffers from malfunctioning hardware or unforeseen cir-
cumstances. More generally, any non-deterministic part of the system context may
introduce errors which are out of the system control, such as: physical environment,
human operator mistakes, operating system exceptions, behaviour of the off-the-shelf
components. To mitigate such situations at runtime, developers must introduce re-
dundancy into the system, and fault tolerance [LA90].
Fault tolerance is a term for system mechanisms that are introduced during devel-
opment and are used by the system during runtime to avoid system failure in presence
of faults. Under certain conditions the system cannot provide a full service, and fault
tolerance mechanisms can be used to gracefully degrade system functionality. Fault
tolerance generally includes three phases:
• Error detection. The system must be able to detect that its state or the be-
haviour of its components is abnormal.
• Error recovery (or compensation). When the deviation of the behaviour is
detected, the system performs some action to return to its normal operation.
• Fault treatment. To avoid repetition of the same error, the system can treat the
fault if the cause is found.
The fault tolerance phases and their relationship with the concepts of faults, errors,
and failures are described in [Avi+04].
2.2.2 Realistic systems and fault tolerance
The ultimate purpose of any system is to perform its function. As the complex-
ity increases and additional constraints are enforced by requirements, non-functional
properties become as important as the functional ones. In critical systems, safety
and other dependability properties are major concerns. To improve dependability,
the context of a system has to become wider and include physical phenomena, hard-
ware and other component failures, operator behaviour etc. Any critical system has
to specifically deal with undesired situations to perform its desired function. The
undesired situations constitute an abnormal part of the system behaviour. However,
the concept of “normality” is vague and specific to the system. The border between
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normal and abnormal behaviour is important, however, it is not always feasible to
fully differentiate between the two. For example, a degraded behaviour of a system is
functional but the actual process of degradation is a reaction to abnormal situations
which is a kind of fault tolerance.
Realistic critical systems may contain up to 35-40% of requirements devoted to
fault tolerance. This is supported by our study of the requirements descriptions pro-
duced by deployment partners for the pilot and mini-pilot studies in the DEPLOY
project. The detailed requirements documents for the case studies are largely con-
fidential, but descriptions of the pilots are provided in public deliverables for the
deployment workpackages [D1.1; D2.1; D3.1; D4.1]. Our study of the requirement
documents shows that the major source of faults considered in these systems is the
environment, including sensors, external networks and human operators. Dealing
with software design faults is never stated as a requirement, and only rarely do re-
quirements define hardware faults (e.g. node crashes in a distributed application) and
state how these need to be addressed.
System requirements normally include description of degraded functionality, the
most typical example being system safe stop. More generally, we observe that the re-
quirements predominantly include information about how general system behaviour
is affected by various abnormal situations. Unfortunately, this information is rarely
explicitly stated as a priority requirement (sometimes, we needed to deduce this in-
formation from other requirements).
It has been found that many system requirements use the concept of operational
modes [Dot+09; IRD09] to refer to different operational conditions resulting in differ-
ent functionalities provided by the system. We observe that the description of system
modes and mode transitions is often intertwined with error recovery. For example, at
the system level, modes may represent fault handling through system degradation.
A final observation is that requirements related to error recovery are often not
structured in a way that makes it easy for modellers to work with these issues. The
relevant requirements are typically scattered over the whole requirements document
and refer to issues related to different levels of abstraction. For example, none of the
documents reviewed had a table of fault assumptions.
Dependability of critical systems is indeed a primary concern and significant efforts
are being spent on analysis and improvement of reliability and safety. Nevertheless,
such systems do fail and their failures often lead to major losses. There are several
well-known examples of critical systems’ failures such as: the Ariane 5 launch fail-
ure [Age96], the losses of the Mars Polar Lander [Lab10] and of the Mars Climate
Orbiter [AA99], and the US and Canada Northeast blackout 2003 [For04]. It is not al-
ways possible to identify a single cause of failure in such cases, it typically represents a
combination of engineering and management omissions. For example, it is well-known
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that the initial cause of the Ariane 5 failure was a software bug: one of the software
components, the Inertial Reference System (IRS), produced an exception which led
to termination of an important piece of control software. However, the IRS software
was reused from Ariane 4 for which it was tested to work correctly. The impact of
the change of both physical and software environment on the operation of IRS was
not checked rigorously in the new system. This is a clear example of poor reasoning
about environment assumptions. The final trigger for the failure was the error recov-
ery action that shut down both the main IRS component and its duplicate due to
exceptions. The primary cause of such an omission was an incomplete definition of
fault assumptions: the error recovery procedures focused mainly on hardware failures,
and the IRS component was treated as a piece of hardware. The implicit assump-
tion in this case was that the IRS control software always produces correct output,
and hot-swapping is a sufficient recovery action. Absence of design faults in software
which is developed using traditional methods is an unrealistic fault assumption. The
fault tolerance mechanism based on such an invalid assumption led to propagation of
the error and eventually to a system failure.
Various fault tolerance techniques are used nowadays in highly dependable systems
at all levels of operation. In hardware, many techniques are based on hardware
redundancy for fault masking. That is, critical subsystems are built using a number
of spare components and a voting mechanism that together provide a single function.
The well-known example is a Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [LV62] which is
built from three replicated active components and ensures fault masking by a voter.
A more general design is called N-modular redundancy (NMR) which can tolerate
(N−1)/2 module faults during the majority voting. These approaches are considered
as static redundancy; no action is performed upon detecting an error as the error is
masked before reaching any other component. A complementary class of techniques
includes dynamic hardware redundancy. These are used primarily in applications that
can operate while receiving temporary erroneous results from hardware components.
For example, duplication with comparison is an error detection mechanism; it uses two
identical modules and a comparison mechanism. It always produces an output from
one of the modules, be it correct or not, and a result of comparing the outputs of the
two modules. The comparison result is then used by a higher-level logic for further
recovery. There are also techniques that involve local reconfiguration of a component
such as hot standby sparing, cold standby sparing, and pair-and-a-spare. With dynamic
redundancy approaches, the reconfiguration process usually takes some time during
which the component is not available or produces erroneous output. These static
and dynamic redundancy techniques are often composed to achieve certain levels of
reliability cost-effectively.
The primary causes of hardware faults are physical deterioration and external
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interference, whereas the primary faults in software are design faults due to design
complexity [Kni12]. In software, fault tolerance is present to some degree in every
application written using a modern programming language. Exception handling and
the principle of defensive programming form a common practice today. Nevertheless,
it is not sufficient in many safety- and mission-critical applications. A well-known
technique of N-version programming (NVP) is used in complex and/or critical appli-
cations to tackle design faults. In NVP, a number of different teams of developers are
given the same specification to implement their “version” of software [Avi85]. All of
these versions are then deployed in a single component of the system in a way similar
to hardware modules. That is, they run simultaneously and vote on the output (NVP)
or active sparing techniques could be used (recovery blocks). Most often, software is
built using existing libraries, so called off-the-shelf components (COTS). Additional
measures are typically used to ensure the overall dependability of the critical software
when using COTS. COTS wrappers [Pop+01] is the most popular fault tolerance
technique that is given significant attention in research. In the distributed computing
area, which includes business applications and high-throughput computing, there are
solutions for tolerating byzantine faults.
Software fault tolerance has been traditionally an iterative engineering process.
It is usually developed using the same principles as is the software performing the
main functionality of systems. This means that it is susceptible to the same types of
mistakes and, therefore, may contain faults. There is a need for methods and tools for
development of highly dependable systems that would facilitate rigorous development
of fault tolerance and help identify and eliminate faults during design.
2.2.3 Fault analysis and formal modelling of fault tolerance
To adequately handle the abnormal situations and improve dependability properties of
a system, possible faults and failures must be specified and taken into account during
design. There are a number of fault analysis techniques that are used by engineers in
industry to achieve this.
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is an inductive technique for safety
analysis [FMIC; FMTR; Sto96]. It is a development procedure for analysis of potential
failure modes of a system by listing their severity, probabilities, and effects. Failure
mode is a general term for capturing possible faults, errors, and system failures. The
technique is informal, it represents a part of the development process which helps
engineers organise their expectations of the system failure modes and effects based on
their previous experience. The technique mainly targets failure modes of individual
components and their impact on the system behaviour.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is another technique used in safety and reliability en-
gineering [Ves81]. It is a deductive top down method in which a system failure or
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another abnormal state is analysed into its low-level causes by using boolean logic.
Given the probabilities of low-level errors (e.g. component failures), the likelihood
of a target system failure can be estimated. Fault trees are used at various stages
of development process from design to maintenance. The process of creating a fault
tree is also informal and is based on engineer’s experience in a specific domain. FTA
targets system and component failures at higher levels and allows for analysis into
lower-level component errors.
In both FMEA and FTA it is an engineer who informally chooses which system fail-
ures need to be analysed. Such information can be also synthesised from the domain
knowledge and a model of how system components are interrelated and communicate
with the system context [McK+05; LGP11]. Hierarchically Performed Hazard Ori-
gin and Propagation Studies (HiPHOPS) [Pap+11] is an example of a model-based
method for semi-automatic safety and reliability analysis. It allows developers to gen-
erate fault trees and FMEA tables based on a model of system architecture expressed
in terms of components and material and data transfers. Such models provide useful
information for the identification of error propagation paths that lead to system fail-
ures, and play an important role in the system design process. Cecilia OCAS [Bie+04]
is another example of a model-based safety assessment framework that is capable of
generating FMEA tables and fault trees from an architectural model. It is based on
the AltaRica [Alt] language and is being used at an industrial level for architectural
safety assessment of avionics systems.
Safety and reliability analysis is necessary for making design decisions during sys-
tem development. As a part of specification, design, and possibly implementation,
formal model of a system typically represents the decisions which were made based
on safety and reliability analysis. Both during fault analysis and formal modelling,
fault assumptions play the key role in defining the resulting behaviour and system
properties [LA90; HJJ03]. A system is designed to perform its function within a
certain environment. Thus, the estimation of the system dependability relies on the
understanding of the environment and assumptions about uncontrolled phenomena.
Wrong assumptions can lead to malfunctioning and unsafe systems which are still
formally correct. Therefore, it is crucial to explicitly define fault assumptions upon
which fault tolerance is modelled and then implemented in the system.
There are a number of studies on formal modelling of fault tolerance. Some re-
search is done on extending original semantics of formal methods with additional fault
tolerance modelling constructs. An example of such an approach is an extension of the
Lustre data flow language for modelling faults and error propagation paths [JH07].
The extended LustreFM language allows developers to specify possible faults of a
component and different aspects of fault activation such as triggers, durations, con-
ditional activations, and error propagation rules. The authors envision the process of
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safety analysis by using libraries of domain-specific fault model components that can
be specialised for a particular system fault model. A similar approach to specifying
error causality on top of functional models is taken in works on FPTN[FM92] and
FSAP/NuSMV-SA[BV07]. A notable work on extending normal system behaviour
with fault tolerance is described in [Jef+09]. Authors introduce a notion of partial
refinement defined for state machines and use it to formally connect the normal be-
haviour of a system with the fault tolerant one.
There are numerous works on extending process-based formal methods such as
CSP with additional formal constructs for modelling fault tolerant behaviour. One
example could be the Peleska’s method for verification of fault tolerant systems with
CSP [Pel91]. It provides algebraic and assertional techniques and is used in parallel
with top-down design of FT systems. Other studies on extending CSP with FT-
oriented semantics include an improved failures model [BR85] and message recovery
techniques for CSP [Jal89].
Another class of FT modelling techniques include patterns and modelling styles
for modelling fault tolerance in specific formalisms without extending their semantics.
An example of such an approach is [LT04b] which provides a guidance to modelling
fault tolerant control system in B. The authors focus on failsafe systems which can be
safely stopped at any moment of time. The approach starts with an abstract general
specification which is applicable to any failsafe control system. During refinement,
system components are introduced and their failures are associated with the abstract
safe stop. Error detection is paid significant attention as this is the phase where actual
difference between normal and abnormal states is defined. The approach follows a
typical control system design by modelling a control cycle consisting of the sensing,
control, and acting phases. During sensing, errors can be detected and are classified
into recoverable and non-recoverable types. In case when an error leads to a failure,
the control operation is skipped and the system is stopped. A recoverable error is
masked by one of the redundancy techniques, and the control operation continues.
Thus, the functionality of the system is always provided under the assumption of
fault-free components. The assumptions used in the approach limit its applicability.
The approach is adequate for modelling low-level component failures that may be
masked, but it is not designed for specification of graceful degradation and system-
level recovery procedures.
A pattern for modelling fault tolerance in B is proposed in [LT04a]. The paper
introduces a general formal specification pattern to be applied in development of de-
pendable systems with a layered architecture. The pattern adds exception handling
mechanism to each system layer and organizes communication between components
within a hierarchical structure by means of exceptions. The layered exception hierar-
chy pattern is based on top-down refinement. The pattern follows the idea of idealised
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fault tolerant component (IFTC) introduced in [LA90]. The IFTC is a generic com-
ponent which explicitly differentiates between its normal and abnormal operation,
and specifies the conditions under which it switches between the two. The system is
thus constructed as hierarchical layers of IFTCs. Each component can handle certain
exceptions, and it propagates the unhandled exceptions to the abnormal part of its
higher-level component. The idea of IFTC implies sequential composition of compo-
nent executions, and its application may undermine the ability to express system-level
safety properties for some proof-based methods. Although the present work focuses on
refinement-based development of reactive systems, we borrow the ideas of top-down
system structuring and explicitness of system abnormal operation.
2.3 Views
Upon deployment, a computer-based system is required to perform its function, pro-
vide a certain level of availability and reliability, operate safely, and maintain other
properties. The necessary properties of the system are defined by its requirements
during early stages of development. Requirements typically cross-cut the system func-
tionality, thus, developers need to create a solution which satisfies all of them. Some
aspects of the system can be “kept in mind” through informal notes and experience,
e.g. maintainability and performance requirements to a software product are typically
met through an engineering effort by architects and software developers who have ex-
perience in low-level programming. When building critical systems, dependability
aspects become the most important properties of the final system, and “keeping in
mind” is insufficient to achieve high levels of safety and reliability. Besides, the de-
velopment process and/or the final system can be required by a certification body to
pass strict tests and comply to safety standards.
To address the problem of cross-cutting requirements and development issues,
there are numerous works on their separation at different development phases. IEEE
1471 standard [S1471] describes a general framework for architectural description of
software-intensive systems. In the standard, different aspects of development and
system requirements are called concerns. Each concern is a reflection of interests of a
particular stakeholder. A concern is represented in architecture by a viewpoint which
can be related to other viewpoints and has a specific impact on the overall system
architecture. A view is an instance of a viewpoint for a specific system under con-
struction. The standard advocates an explicit separation of concerns through a set
of documents (views) to enable specialists (stakeholders) to concentrate on specific
problems in their area of knowledge. The ViewPoints approach [FKG90] is similar
in its ideas of using multiple viewpoints at all stages of software development. The
ViewPoints tool maintains the viewpoints consistency using distributed graph trans-
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formations [Goe+00].
A similar approach can be found in architecture description languages. Authors
of [DR+10] describe a framework for semantic extension and MDE-based customisa-
tion of architecture description languages (ADLs) to address concerns defined for a
particular project. Another example is the widely-used AADL [AADL]. It contains a
language for architectural description of functionality and an additional error model
annex (viewpoint) that supports fault/reliability modelling and hazard analysis.
UML [Amb04] offers facilities to model various aspects of a software product as
separate diagrams. Each diagram is specifically designed to represent a certain concern
of a developer. For example, use-case diagrams represent the specification of a system
from the point of view of a user. Activity and state machine diagrams are behavioural
descriptions. Class diagrams are tailored to object-oriented design of the system.
Deployment diagram reflects the concern of hardware configurations during software
deployment, etc. The main benefit of having separate diagrams in UML comes from
their explicitness. They are used mainly for documentation and information exchange
within the development team. Some of the diagrams related to object-oriented design
and software behaviour can be used for code generation.
In formal methods, the separation of concerns is also given significant attention.
An example of a formal approach to the separation of concerns is shown in the Rosetta
framework [AKS01; KA03]. The authors show how to formally accommodate and
develop different views (facets) of the same system expressed using different com-
putational models in a consistent manner. Another work on model views [Jac95]
gives a formal technique for partial specifications in Z. The work encourages multiple
representations of the program state for separating different aspects of functionality.
The views are then composed into a single model through cross-view invariants and
common operations. Authors of [DW06] propose a solution to the consistency prob-
lem between multiple view via model transformations. The paper introduces a proof
technique that allows a developer to reason at a view level about cross-view model
transformations. There are also some works on separation between functional and
error models. A work on LustreFM framework [JH07] offers a solution for separating
the fault model from the functional model. The fault model is used for safety analysis
and is composed at later stage with the nominal one. A similar goal of error modelling
is achieved at the architecture level using the AADL error model annex mentioned
previously [AADL].
The discussed multi-view development approaches, especially the ones designed for
architecture and design levels, are widely used by industry. This highlights the claimed
benefits of incorporating multiple viewpoints in a development process. Namely, sepa-
rate viewpoints may provide explicitness and means for separation of responsibilities,
improve documentation, and increase the overall quality of the products.
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2.4 Problem Statement
As we showed throughout the chapter, the formal methods today are being success-
fully used for developing dependable systems, and there is significant research being
done to improve the applicability of the methods. A major obstacle to wider adoption
of formal methods remains the conservatism of engineering practices. The main argu-
ments against using formal methods today are the lack of formal modelling training
offered to industry users, and hence insufficient experience, and substantial efforts
during formal modelling. Both of the problems can be addressed by providing guide-
lines to top-down development of critical systems. The engineers need support during
the modelling process as well as during refinement planning. The effective guidelines
must cover both of these activities: they shall provide practical modelling solutions
that give specific design recipes, modelling patterns, and guide during refinement
planning which is crucial for minimising proof efforts. We believe it is possible to
define such guidelines, this is reflected by Hypothesis 3 in Section 1.2.
The problem of a semantic gap between specifications of a system and its envi-
ronment needs to be taken into account during modelling. It is possible to introduce
implicit assumptions about an environment while developing its abstraction. Since a
system specification obtained via formal modelling is only correct with respect to the
stated assumptions, there is a need for additional guidelines to adequately represent
environments in system models.
Another problem of some of the current modelling solutions is that they may hinder
the expression of the system-level safety properties. To overcome this, engineers need
a set of explicit modelling principles that are oriented on using the original strength of
formal methods without harnessing its applicability. In the context of fault tolerant
systems, it means that the guidelines for modelling fault tolerance must maintain the
original applicability of the formal method to modelling of functionality. We state
this with respect to Event-B in Hypothesis 4.
We showed in this chapter that ensuring dependability properties of critical sys-
tems is given a high priority in research. Although many analysis techniques exist
for revealing faults and error propagation paths in hardware architectures, formal
top-down development of high-level fault tolerance is given little attention in prac-
tice. The techniques discussed do not provide means for smooth integration of fault
tolerance and functional behaviour during formal refinement. Specifically, such fault
tolerance mechanisms as graceful degradation and system-level recovery procedures
comprise an inherent part of an abstract system behaviour. Existing fault tolerance
modelling approaches treat such kind of fault tolerance as a system-specific function-
ality and leave the modelling to users. A solution to effective fault tolerance modelling
may be a dedicated language integrated with functional modelling. However, current
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approaches to multi-view specifications are typically informal and/or are designed
for an iterative code-and-test development process. This makes their application to
well-established refinement-based formal methods difficult in regard to fault toler-
ance modelling. A dedicated formal language for modelling of fault tolerance would
validate our Hypotheses 1 and 2 stated in Section 1.2.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we provided a background on the three major areas or research that
are relevant to the topic of the thesis. We showed that despite the increasing usage
of formal methods, there are still major obstacles such as the lack of experience in
formal modelling by engineers and significant efforts during modelling. Another topics
that we covered include existing approaches to modelling fault tolerance and current
research on multi-view development.
Finally, we have identified the key state-of-art problems that we address in this
study by proposing a top-down method for developing critical systems which seam-
lessly integrates formal modelling of functional and fault tolerant behaviour.
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Chapter 3. Modal and Fault Tolerance Views
This chapter presents a modelling environment for constructing modal and fault tol-
erant behaviour of systems. The environment provides facilities for creating formally
defined views on Event-B models and provides consistency conditions between views
and models.
We give an overview and basic definitions of the modelling language in Section 3.1.
Then we introduce the rules of construction and top-down development of views in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 correspondingly. We present the formal consistency conditions
between the views and Event-B in Section 3.4. Then we conclude and discuss some
limitations of the approach in Section 3.5.
A practical application of the views is demonstrated throughout Chapter 4 as a
part of the proposed method: Section 4.5.4 introduces a number of modelling tem-
plates and Section 4.6.3 shows the usage of the proposed Modal Views approach at
one of the method steps.
3.1 Overview and Definitions
During early stages of the DEPLOY project [DEP] it was recognised [IRD09; Dot+09]
that many challenging developments deal with dynamic system reconfiguration. Such
models typically describe several “stable” phases of system behaviour and some ac-
tivities that lead from one phase to another. In requirements, such phases, or modes,
are often used to describe system behaviour in regard to environmental conditions,
component errors, and system fault tolerance [D1.1; D2.1; D3.1; D4.1]. Such an ob-
servation has led to the design and implementation of the Modal and Fault Tolerance
Views modelling language [WIFT; Dot+09; IRD09; LIR10]. The language provides
an additional viewpoint introduced into the formal development process that is used
to define modal and fault tolerant system behaviour.
The approach presented in this thesis builds on the initial idea of modal specifi-
cations of systems [Dot+09]. We provide a practical application and implementation
of the idea, and extend the original approach to modelling fault tolerant behaviour of
systems.
The language extends the Event-B modelling notation with a superstructure de-
scribing system modes and transitions between modes. It employs a simple visual
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notation based on modecharts [JM94; MR98]. The graphical document, called a
modal/fault tolerance view of a system, co-exists with an Event-B machine; the two
define differing viewpoints on the same design. A modal view has a formal semantics
(proof semantics and operational semantics [Dot+09]) from which a set of consis-
tency and refinement conditions are derived. These demonstrate that a modal view
and the corresponding Event-B machine are in a formal agreement. The approach
is supported by a Modal and Fault Tolerance Views plug-in [WIFT] for the Rodin
development environment [ROD].
A mode in a modal view is an island of relatively stable system behaviour. Within
a mode a system still evolves but within far stronger limits than the safety invariant
of an Event-B machine. Such limits are defined by a pair of assumption and guarantee
predicates. The assumption predicate is normally interpreted as a set of conditions
under which a system is able to stay in the mode; the guarantee describes what
the system is doing while in the mode. The guarantee is a before-after predicate:
it references both current and next states. Modes are related via mode transitions;
these are also characterised formally and, in this respect, are similar to Event-B events.
There are three types of modal transitions:
• Normal transitions represent functional reconfigurations of a system.
• Error transitions define changes of system behaviour in response to errors.
• Recovery transitions finalise the system recovery by returning it to normal op-
eration.
Error and recovery transitions are special kinds of fault tolerance transitions. There
are additional structural and refinement constraints on the usage of FT transitions.
The state model of a view is borrowed from an Event-B machine. The central
feature of the method is a step-wise refinement of modal views along with the process
of Event-B refinement. When a machine is refined, a developer also needs to refine the
modal view to reflect the changes in the machine (or state view). There are a number
of refinement laws describing possible ways of refining a modal view; in practice, these
give rise to a number of templates offered to a developer.
3.2 Views Construction
The building blocks of a modal view are modes and transitions. A view must contain
a single start mode and one or more regular modes. There is no explicit stop mode
defined in the modal views language. In the method, we represent stop as a normal
mode with stuttering behaviour, i.e. a livelock (self-loop) which does not change
the system state. A system switches between modes via directed mode transitions.
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Mode1
error1
Rec
Mode2 Deg2
recovery1
trans1 error2
Deg3
error3
Figure 3.1: Example of a modal view
Transitions are of three types as described previously. The initial transitions from the
start mode must be normal. All modes must be reachable from the start mode through
some transition path. These construction rules represent syntax-level consistency
conditions that are checked by the tool during modelling.
An example of a modal view is shown in Figure 3.1. The start mode is represented
by a circle, and regular modes are represented by named rectangles. The solid arrows
depict the normal transitions (e.g., the initial transition and trans1), the dashed
arrows are the error transitions (e.g. error1, error2, and error3), and dashed arrows
starting with a filled circle represent the recovery transitions (e.g. recovery1).
The special fault tolerance types of modal transitions define different types of
modes. We differentiate modes by the types of transitions which are linked to them.
There are three types of modes that we define:
• Normal modes typically depict a stable functioning of a system when it is fully
operational.
• A degraded mode is used to describe the system behaviour under certain unre-
coverable errors when the system can still perform some part of its functionality.
There must be an error transition leading to this type of mode, but no outgoing
recovery transition.
• A recovery mode represents the means of a system to recover from particular
errors. A recovery mode is different from a degraded mode in that it has at
least one outgoing recovery transition which returns the system to its normal
operation.
For example, mode Rec from Figure 3.1 is considered to be a recovery mode
because it can recover the system from an error represented by error1. Modes Mode1
and Mode2 are normal modes, they are connected by a normal transition. Modes
Deg2 and Deg3 are degraded: only errors lead to these modes, and recovery back to
normal operation is not possible. Note that mode Deg2 has two roles: it is degraded
relative to error transition error2, and it is normal relative to transition error3.
We use the fault tolerance types of transitions to enforce fault tolerance related
constraints on the construction of views. We require that at each level of modelling
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there must be no cycles made of error transitions. More specifically, for each mode,
if there is an error leading to some other mode and there exists a path back to the
initial mode, then that path must contain a recovery transition. Thus, one should be
able to differentiate normal from abnormal modes relative to a specific mode. E.g.,
a hypothetical transition error4 from mode Deg3 to mode Mode2 would make the
view in Figure 3.1 invalid as there would be a cycle fully made of error transitions
(error2-error3-error4). That would mean that the system could switch between the
three modes upon detection of certain errors indefinitely. Such a behaviour could not
be given a comprehensible meaning.
Besides the structural rules given in this section, there are also formal consistency
conditions described in Section 3.4.
3.3 Views Refinement
Once a modal view is in place for a particular Event-B model, it can be further re-
fined to represent changes made in successive Event-B refinement. The modal views
development process is a tree of documents much like Event-B development. There
should be no confusion between two types of refinement: a mode can only refine
another mode, and an Event-B model can only refine another Event-B model. The
view refinement process forms a tree of modal views associated with a tree of Event-B
machines (Figure 3.2).
Mi
Mi+1
Viewi
Viewi+1
Event-B refinement Modal/FT Views refinement
proof obligations
Figure 3.2: Modal views development chain
A view can refine at most one abstract view, and can be associated with at most
one model. However, the same Event-B model can be linked with any number of views,
and will have proof obligations generated for each of the linked views. Therefore,
there can be more than one view trees attached to the main Event-B development. A
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modal view could also be abstract enough to represent a number of different systems.
The models of the systems would then be associated with equivalent views. On
the other hand, it is not mandatory to create a view for each model: a view is a
modal representation of the system, and mode refinement can be skipped for those
models that do not refine the system modal behaviour. We informally describe the
view refinement process in the next two subsections devoted to mode refinement and
transition refinement correspondingly.
3.3.1 Mode refinement rules
Each concrete mode must refine an abstract mode from an abstract view. Each
abstract mode must be refined by at least one concrete mode; it can be a one-to-
one mapping, however, the concrete mode must be expressed using the refined model
variables (see Section 3.4).
Figure 3.3 shows an example of a refinement step performed over the modal view
shown in Figure 3.1. For simplicity, only two modes Mode1 and Deg2 are refined.
Abstract mode Mode1 (shown in a dashed rectangle) is refined into three sub-modes
connected by normal transitions. Abstract degraded mode Deg2 is refined into two
sub-modes.
error1
Rec
Mode2 Deg2_1
recovery1
trans1 error2_1
Deg3
error3
Mode1_1 Mode1_2
Mode1_3
Mode1 Deg2
Deg2_2error2_2
Figure 3.3: Example of a modal view refinement
Whenever an abstract mode is refined into two or more concrete modes, each of
the concrete modes depicts a more detailed and typically more deterministic part of
functionality. This is ensured by the formal conditions of refinement described in
Section 3.4.
3.3.2 Transition refinement rules
Each new transition has to refine either an abstract transition or an internal behaviour
of an abstract mode. In the first case, a transition has to connect two concrete
modes which refine two different abstract modes. The transition has to have the same
26
direction as the abstract transition. In this case, a concrete transition directly refines
an abstract transition. In Figure 3.3, error transitions error2 1 and error2 2 directly
refine abstract transition error2: they connect the concrete versions of abstract modes
Mode2 and Deg2 and maintain the direction of transition. Another example is error3
which essentially depicts two transitions from Deg2 1 and Deg2 2, and is shown to
originate from the group of the two concrete modes.
In the second refinement case, a transition can connect two concrete modes which
refine the same abstract mode. Such a transition did not exist on the abstract level
and is a refinement of the internal behaviour of an abstract mode. As an example,
abstract mode Mode1 is refined into three sub-modes. There are three (unnamed)
transitions which refine the internal behaviour of the abstract mode and become the
three explicit transitions between the concrete modes.
It is a requirement that the concrete transitions belong to either one of the two
types. We express such a requirement by the following rule: when concrete modes
are projected onto their abstract counterparts, every transition must either project
onto the internal behaviour of a mode or onto an explicitly defined transition with
the same direction.
A fault tolerance transition can be only refined by a fault tolerance transition
of the same type. This is demonstrated in the example by transitions error2 1 and
error2 2. A regular mode transition can be refined by a more specific fault tolerance
transition, but the opposite (generalisation) is not allowed.
3.4 Formalisation
The intention for the modal viewpoint is to offer a modelling assistant environment
to Event-B developers. For the approach to be useful, there needs to be a formal
relationship between a view and an Event-B model establishing that a model agrees
with a view. Thus, a modal view alone would be enough to grasp the design of modal
and fault tolerant behaviour in a model.
The formalisation approach is based on a more general notion of formal modal
systems [IRD09]. There is a study on linking modal views and Event-B [Dot+09]. The
consistency conditions discussed in this section maintain the original modal semantics
and provide developers with a practical set of proof obligations.
3.4.1 Well-definedness conditions
Mode is a general characterisation of a system behaviour. To match this notion in
terms of Event-B models, all modes and transitions are mapped into event groups.
For a stronger notion of a view - model relationship, we consider an FT view as a
set of modes providing different functionality under differing operating conditions. We
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use the terms assumption to denote the different operating conditions and guarantee to
denote the functionality ensured by the system under the corresponding assumption.
With assumption and guarantee of a mode being predicates expressed on the same
variables as an Event-B machine, we are able to impose restrictions on the way modes
and transitions are mapped into model events and thus cross-check design decisions
in either part.
Formally, a mode is characterised by a pair A/G where:
• A(v) is an assumption - a predicate over the current system state;
• G(v, v′) is the guarantee, a relation over the current and next states of the
system; and
• vector v is the set of model variables.
It is required to show that the assumptions exhaust the invariant and thus cover
all the safe system states:
I(v)⇒ A1 ∨ A2 ∨ · · · ∨ An (COVER)
Here I(v) is a model invariant characterising valid states of v.
One other important property of a mode is that it is possible for some state
transition to take place within a mode. We do not need here to give a precise definition
of such transition because this information would be later filled in by an Event-B
machine. It is only necessary to show that there exists at least one such transition
and thus mode characterisation makes sense:
∃v, v′ · I(v) ∧ A(v)⇒ G(v, v′) (FIS)
Thus, G can never be false everywhere while, under certain circumstances, this would
be allowed for A. Note that from above it follows that a mode assumption is satisfiable:
∃v · A(v).
Each internal state transition must also preserve the machine invariant. For all
the events, such condition is satisfied by Event-B proof obligations. Being a gener-
alisation over a particular part of the machine behaviour, each mode has to preserve
the invariant as well:
I(v) ∧ A(v) ∧G(v, v′)⇒ I(v′) (INV)
In addition to modes, a view also includes transitions. Their purpose is to define
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possible mode changes. A system switches from one mode into another through a
mode transition that non-deterministically updates the state of v in such a way that
the assumption of the source mode becomes false while the assumption of the target
mode becomes true. Let us consider two modes, i and j. A mode transition is
required to establish a new state v′ such that ¬Ai(v′) and Aj(v′), and it is not under
the obligation to respect Gi(v, v
′).
It is required that all the modes are reachable. Although we could give a formal
test for this property, there is no need in additional proof obligation - such condition
is checked by the tool at the syntax level as mentioned in Section 3.2.
3.4.2 Event-B consistency conditions
With the basic formal framework of modes in place, it is possible to define consistency
conditions for a modal view and an Event-B machine. The core principle is seeing the
view as a source of further proof obligations for a machine. We do not translate modes
into Event-B or Event-B into modes. Instead, we add additional proof obligations to
a machine that establish the consistency with a given FT view. Formally, it does
not matter where the proof obligations are added - we could prove that a machine
is consistent with a view by adding theorems to views. It is, however, more natural
to deal with additional constraints in a machine, and the intuition is that a simpler
view should lead the development of a machine. As mentioned in Section 3.3, one can
prove that the same machine is consistent with more than one view.
One can also treat the resulting Event-B model as a composition of an original
Event-B model and a view. In this respect, it is related to Event-B A, B, and in-
terface types of decomposition [Hoa+11]. With Event-B (de)composition techniques,
one horizontally splits a model into two or more models to reduce proof efforts and
improve collaborative modelling. The current approach is different from existing de-
composition techniques in that it provides orthogonal models (views) that represent
the same system-level behaviour from different “angles” as opposed to component-
wise decomposition of behaviour. Thus, a model and a view “contain” each other
through formal consistency.
The first step to formally establishing such consistency is to relate modes and
transitions to machine elements. A view is linked with an Event-B model by attribut-
ing a list of Event-B model events to each mode and each transition:
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A1/G1 7→ E1
A2/G2 7→ E2
. . .
An/Gn 7→ En
Trans1 7→ En+1
. . .
T ransk 7→ En+k
The events which are mapped to a mode represent the internal state transitions that
may occur while the system is in that mode. Each such event must preserve the
mode guarantee and re-establish the mode assumption. The events mapped to a
transition represent different ways in which the transition may happen. Unlike modes,
the transitions are instantaneous. Thus, only one of the associated events fires while
making the transition. Therefore, every event of a transition must establish the target
mode assumption and falsify the source mode assumption as discussed earlier. Since
the same event may be associated with both a mode and more than one outgoing
transitions, the following proof obligation contains a disjunction of both conditions in
its goal:
I(v) ∧A(v) ∧H(v) ∧ S(v, v′) =⇒ [A(v′) ∧G(v, v′)] ∨ [¬A(v′) ∧ (A1(v′) ∨ . . . An(v′))]
(EVT G)
where H(v) is an event guard, S(v, v′) is an event action, A(v′)/G(v, v′) is the source
mode, A1(v
′) . . . An(v′) are the target modes of a transition. The first disjunct is only
present in the obligation if the event is mapped to a mode. The second disjunct
enables one of the target modes assumptions if the event is mapped to a transition.
The ability to map an event to many modes and transitions is the difference from
the original approach to modal specifications [Dot+09]. Although this distinction
can dramatically weaken the proof obligations if overused, we allow such mapping for
practical purposes. It allows for modelling modal features of systems at abstract levels
where models typically contain non-deterministic events. Nevertheless, we assume and
suggest that system models become more deterministic during refinement, and proof
obligations generated from FT views at later refinement steps become stronger.
The next proof obligation that we describe states that the execution cannot
progress if there is no suitable enabled event for a mode or a transition. It follows that
the partitioning of the events into modes and transitions must be in agreement with
the event guards. When an event is enabled then the assumption of its mode must
hold. The same applies to a transition: the assumption of a source mode must hold
when a transition event is enabled. Since an event can be associated with multiple
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modes and transitions, the disjunction of all the relevant assumptions must hold:
I(v) ∧H(v) =⇒ A1(v) ∨ · · · ∨ Ak(v) ∨ Atr1 ∨ · · · ∨ Atrn (EVT A)
where A1 − Ak are assumptions of the modes associated with the event, Atr1 − Atrn
are assumptions of the modes of which outgoing transitions are associated with the
event.
The requirement of execution progress also implies that at least one of the events
associated with a mode must be enabled when the system is in that mode:
I(v) ∧ A(v) =⇒ H1(v) ∨ · · · ∨Hk(v) (ENBL)
where H1(v) . . . Hk(v) are the guards of the associated events.
3.4.3 Modal views refinement conditions
Refinement rules discussed previously in Section 3.3 are complemented with additional
formal requirements. There are two proof obligations for each mode at each refinement
step. The first obligation states that the assumptions of the concrete modes must be
weaker than the abstract one:
J(v, u) ∧ A(v) =⇒ A1(u) ∧ · · · ∧ Ak(u) (REF A)
where J(v, u) is the gluing invariant containing the relation between the abstract
and concrete state variables v and u correspondingly, A(v) is the assumption of the
abstract mode, A1(u) . . . Ak(u) are the assumptions of the concrete modes.
The second obligation requires that the guarantees of the concrete modes must be
stronger than the abstract one:
J(v, u) ∧ (G1(u, u′) ∨ · · · ∨Gk(u, u′)) =⇒ G(v, v′) (REF G)
where J(v, u) is the gluing invariant, G1(u, u
′) . . . Gk(u, u′) are the guarantees of the
concrete modes, G(v, v′) is the guarantee of the abstract mode.
The understanding behind the proof obligations is that during refinement we widen
the system operating conditions by weakening the assumptions, and make its be-
haviour more deterministic by strengthening the guarantees [Dot+09].
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3.5 Conclusions and Limitations
The modal views approach is implemented as a plug-in for the industry-strength
development environment Rodin [ROD] which is based on an open extension plat-
form Eclipse [ECL]. The tool provides a view editor and seamless integration with
the Event-B development extensions such as the project explorer and the proof obli-
gation generator. The tool automatically generates verification conditions that are
necessary to ensure that a given modal view is sound and consistent with an Event-B
machine. A number of case studies have been developed using the tool to ascertain
the scalability of the method and the implementation [WIFT; LIR10]. This work
includes two industrial case studies described in the next chapters of this work.
One outcome of the experience with this environment (and the supporting tools) is
that it is generally beneficial to stratify a design into aspects, or views. This permits
a far more focused analysis and discussion of properties pertinent to a given view and
a more explicit connection to any requirements about modal and/or fault tolerance
properties.
The modal viewpoint brings benefits of explicitness and simplicity to non-formal
engineers in industry. It provides an additional type of documents which can be used
by requirements analysts and system engineers.
One of the main benefits of using the modal viewpoint is extra assurance in the
final system behaviour. The views represent an additional source of behaviour defini-
tions (along with behavioural part of the system model and safety properties) which
helps in eliminating possible mistakes and omissions. The modal views approach fol-
lows the top-down formal refinement development thus supporting the main formal
development. The views are a flexible solution for expressing orthogonal aspects of a
system which are formally consistent.
Being a positive outcome of modal views, formal consistency also requires addi-
tional proof efforts from developers. On average, the usage of modal views doubles
the number of proof obligations for those models which have one associated view. The
proportion of automatically proved obligations is approximately equal to that of the
original Event-B obligations. The complexity of those proof obligations that require
interactive proof is also similar to the original Event-B proof obligations. However,
complex views which have modes associated with large overlapping sets of events can
generate complex EVT A and ENBL proof obligations. This may be an indirect indi-
cation that the modal views are used at a very detailed level and should be simplified
(abstracted).
The possible applications of modal views are limited by their semantics. A mode
represents a possibly non-terminating behaviour, and therefore, liveness properties
cannot be expressed with a modal view. Also since a single view covers the whole sys-
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tem behaviour, it is unreasonable to create modal views for a sequentially decomposed
system. The proposed method described in the next chapter benefits from using the
modal viewpoint for modelling reactive behaviour of systems and leaves the sequential
decomposition until later steps.
From an engineering perspective, the modal viewpoint is a flexible solution which
requires engineering decisions and experience. However, it lacks modelling guidelines
and usage patterns. The development method proposed in this thesis uses modal
views as additional restrictions to the main modelling process. We provide a number
of templates and define a development step for using the modal language.
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Chapter 4. Development Method
In this chapter, we describe a method for top-down development of fault tolerant
systems with a focus on abstract levels of modelling. The method addresses a number
of issues of the state-of-the-art approaches that are described in Chapter 2 and is
designed to fill the existing gap in modelling and verification of abstract fault tolerant
behaviour.
The development method includes the following three constituents:
• the modelling principles stating the key points for modelling fault tolerant sys-
tems in refinement-based methods,
• the refinement strategy defining a sequence of refinement steps that need to be
performed to arrive at a meaningful model of a fault tolerant system, and
• a set of modelling patterns and modal view templates that provide a reuse mech-
anism during modelling.
The three constituents together represent modelling guidelines for building fault tol-
erant systems in refinement-based formal methods in a systematic way.
The method is designed for modelling labelled transition systems. In our method,
a system is composed of a set of states, a set of initial states, and a set of labelled
transitions between states. Each transition is a partial relation over the set of states.
The domain of a transition is defined by a domain restriction presented as a predicate.
The set of states is partitioned using variables. The method specifies particular steps
that need to be performed over the state transition system to adequately represent
the system environment and correctly model the system fault tolerant behaviour. The
guidelines proposed in this chapter can be applied during modelling in any state-based
formal method with interleaving semantics such as Action Systems [BS89], B [Abr96],
Event-B [Abr10], Z [WD96], VDM [Jon90], and TLA [Lam94].
The method consists of two parts. The first part is applicable to top-down de-
velopment of fault tolerant systems in any problem domain. It produces a reactive
system model [Ace+07] satisfying the required safety properties, and focuses on ab-
stract modelling of fault tolerant behaviour as an inherent part of system functionality.
The second part of the method is applicable to control systems. It contains guidelines
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for modelling hardware units and implementation-level constructs such as a control
loop. This part prepares the reactive system model for implementation.
The description of the method is organised as follows. We start with stating the
basic assumptions and principles of the development method in Section 4.1. The
principles constitute a significant part of the method by underlying the key points
to be adhered during the refinement-based modelling of fault tolerant systems. In
Section 4.2 we provide a refinement strategy for modelling fault tolerant systems. We
introduce the first case study in Section 4.3 that is used throughout the chapter as a
running example to demonstrate the proposed development steps. The development
steps introduced in Section 4.2 are described in the rest of the chapter (namely, in
Sections 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8) and exemplified on the case study. We provide a
full list of the proposed modelling patterns and modal view templates in Section 4.9.
We finalise the chapter with conclusions in Section 4.10.
4.1 Assumptions and Principles
The development method is based on a number of assumptions and principles. We
start with an assumption that the system requirements were elicited prior to mod-
elling [HS99]. Changes to requirements during modelling can lead to (partial or com-
plete) redevelopment as it is the case with a waterfall development process [Sca02].
The main outcome of the method is a reactive model of a fault tolerant system that
satisfies the functional and fault tolerance properties stated in requirements. If the
system is a control system, then the method can be used to arrive at a detailed model
of a control system ready for implementation or code generation.
The next assumption highlights the intended outcome of the modelling process:
The ultimate purpose of modelling is to create implementable behaviour sat-
isfying the desired properties.
To satisfy the purpose, properties must be expressed in the model. These can be
safety properties expressed as invariants and proved by a theorem prover or liveness
properties to be verified by a model checker. To help developers in expressing the
desired properties, they must be easily expressible. The model should also be imple-
mentable. It should represent a behaviour that is sensible and can be implemented
and deployed in a real system. This assumption leads to a number of modelling
principles that are described in the following subsections.
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4.1.1 Multi-view development
One of the key features of the proposed method is the usage of an additional view-
point [FKG90] that contributes to the correctness criterion for the models. The
additional viewpoint fits into state-based semantics of the target formal methods, ref-
erences the model elements, and generates a number of extra proof obligations. The
proof obligations represent an additional behaviour coverage that adds rigour to the
development process. We treat the views as collections of diagrammatically repre-
sented properties that otherwise could be difficult to express in the model, or can be
missed.
We use the the Modal / Fault Tolerance Views approach for expressing modal and
fault tolerant behaviour in separate views (see Chapter 3). A usage of the orthogonal
modal viewpoint provides three major benefits:
• The activity of system design in terms of modes, errors, and recovery transitions
gives additional understanding of the system and its modal and fault tolerant
behaviour.
• In requirements engineering, additional viewpoint represents a means for tracing
certain kinds of requirements, such as descriptions of system degradation, error
conditions, and system-level error handlers, into the formal development process.
• For engineers who are not involved in formal modelling, the diagrammatic part
of views is easier to understand than a formal model.
4.1.2 Co-refinement and restricted modelling
Refinement is a formal technique for adding details into a system model and arriving
at a model sufficiently detailed for further development steps such as implementation
or code generation. Application of formal methods, and in particular refinement, is
an engineering task. Refinement does not prescribe the exact way to model a system.
The same system can be modelled in various ways due to expressiveness of formal
notations. The criterion for a model’s usefulness is whether the model contains the
intended behaviour which satisfies the desired properties. Consider Figure 4.1. The
system behaviour must always ensure that the desired properties hold. In this regard,
properties represent the safe states of a system, but there can be more than one
behaviour satisfying the same properties.That is, the currently defined behaviour may
deviate from the intended one. By restricting the modeller’s choices, the proposed
method helps the modeller to focus on the desired behaviour and properties of the
model.
With the development process based on refinement, one starts from an abstract
model of a system that is typically non-deterministic. By making a number of steps,
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Behaviour
Intended 
behaviour 
Properties
Figure 4.1: Properties and behaviour
a deterministic implementable model is produced. One unveils system details through
state refinement and removes non-determinism by restricting the behaviour. Remov-
ing non-determinism is analogous to cutting off the traces of behaviour that are not
desired or irrelevant to the properties under investigation. The proposed method uses
a concept of additional views on the system model as a means to introduce restric-
tions into the modelling process. The additional restrictions remove the behaviour
that is not specified on the views thus forcing developers to make models sufficiently
deterministic.
In the method, models and views are refined in parallel and when necessary. Re-
finement of views ensures that the modal behaviour of the system becomes more
deterministic. By putting additional restrictions on the model, view refinement also
ensures that the model becomes more deterministic and still complies with the modal
and fault tolerant behaviour described in the views.
4.1.3 Behaviour restriction
In the development method proposed in this study, we see the system model as a
transition system that is “composed” of two parts: an unconstrained behaviour and a
set of functional and fault tolerance constraints. An unconstrained behaviour contains
all system states and all transitions; it is merely a declaration of the system structure
using variables. A model without constraints has a non-deterministic behaviour as it
can go from any state to any other state. Although theoretically valid, such a model
rarely has a practical application. In order for system to “behave”, i.e. realise certain
properties, we introduce constraints that define valid sets of states and transitions.
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The constraints define the part of a transition system that is safe and sensible in the
problem domain.
We consider a transition system development as a sequence of two kinds of steps:
state refinement and behaviour restriction. A state refinement functionally redefines
a state (or a set of states) by its more detailed version that typically contains more
states. A state refinement can also add new states thus expanding the state space.
It is a top-down process of adding details to the system structure by declaring new
variables and relating them to the previously defined variables. The second type of
step, behaviour restriction, introduces new constraints and rejects previously accept-
able states and transitions. By reducing the number of transitions originating at the
same states we reduce the system non-determinism.
For example, in Event-B, state refinement is conventionally called “data refine-
ment” [Abr10] and is conducted during a vertical refinement step. Behaviour re-
striction does not have a conventional name in Event-B and is regarded as a part of
functional refinement. Here, we stress the importance of separating the two aspects of
refinement for better understanding of system behaviour and dependencies between
system components.
The method advocates modelling the abstract functionality together with fault tol-
erance in its unrestricted form first. Such a form contains elements of behaviour that
cover all possible system state changes without constraints. Additional constraints
are introduced during behaviour restriction steps to satisfy requirements. Fault tol-
erance requirements represent the constraints over the system behaviour similarly to
the functional requirements.
4.1.4 System environment
This principle is induced by our choice to use state-based formalisms for modelling
high-level system logic. The semantics that we choose for our method is interleaving
with atomic actions. It can differ from the language that is conventionally used
for expressing the system environment. For example, a physical environment of a
system would typically be of a continuous-time nature that might involve stochastic
processes. We state that an environment has to be properly abstracted in order to
create a correct model of a system:
The system environment must be adequately represented in the system model.
To represent the environment, one has to adequately model a state-based abstrac-
tion of the environment and define assumptions about the environment. The adequacy
of the model is always relative to the assumptions that we state and the purpose of
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modelling, that is the properties that we intend to demonstrate in our model. De-
velopers may also need to refine the abstraction when using refinement-based formal
methods. Starting from the top level of development, the model inevitably contains
a certain form of abstract system environment. During refinement, both the system
and the relevant part of environment have to be specified in details.
This leads to a requirement for the developer: he/she must understand the nature
of the variables in the model, and their future implementation in the real system.
The variables may represent the logical state of the system under control, the user,
another technical system, or the system physical environment.
4.1.5 Implementable causality
In our method, we assume that a system observes some part of its environment and re-
acts to its changes. By reaction we mean any state change in the system: this includes
changes in its internal behaviour and external actions towards the environment.
All state transitions that occur during system execution need to satisfy the causal-
ity rule:
A cause should not be dependent on a reaction.
Typically, one needs to define a context of a system by explicitly separating the
system from its environment. The assumptions about the environment can be defined
explicitly as properties or implicitly using the language semantics. The causality rule
warns about a possible “trap” of modelling an environment that “waits” for system
execution without explicitly stating that as an assumption. It is acceptable when an
environment consists of another technical system that is designed to wait for the target
system. However, in many cases the system reaction must follow the environmental
cause, but not the opposite.
For example, let us define a property specifying a simple relationship between a
cause, and a reaction of a system:
cause variable = CAUSE ⇒ reaction variable = REACTION (4.1)
We assume that the cause is a part of the environment that we cannot control. To
maintain this property, both variables cause variable and reaction variable need to
be changed at the same time. We focus on modelling the system behaviour, and,
thus, our abstract representation of the environment (such as reading a sensor) con-
tains non-deterministic updates of variables. If a transition changes cause variable
non-deterministically and does not update reaction variable, it cannot be shown to
re-establish the property due to weak hypotheses. To overcome this, the domain
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of the transition may be restricted to certain values of reaction variable. Such a
constraint would mean that in order to change variable cause variable, that repre-
sents an external phenomenon, the environment would have to wait until variable
reaction variable, that represents the system state, has a certain value. This breaks
the causality principle.
Exemplified in Event-B, this principle means that the Event-B events representing
environment must not refer to system variables in their guards. If they do, the
justification for such a design has to be given explicitly as an assumption about the
environment. Otherwise, environment events may represent false assumptions about
the real world and become unimplementable. As a result, the modelling and proving
effort becomes a mere mathematical exercise without real application.
A possible solution to this problem may include modelling the relevant part of
the environment [HJJ03; HH11] and expressing environment phenomena as a part of
system properties. However, our method focuses on modelling the system behaviour,
and only stresses the necessity to use the implementable causality principle in regard
to system environment.
4.1.6 Reactive systems and property coverage
Invariants at the current abstraction level can only cover state relationships
within a single atomic change.
By an atomic change, we understand a transition that changes all (or a part of) the
variables referenced in the property in such a way that preserves the property.
Let us consider the property defined in 4.1. If the system reaction consists of a
sequence of steps, the original property cannot be proved as it does not hold until all
steps are executed. Every step has to be covered by a finer-grained invariant; this
means that the relationship between the cause and the final system state cannot be
expressed as a single safety property at this particular level of abstraction in case of
a sequential behaviour.
Note that the atomicity refinement can still be applied, and the system-level safety
properties can be preserved during further refinement steps. However, the formal
connection between the steps of a sequence cannot be captured in safety properties
defined at the current level. Some formalisms provide means for expression of live-
ness properties as transition convergence (for example, Event-B variants). However,
this approach does not allow developers to explicitly define complex properties, and,
in practice, is mostly used for demonstration of system-level termination. To allow
developers express the necessary safety properties, we advocate the usage of abstrac-
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tions and reactive style of modelling at higher levels and postponing the sequential
decomposition until lower levels:
For high-level modelling, it is desirable to have as few blocks of atomicity as
possible, one being an ideal case.
By reactive models we mean such definitions of behaviour that allow developers
to express high-level properties in a form cause⇒ reaction. The method proposed in
this work facilitates development of reactive models. The step for modelling a classical
control cycle of a control system is done at later stage when the reactive functionality
of the system is modelled.
4.1.7 Error modelling
Faults and the resulting errors are inevitable phenomena of the final systems [LA90].
They need to be modelled appropriately so that the system behaviour stays deter-
ministic in hazardous situations.
The proposed method focuses on modelling and refinement of abnormal system
behaviour and its environmental causes. Abnormal situations impact the system
behaviour in the same way as functional parameters do. However, such situations are
usually associated with hazardous states and severe consequences.
The method adopts error modelling from the early stages of development, and
facilitates tracing errors into requirements. Abstract errors are refined into more
specific ones; this refinement corresponds and is formally related to the appropriate
refinement of functional behaviour. For each functional level where a fault-tolerant
behaviour exists, there must be an appropriate abstraction of errors.
Errors must be abstractly modelled from the early modelling steps where func-
tionality depends on the environmental conditions.
The error modelling principle is closely related to fault injection techniques [Avr+96].
Fault injection approaches provide means for including faults to an existing model as
external entities and for checking that the system behaviour remains satisfactory. In
the proposed method, all faults originate in the system environment, and a system ob-
serves manifestations of faults through error detection. Thus, error modelling activity
is a kind of fault injection, and compliance to the error modelling principle guarantees
the formal correctness of the system behaviour in presence of injected faults.
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4.1.8 Refinement planning
The result of a refinement-based modelling is a chain, sometimes a tree, of models.
Each level of the chain has to be in the refinement relation with the previous one. The
modeller arrives at the resulting model by exploring a tree of possible models. As each
step is associated with a proof effort, the cost of redevelopment of the abstract levels is
generally higher than that of the lower ones. To reduce the cost of redevelopment, one
needs to plan ahead by considering options for modelling certain phenomena [GIL12].
As this method focuses on fault tolerance modelling, we provide a number of modelling
practices and patterns, and formulate some modelling principles that need to be
understood when planning the refinement chain.
The system components represent various parts of the system and form a tool for
hierarchical abstraction. For example, a car engine is a component of a car and also
is a system itself with subcomponents such as valves and various sensors. During the
specification construction, components need to be defined in a top-down manner. This
is because subsystems are designed to provide certain functions to support the main
functionality of the system. For example, the process of creating a car specification
does not start with specifying the sensors’ sensitivity. The necessary and sufficient
level of sensor sensitivity is unknown until the desired properties of the engine are
defined. On the other hand, the developers need to know possible low-level solutions
in order to make decisions about high-level architecture. Such two-directional de-
pendency between levels of abstraction is an essential property in many engineering
fields including modelling. This includes refinement-based top-down formal modelling
where one needs to know possible and acceptable solutions of low-level modelling in
order to construct an abstract model.
Starting from the very abstract, models should represent system components at
appropriate abstraction levels. At the first level, the system is a single component as
a whole. The next level should introduce components that represent a decomposition
of the system, and so on. Such components as sensors, actuators, and communication
channels should be introduced at lower levels and linked formally with the abstract
components and overall system behaviour.
The same principle applies to error modelling and fault tolerance. As the desired
high-level properties of critical systems may include fault tolerance, low-level errors
need to be abstracted and included in high-level components’ behaviour. This leads
to the necessity of a pre-modelling hazard and failure analysis, an environment analy-
sis, and a possibly informal description of a system architecture. Only based on such
analysis, one is able to construct failure and error abstractions, and make high-level
decisions about the system behaviour that includes fault tolerance. Levels of abstrac-
tion at which fault tolerance is modelled need to correspond to those for functionality
as both types of behaviour are expressed in terms of the same components.
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4.2 Refinement Strategy
The development method prescribes a number of steps that need to be performed to
arrive at a meaningful model of a fault tolerant system. At each step, certain devel-
opment actions are taken such as editing or refining a system state model or refining
a modal view. The schematic procedure of the development method is shown in Fig-
ure 4.2. The development method is divided into two parts: the first part contains
steps for a generic development of reactive fault tolerant systems and is applicable
in any problem domain; the second part focuses on control systems and facilitates
modelling of low-level components with an intention of further implementation.
Failure-free
functionality
Safe stop system
Refinement
of functionality
FT component refinement
Behaviour restriction
Hardware
Control cycle
Reactive system
abstract modelling
Control system
Requirements
Implementation
Figure 4.2: The steps of the method
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Abstract modelling of a reactive fault tolerant system starts with defining a failure-
free functionality of the system. By failure-free functionality we mean the abstract
behaviour only restricted by functional requirements. The abstract behaviour is then
refined and strengthened to satisfy fault tolerance requirements. At the first abstract
level where fault tolerance requirements impact the system model, a designer has to
choose an abstract fault tolerance class of the system. We define two such classes by
answering the question whether the system can mask all component errors. If the
system can eventually stop due to unrecoverable errors, then the safe stop step is
applied as a starting point for further refinement of fault tolerant behaviour.
The system functional behaviour is refined until it reaches a level of component
granularity used in fault tolerance requirements. We assume that fault tolerance
requirements enumerate component errors and describe error recovery procedures.
At this level, the system becomes aware of possible component errors and contains
appropriate reactions. The system stopped state is then refined by a combination of
component errors. At subsequent steps, component error states are further refined by
its sub-component errors etc. Thus, system functionality and component error states
stay at the same level of abstraction at all refinement steps. The functional and error
states related to a single component together comprise a fault tolerant component
in this work. Once the error states are defined for all components at the current
refinement step, the system behaviour must be restricted to contain the appropriate
reactions, i.e. fault tolerance. The modelled error states restrict the possible state
transitions of the system; this is done at the fault tolerance behaviour restriction step.
The process of alternating the two steps, functional refinement and refinement of fault
tolerance with subsequent restriction, continues until all the required properties of the
reactive system behaviour are expressed and verified.
The second part of the method refines the reactive model into a model of a control
system. The two steps performed are inclusion of low-level hardware units (sensors
and actuators) and realisation of a control cycle.
We describe each of the refinement steps in the rest of the chapter as follows.
The steps for functional development are project-specific and are left to modellers.
The discussion of the abstract fault tolerance classes of systems including the safe
stop modelling is contained in Section 4.4. The step of fault tolerance component
refinement and behaviour restriction takes the central place in the method and is split
into Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 accordingly. The refinement of system components
with sensors and actuators is described in Section 4.7. The step of implementing the
control loop of a control system is given in Section 4.8.
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4.3 Airlock Case Study
This section contains a description of a case study that is used in the rest of this
chapter as a running example of the proposed ideas. We formulate the requirements
for the system as a series of statements. Each statement has an identifier, such as
ENV0, and an informal definition of a requirement itself. The prefix ENV identifies
assumptions about the system environment, statements starting with FUN describe
the desired functionality of the system, SAF define the safety properties, and FT define
the fault tolerant behaviour of the system. Some requirements are explicitly traced
into models where stated (most of SAF and FT) while others provide assumptions
that are used implicitly (such as ENV). The identifiers serve as references that we use
throughout this chapter to link the elements of modelling with requirements.
The case study is an airlock system. The function of the airlock is to separate
two areas with different air pressures and allow users to pass safely between the areas
(Figure 4.3).
External
environment Airlock
chamber
Internal
environment
Door 1 Door 2
Door motor
Pressure sensors
Door closed sensor
Door opened sensor
Door position sensor
Figure 4.3: The airlock system
For clarity let us call the two conjoining areas as external (the left area) and
internal (to the right). Let us also assume that the pressure outside is lower than
inside. We can describe these assumptions about the environment of the system as
the following statements:
ENV1. The airlock system separates two different environments. The pressure
of the external environment is lower than that of the internal one. The internal
environment is considered to be natural to humans.
45
ENV2. In order to maintain different pressures, the two environments must
be physically separated.
The primary function of the system can be expressed in the following form:
FUN1. When in operation, the airlock system must be able to let users pass
safely between the two environments via the airlock.
Considering ENV1-2, the system implements its function FUN1 using a number
of physical components:
ENV3. The system has two doors and a chamber. Each door when closed
separates the chamber from the appropriate environment.
ENV3 already describes a part of the solution to the problem as it defines the
components that are used to implement the desired function. Such solutions come
from domain experts and engineers. The domain knowledge should be expressed
explicitly in requirements so that they can be formalised and traced back. It is
not always practical to formally establish all properties (e.g. FUN1 is a liveness
property and can be difficult to express in proof-based methods), however, the system
architecture and abstract components such as described in ENV3 is necessary for top-
down refinement modelling. Safety requirements can be (and have to be) expressed
as invariants in the models.
Safety properties described in this section do not completely cover all safety con-
cerns that would arise for a real system. For example, a user would be required to wear
special equipment while in the chamber in order to survive the change of pressure.
We implicitly assume that this and other possible safety requirements are satisfied.
We only focus on a particular part of system properties described in this section to
limit the context of the case study.
The first safety requirement SAF1 limits the allowed range of pressure that the
system cannot exceed. Such a requirement is implied by ENV1 and ENV3:
SAF1. The pressure in the chamber must always be between the lower external
pressure and the higher internal one
Following ENV2, we can also state that it is unsafe to let a door open when the
conjoining areas have different pressures, therefore:
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SAF2. A door can only be opened if the pressure values in the chamber and
the conjoined environment are equal
The other two safety requirements can be inferred from SAF2 and ENV1-3. Stating
them explicitly facilitates the formal modelling of ENV1 and ENV2 as well as it can
help to informally validate the requirements:
SAF3. Only one door is allowed to be opened at any moment of time
SAF4. The pressure in the chamber shall not be changed unless both doors
are closed
In order to allow a user to pass from inside through the airlock into the external
area, the system needs to perform the following steps:
1. equalise the chamber pressure to that of the internal environment,
2. open the second door to allow the user in the chamber,
3. close the second door,
4. equalize the pressure in the airlock to that of the external environment,
5. open the first door to allow the user out,
and vice versa for the opposite direction.
The components that perform these steps are described abstractly. The engineers
need to define the physical means for performing these actions such as sensors and
actuators:
ENV4. Each door is equipped with three positioning sensors and a two-way
motor. The sensors consist of two boolean sensors representing the fully closed
(SNS CLOSED) and opened (SNS OPENED) door states, and a range-value po-
sition sensor (SNS POS) that returns values in a range between the fully closed
and the fully opened states inclusively. The two-way motor (ACT MOTOR) is the
actuator that can open and close the door within its physical range of movement.
ENV5. There is a pressure sensor in each of the areas, three in total
(SNS PRESSURE OUT, SNS PRESSURE CHAMBER, SNS PRESSURE IN).
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ENV6. The pressure in the chamber can be changed by the pump actuator
(ACT PUMP).
On top of the functional requirements to the system, we also introduce a “fragile”
environment where the physical components of the system may fail. We state this as
the following fault assumption regarding the system low-level components:
ENV7. Any of the sensors and actuators may fail to provide a correct function.
In case of critical systems, ENV7 raises another type of requirements that concerns
fault tolerance and system behaviour in a fragile environment. It is already mentioned
in FUN1 that the system performs its function “when in operation”. Under the
assumption of a fragile environment, such statement needs to be more elaborate. The
system reaction to errors has to be specified:
FT1. A system must be able to tolerate internal errors where possible and
continue its operation at an acceptable level
FT2. When errors cannot be tolerated, or it becomes dangerous to continue
operation, the system must stop in a safe state (that is already ensured by the
four safety conditions)
The system can only tolerate errors that affect redundant components. In this
case study, such redundancy is provided for the door positioning sensors:
FT3. The boolean state sensors SNS CLOSED and SNS OPENED form a
pair of devices that could be used as a hot spare for the more accurate positioning
sensor SNS POS.
When one of sensors SNS CLOSED and SNS OPENED fails, the door still re-
mains operational using the positioning sensor SNS POS, and vice versa. However,
we consider such operation dangerous in the long term, and expect the system to
gracefully degrade and finally stop for maintenance. The exact system behaviour un-
der such conditions needs to be specified, and this is an analysis task where decisions
must be made. To reason about the intended fault tolerant behaviour of the system,
we need to explicitly specify the possible hazardous situations and system reactions.
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Such information can be obtained by applying the Failure Modes and Effects Anal-
ysis [FMTR]. In our case study, we specify the following reactions of the system to
hardware component failures:
FT4. The system should disallow opening a door if one of the corresponding
redundant sensors failed (see FT3)
FT5. The system should stop if one of the non-redundant sensors or actuators
failed
FT6. If both doors have redundant sensors failed, the system should stop as
soon as it is safe. It is considered to be safe to stop when there is no user trapped
in the chamber. If there is a user in the chamber, the system should allow opening
the internal door
In order to implement the fault-tolerant behaviour of the system, we decided to
add an additional component:
ENV8. There is a boolean-valued sensor (SNS USER) that indicates the pres-
ence of the user in the chamber
For our purpose of modelling, i.e. proof of high-level safety properties in presence
of errors, we can assume that sensor failures and appropriate system state changes
happen negligibly quick. In a method with interleaving semantics, such an assumption
allows the model to react to one error at a time. This assumption simplifies modelling
while still allows us to demonstrate the method.
It should also be noted that the method does not specify the technique of require-
ment elicitation and elaboration, it only stresses the necessity of having one. Problem
Frames [Jac01] can be one way of such reasoning about requirements.
4.4 Abstract System Fault Tolerance Classes
According to the proposed method, the first decision a developer has to make is to
choose an abstract class of a system. We define two abstract classes of systems from
the fault tolerance modelling perspective: a class of failure-free systems and a class
of safe stop systems. The differentiation between the two classes is an outcome of
a study of existing models, and is a result of a defined refinement process using the
Modal and Fault Tolerance Views’ templates (see Section 3.1 and Section 4.5.4). The
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first class of systems is failure-free at the abstract level. It can mask all internal
errors and operates indefinitely. The second class cannot tolerate certain errors and
can eventually stop.
If the system is failure-free, its model should follow a general style for modelling
reactive systems in the target formal method. There can be a number of refinement
steps that refine abstract error-free functionality. The functionality refined at these
first steps should not involve error conditions of system components or any other en-
vironmental state that can influence the system behaviour. Typically, control systems
do not have such failure-free abstractions and their modelling should follow the safe
stop approach.
The second class of systems may stop under certain conditions that no longer
support safe system execution. The errors that can cause a system stop are called
unrecoverable and will have to be specified at later refinement steps. We do not
model the whole phenomena of the system environment and, therefore, are unable to
simulate consequences of system failures. We only focus on an implementable reaction
of a system, and consider safe stop systems. Safe stop systems can be stopped at any
moment of time to ensure safety under undesired operating conditions.
The purpose of this step is to “reserve” an abstract representation of the overall
system fault tolerant behaviour for further refinements. This step is only necessary if
the stop behaviour is refined by component failures at subsequent levels. Although safe
stop is usually the top abstraction for such systems, nothing prevents the developer
from making several steps of refinement of failure-free functionality before this step.
4.4.1 Safe stop pattern
If the safe stop abstraction is chosen for the system, the modeller has to apply the
safe stop pattern early during modelling to satisfy the error modelling principle. The
actual level for application is a designer choice. However, we suggest to introduce the
safe stop when the failure-free behaviour is specified.
Define a single variable representing the operational state of the system
(stopped). One of its values shall represent the stopped state (e.g., stopped =
TRUE). Separate the functional behaviour from the stopped state by using the
declared variable. Define a transition that switches the system to the stopped
state.
Safe stop is a special case of a more general error state variable pattern (see
Section 4.5.1). It applies to the most abstract level of fault tolerant behaviour. At
this level, we treat the whole system as a single component from the fault tolerance
perspective. The pattern assumes that the functional behaviour of the system is
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defined on previous levels, and the system will be structurally decomposed on further
levels. The pattern explicitly separates the operational system behaviour from the
stopped state. The stop transition depicts an abstraction of unrecoverable errors.
The actual errors will be added during subsequent refinement steps.
4.4.2 Abstract modal views
Views are built in a step-wise manner, starting from the most primitive case and
introducing details along with model refinement. There are just two possible initial
views, defining the two system classes from the modelling perspective. The first class
does not have an unrecoverable error: all errors are recoverable and, at a sufficiently
abstract level, there are no errors at all. In the other case, there are errors that
cannot be masked and system necessarily transitions into a differing mode after an
error occurrence. What is considered to be an error is a design choice: the same
functionality may be implemented by either system class. Figure 4.4 illustrates the
two possible initial views.
Normal DegradedNormal
Figure 4.4: Two abstract classes of fault tolerant systems
In the first view, the most abstract system is a normal mode. Further refinements
of the view may introduce only maskable errors. In the second view, in addition to
the normal mode there is an error leading to a degraded mode. Both normal and
degraded modes may be explained in further details by introducing new maskable
errors. The error originally present in the initial view may also be explained in terms
of a number of new errors.
The abstract view of the system corresponds to the chosen fault tolerance class. As
shown in Figure 4.4, the first view represents a system with a single mode of operation.
The assumption/guarantee (A/G) pair of the mode is trivial: FALSE/TRUE. It is
valid to use such view as the first abstract depiction of the system behaviour, however,
it can be skipped in practice as it does not contribute any proofs (they are all trivially
true).
The second view is a system that can eventually stop due to unrecoverable errors.
The stop transition is an abstraction of all unrecoverable errors, and has to be refined
later. The view elements use the variables and a transition created by the safe stop
pattern. The modes shall have their A/G specified as shown in Figure 4.5.
The proposed step of modelling an abstract fault tolerance class of systems is
exemplified using our airlock example.
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Normal Stop
Assumption: stopped=FALSE
Guarantee:   stopped'=FALSE
Events:         <all functional events>
Assumption: stopped=TRUE
Guarantee:   stopped'=TRUE
Events:         stopped
Events: stop
Figure 4.5: Modal view of a safe stop system
4.4.3 Application in Event-B
We demonstrate the application of the step proposed above to modelling the airlock
system in Event-B. In the first two models of the case study we model an abstract
failure-free functionality of the system and its abstract class of fault tolerance.
In the initial model M0 we define an environment and a functional behaviour
of the airlock system at the abstract level. Snippet 4.1 contains definitions and in-
variants that represent requirements discussed in Section 4.3. We represent the two
environments described in ENV1 by their pressure values LOW PRESSURE and
HIGH PRESSURE that we assume to be constant. The abstract components from
ENV3 are represented by variables door1 and door2 for the two doors correspondingly,
and variable pressure depicts the pressure in the chamber. The rest of the invariants
correspond to the safety requirements. Namely, inv9 ensures that the pressure in the
chamber stays within the allowed range as required by SAF1. Requirement SAF2 is
split into two invariants inv4 and inv5 stating that each of the doors can only be
opened when the chamber pressure is equal to that of the conjoining environment.
Requirement SAF3 is ensured by inv6 requiring that at least one of the doors is closed
at all times. Invariants inv7 and inv8 together represent SAF4 by ensuring that the
chamber pressure is only changed when both doors are closed.
The behavioural part of model M0 contains system functionality free of errors.
There are five events for each door that ensure the safe traversal of the corresponding
door through its set of possible states (DOOR STATE at axm1), and two events
for increasing and decreasing the level of pressure in the chamber correspondingly.
For brevity, we show one event of a door behaviour (open1) and one pressure event
(pump up) on Snippet 4.1. Event open1 starts opening the first door if it is either
closed or stopped at some intermediate position, event pump up increments the cham-
ber pressure value. The full model can be found in Appendix A.
The next step is to define the fault tolerance class of the system and apply an
appropriate type of abstraction. The system as described in Section 4.3 is a safe stop
system. It is aware of the fragile environment in which hardware system components
can produce errors. Under certain conditions, the system may stop functioning, and
this has to be appropriately represented in the model. The actual conditions are
irrelevant at this abstraction level, and we only define the system reaction.
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axioms
axm1: partition(DOOR STATE, {OPENED}, {CLOSED}, {OPENING},
{CLOSING}, {STOPPED})
axm2: LOW PRESSURE = 0
axm3: HIGH PRESSURE = 2
invariants
inv1: door1 ∈ DOOR STATE
inv2: door2 ∈ DOOR STATE
inv3: pressure ∈ N
inv4: door1 6= CLOSED⇒ pressure = LOW PRESSURE
inv5: door2 6= CLOSED⇒ pressure = HIGH PRESSURE
inv6: door1 = CLOSED ∨ door2 = CLOSED
inv7: pressure > LOW PRESSURE⇒ door1 = CLOSED
inv8: pressure < HIGH PRESSURE⇒ door2 = CLOSED
inv9: pressure ≥ LOW PRESSURE ∧ pressure ≤ HIGH PRESSURE
events
event open1 =̂
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = LOW PRESSURE
grd3: door2 = CLOSED
then
act1: door1 := OPENING
end
event pump up =̂
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure < HIGH PRESSURE
then
act1: pressure := pressure+ 1
end
Snippet 4.1: Definitions, invariants, and behaviour of M0
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We refine model M0 by applying the safe stop pattern. We apply the pattern
to the Event-B modelling in the following way. We define a single boolean variable
stopped ∈ BOOL. The value of the variable represents the operational availability
of the system and separates the system normal behaviour from the stopped state.
When stopped = FALSE, the system operates as defined at M0. This is ensured by
extending all functional events defined at M0 with guard stopped = FALSE. When
stopped = TRUE, the system is considered to be in the stopped state. The new
event stop puts the system in the stopped state, and represents an abstraction of
all unrecoverable errors. The new event stopped models the system behaviour in the
stopped state and has an empty action list. Because of the extended guards, the set
of functional events and event stopped do not compete and are mutually exclusive.
Thus, event stopped represents a system deadlock and guarantees that the system
will stay in the stopped state; this is sufficient for modelling the system stop [LT04b].
Snippet 4.2 shows the two new events introduced by applying the pattern and an
extension of event open1. All the 12 functional events defined at M0 are extended
similarly to open1.
invariants
inv1: stopped ∈ BOOL
events
event open1 =̂ extends open1
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
event stop =̂
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
end
event stopped =̂
when
grd: stopped = TRUE
then
skip
end
Snippet 4.2: The safe stop pattern applied to model M1
Model M1 is associated with a modal view that ensures that the separation be-
tween operational and stopped modes is correct in the model. The modal view with
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Normal StopAssumption: stopped=FALSE
Guarantee:   stopped'=FALSE
Events:         open1, opened1, close1, closed1, stop1,
                     open2, opened2, close2, closed2, stop2,
                     pump_up, pump_down
Assumption: stopped=TRUE
Guarantee:   stopped'=TRUE
Events:         stopped
Events: stop
Figure 4.6: Modal view associated with M1
its assumption/guarantee pair and associated events is shown in Figure 4.6. It corre-
sponds to the safe stop class of fault tolerant systems.
4.5 Fault Tolerant Component Refinement
A Fault tolerant component is a structural system unit that is described by its func-
tional and error states. In this work, we assume that the fault tolerant system under
development can be represented as a layered hierarchy of fault tolerant components.
Each layer represents a level of abstraction with the system being the root of the
hierarchy. The method traverses the hierarchy starting from its root by modelling
component functional and error states at each layer. At each step, the set of compo-
nents is decomposed into its subcomponents via state refinement.
The functional refinement of components is well-known by practitioners and typi-
cally includes both data and behaviour refinements. During functional refinement, the
state representations of the higher-level components are refined by their more elabo-
rate lower-level counterparts. The behaviour of the system is refined accordingly by
specifying the allowed transitions.
In this section, we describe a refinement step for representing and refining the
component error states. The step consists in application of three modelling patterns
each described in its subsection.
4.5.1 Error state variable pattern
Each component at a current abstraction level has a functional state. For example, a
door can be opened, closed, or in an intermediate position, a boolean sensor value can
return true or false. These are the logical states of components that are necessary for
modelling the functional behaviour. To model the fault tolerant behaviour, the system
must also be aware of the availability, or error state, of its components. Examples
of such component states are “operational” and “broken”. Error states can carry
different meanings depending on the nature of the system context. In a physical
environment, error state is an abstraction over the physical state. E.g., a sensor can
be stuck, broken, or low on power supply. Such an abstraction can be derived from
the hardware specifications and/or results of reliability analysis. When the system
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context is another technical system, error state abstraction can be derived from the
specification of the external system. However, the principles used in this and following
patterns are general and are applicable to any nature of system environment.
For each component, specify a variable depicting the error state of the compo-
nent at the current abstraction level.
This pattern prescribes to define a set of variables corresponding to error states of
the components. In the simplest case, the variables can be boolean depicting whether
the component is operational or not. They can also be defined over a set enumerating
all possible error states of a particular component.
The safe stop pattern described in Section 4.4.1 is a special case of the error state
variable pattern. At the most abstract level, the whole system is considered as a
single component and its error state is represented by a single boolean variable. The
variables introduced by the error state variable pattern are formally related with their
abstract counterparts by the invariant pattern described next.
4.5.2 Error state invariant pattern
At the functional refinement step, the logical state of the component is refined into
the logical states of its subcomponents, and the behaviour is refined accordingly. For
the refinement relation to hold, one has to refine the error states of components as
well. Abstract error representation needs to be refined each time a component is
refined into its subcomponents. The error state refinement can be done together with
functional refinement, or at a subsequent step. To ensure the correctness of the error
state refinement, we introduce the error state invariant pattern:
Define a relation between the concrete and abstract error states.
Given a set of components at the concrete level, their error states need to be
related to those at the abstract level. The pattern is applicable to any type of com-
ponent hierarchy. For example, two abstract components can share a subcomponent
in such a way that a subcomponent failure can lead to changes in error states of both
components. The error states of abstract components can also be dependant on the
functional state of the concrete ones. Therefore, the relation created by applying the
error state invariant pattern can also refer to functional state. This pattern has to be
applied each time the error state variable pattern is applied.
If the system is a safe stop system to which the safe stop pattern was applied,
then a more specific invariant pattern can be used at the next consecutive level:
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Define a relation between the abstract stopped state and concrete component
error states. The suggested form is as follows: stopped = TRUE ⇔ Predicate.
Variable stopped is defined at the abstract level by the safe stop pattern, Predicate
is a project-specific predicate expressed in terms of the concrete component error
state variables.
The error state invariant patterns are necessary for formally establishing the rela-
tion between two subsequent layers of abstraction. Typically, refinement-based meth-
ods provide a means for expressing such a relation. In B and Event-B, this type of
relation is expressed using gluing invariants that we demonstrate later in Section 4.5.5.
4.5.3 Fault tolerant behaviour pattern
The error state variables represent the knowledge of the system about its components
conditions. At the lowest level, this knowledge comes from comparison of the current
sensor readings against the system expectations about the environment that is based
on assumptions. At all higher levels, there must be a behavioural abstraction of the
system error detection mechanisms. We represent the abstract error detection by a
number of transitions each of which corresponds to an occurrence of a certain error or
a class of errors at the current abstraction level. All errors at the current abstraction
level must be covered to satisfy the error modelling principle.
A fault tolerant system follows a detected error with an appropriate reaction. In
order to conform to the reactive systems principle, we model error detection as a
refinement of appropriate system reactions:
Every component error transition must refine the corresponding reaction tran-
sition of the system. All relevant functional states have to be covered by outgoing
error transitions.
The same error may lead to different reactions depending on the current state.
Both functional and error states are used when choosing an appropriate reaction.
Therefore, this pattern applies not only to errors but to relevant changes in the func-
tional part of the environment as well.
The fault tolerant behaviour pattern must also conform to the causality principle.
If a model has a functional state that forbids components to fail, then its behaviour
violates the causality principle. Therefore, it is mandatory to cover all possible system
conditions under which the error can be detected. In the model, this means that given
a set of errors and a set of possible system states, the resulting set of state transitions
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will be a Cartesian product of the former two. A part of the resulting set of state tran-
sitions are modelled as error detection transitions. Those detection transitions that
lead to a system reaction specified at the abstract level should refine the appropri-
ate reaction transition. The detection transitions that represent the maskable errors
should be modelled as new transitions (they only change the state of new variables).
Some part of error state transitions can be omitted in models if there are explicitly
defined assumptions about such transitions, e.g., certain system operations can take
negligible time during which the system does not react to environmental stimuli.
After applying this pattern, the model contains all relevant detection transitions
that compete with functional transitions, both types of transitions originate at the
same states. We believe this is sufficient to adequately represent the environment in
a state machine for verifying safety properties.
4.5.4 Modal views
During the fault tolerant component refinement step, abstract components and their
errors are refined by a number of concrete subcomponents and errors. The system
behaviour is redefined in terms of subcomponent states. This allows developers to
introduce new details into the behavioural model. This is also reflected by refining
modes and splitting transitions defined on modal views.
Modes are abstractions over the overall system behaviour and not over separate
system components. Therefore, the component decomposition of the model allows a
more detailed representation of the overall system behaviour in terms of modes and
mode transitions. The refinement of modes involves both the functional and fault
tolerant system behaviour. The exact way of mode refinement is only limited by the
modal refinement conditions, and is generally project-specific.
To assist in construction of modal views, we offer two templates for modal refine-
ment. The first template is concerned with refinement of error transitions in a view.
The idea here is to replace an abstract depiction of an error with two or more concrete
errors. This process may be repeated as many times as needed and the result is a
family of errors derived from a single abstract error.
As shown in Figure 4.7, there are two versions of this template. One for the case
when an error leads to a degraded mode and another when there is also a subsequent
recovery. This distinction is due to the fact that an obligation of successful recovery
must be preserved during refinement. In the second version of the template at least
one of the recovery modes must provide a recovery transition. Thus, either one of
the recovery transitions on the second template at Figure 4.7 must remain while the
other one can be removed. For example, we can remove the recovery transition from
mode Recovery2 and still preserve the abstract recovery transition during refinement
through Recovery1.
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Normal Degradedabstract_error
Normal
Degraded1concrete_error1
Degraded2concrete_error2
Normal Recovery
abstract_error
Normal
Recovery1
concrete_error1
Recovery2concrete_error2
Figure 4.7: Error split template
In the template, error transitions are labelled with the according events that rep-
resent the transitions in the model. During refinement, the abstract error detection
event is refined by a number of lower-level component errors using the three fault tol-
erant component refinement patterns. If the definition of concrete-level errors allows
developers to refine the system modal behaviour, then the modal view can follow this
template to represent the more detailed reactions of the system to errors. As shown
on the template, the mode transitions on the two consecutive levels should contain
references to the appropriate events of the system reactions such as abstract error,
concrete error1 and concrete error2.
Mode A Mode B
Mode A
Mode B2
Mode B1
Figure 4.8: Behavioural split template
The second template is a behavioural template, it splits a system mode into a chain
of two (or possibly more) consecutive modes. This template can be used to model
intermediate operations that the system needs to perform to arrive at a supposedly
stable mode. In Figure 4.8, mode B is refined into two consecutive modes B1 and B2.
The two new transitions A→ B1 and A→ B2 refine the abstract transition whereas
transition B1→ B2 is internal and typically represents a change in a functional state
of the system. There are different applications of the template possible, however we
focus on a particular application of a functional refinement. Modes A and B2 are
assumed to be important modes in which the system is supposed to stay for long
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periods of time, mode B1 is a temporary mode in which the system stays until some
functional condition is set to arrive at B2. Note that mode A could be refined in
a similar way. This template supports evolution of a system modal state over time,
however, the modal views language does not guarantee termination of modes.
Operation Stop
Normal StopDegraded
Figure 4.9: Graceful degradation template
A particular application of the behavioural template can be used for specifying
the system graceful degradation. As shown in Figure 4.9, a system may have one-way
transitions between a set of operational modes such as Normal and Degraded. The
chain of degradation can involve several modes and more than one path. The system
eventually stops when it encounters the conditions under which its function is not
safe. The transition to Stop can happen from any of the operational modes because
the safe stop action does not depend on the system state.
4.5.5 Application in Event-B
At M0 and M1, the system functional behaviour is defined in terms of its components.
Namely, the two doors and the airlock chamber are represented by their relevant
functional state variables. However, the system error states are defined by a single
variable stopped depicting the overall system error state.
We refine M1 by applying the fault tolerant component refinement step. Firstly,
we apply the error state variable pattern and define error states of every system com-
ponent participating in fault tolerance requirements. We introduce two error state
variables corresponding to the two doors of the airlock: door1 cond and door2 cond
as shown on Snippet 4.3. The possible door error states are
{BROKEN,DEGRADED,OK}. The error states are abstracted from fault toler-
ance requirements FT3-FT6 given in Section 4.3.
axioms
axm1: DOOR CONDITION = {BROKEN,DEGRADED,OK}
invariants
inv1: door1 cond ∈ DOOR CONDITION
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inv2: door2 cond ∈ DOOR CONDITION
inv4: door1 cond = BROKEN ∨ door2 cond = BROKEN ∨
(door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧
obj presence = FALSE)⇔ stopped = TRUE
events
event break =̂ extends stop
any
d1c d2c
where
grd2 0: d1c ∈ DOOR CONDITION ∧ d1c ≤ door1 cond
grd2 1: d2c ∈ DOOR CONDITION ∧ d2c ≤ door2 cond
grd2 2: d1c = BROKEN ∨ d2c = BROKEN
grd2 3: door1 cond 6= BROKEN ∧ door2 cond 6= BROKEN
grd2 4: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED
⇒ obj presence = TRUE
then
act2 0: door1 cond, door2 cond := d1c, d2c
end
event degrade =̂
any
d1c d2c
where
grd0: stopped = FALSE
grd1: d1c ∈ DOOR CONDITION ∧ d1c ∈ {OK,DEGRADED} ∧
d1c ≤ door1 cond
grd2: d2c ∈ DOOR CONDITION ∧ d2c ∈ {OK,DEGRADED} ∧
d2c ≤ door2 cond
grd3: (door1 cond = OK ∧ d1c = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = d2c) ∨
(door2 cond = OK ∧ d2c = DEGRADED ∧ door1 cond = d1c)
grd4: d1c 6= DEGRADED ∨ d2c 6= DEGRADED ∨ obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door1 cond := d1c
act2: door2 cond := d2c
end
event stop on degrade =̂ extends stop
when
grd1: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∨ door2 cond = DEGRADED
grd2: obj presence = FALSE
grd4: door1 cond = OK ∨ door2 cond = OK
then
act1: door1 cond := DEGRADED
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act2: door2 cond := DEGRADED
end
Snippet 4.3: Fault tolerant component refinement applied at M2
Next, we apply the error state invariant pattern. We “glue” abstract variable
stopped with the newly defined door error state variables by invariant inv4 shown on
Snippet 4.3. The example follows the safe stop invariant pattern. Note that the gluing
invariant also refers to functional variable obj presence to meet the requirements
described in FT6. Such reference highlights the point that the fault tolerant properties
of the system are inevitably tied to the functional state and both need to be taken
into account during refinement.
To satisfy the gluing invariant that describes error states of components, we also
refine the behavioural part of the model. We apply the fault tolerant behaviour
pattern and define the system reaction to component errors. Snippet 4.3 shows three
events break, degrade and stop on degrade changing the door error states in three
different situations. Events break and stop on degrade extend abstract event stop
with actions putting the doors into degraded and broken states to satisfy gluing
invariant inv4. This shows how an abstract fault tolerant reaction is refined into
more specific component failures. Event degrade is new at M2, it changes the door
error states and continues the system operation. It represents the tolerance of the
system to certain errors. The three presented events represent a part of requirements
FT5 and FT6. Two events degrade and stop on degrade depict the same abstract
detection of a door failure, but they lead to different reactions, and the choice depends
on the current system state as required by FT6. We have to have both events in the
model to cover all relevant system states at the moment of component failure to satisfy
the causality rule (see Section 4.1.5).
An example of breaking the causality rule can be removal of event degrade. This
event represents a situation when both doors get degraded while the user is still
present in the airlock chamber. Without event degrade such situation can never arise
and the underlying hypothetical assumption could then be formulated as follows:
The door does not degrade while the user is present in the chamber
Such an assumption is unrealistic and breaks the implementable causality rule: the
door is a part of a physical environment and it cannot be forbidden to degrade or
break. Although such an assumption is unimplementable, the formal behaviour that
satisfies the assumption can be modelled and proved to be correct. This highlights
the need in additional modelling principles and patterns that add rigour to the formal
development process.
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As an example of system modal and fault tolerant behaviour refinement, we show
the modal view that is associated with M2 in Figure 4.10. It represents an application
of the graceful degradation template. The operation of the system is split into four
modes: the normal operation mode and three degraded modes. The system stays in
mode Door1 when the first door is degraded and the second door is fully operational,
and vice versa for mode Door2. When both doors are degraded and there is a user
present in the chamber, the system stays in mode Trapped until the user leaves the
chamber. The new mode Normal together with the three degraded modes formally
refine abstract mode Normal as shown by a dashed area.
The abstract system failure transition is refined by four concrete transitions de-
picting the sources of failure. Transitions Stop on degrade and User leaves initiate
at the new modes. Transition Break can initiate at any of the four modes within the
dashed area.
Normal
Door1
Door2
Trapped Stop
Break
Degrade
Degrade
Degrade
Degrade
Stop on degrade
Stop on degrade
User leaves
Figure 4.10: Modal view of airlock M2 model
The degraded modes on the view represent different sets of available components
and the associated subsets of system behaviour. The assumptions of the modes split
the possible combinations of the components error states into disjoint sets as shown
on Snippet 4.4. The mode assumptions cover all the system states as specified in the
model invariants. This is ensured by the well-definedness proof obligation COVER
(see Section 3.4).
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assumptions
Normal: door1 cond = OK ∧ door2 cond = OK
Door1: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = OK
Door2: door1 cond = OK ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED
Trapped: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧
obj presence = TRUE
Stop: door1 cond = BROKEN ∨ door2 cond = BROKEN ∨
(door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧
obj presence = FALSE)
Snippet 4.4: M2 mode assumptions
4.6 Behaviour Restriction
The behaviour restriction step follows the fault tolerant component refinement step
described in the previous section. During this step, refined component error states
and modal views are used to restrict the functional behaviour. When applied to the
model, the step implements those fault tolerance requirements that define the changes
in system behaviour under different operating conditions. The behaviour restriction
step consists of a behaviour restriction pattern and an application of modal views.
4.6.1 Behaviour restriction pattern
The behaviour restriction pattern uses the component error states introduced by ap-
plying the error state variable pattern to restrict the functional behaviour.
Restrict the functional transitions that are not allowed with respect to the
error state variables defined earlier: use the error state variables to strengthen the
domain restriction predicates of transitions.
The error state variables represent the operational availability of components.
Under different operational conditions, system functionality may provide different
functions. For example, safety requirements might only permit a partial operation
of certain components after errors have been detected. Moreover, fault tolerance
requirements may contain specifications of different system behaviours under different
operational conditions, e.g., graceful degradation. The behaviour restriction pattern
ensures that the behavioural model satisfies such types of requirements by disallowing
functional transitions that are not valid.
The pattern should be used together with modal refinement. The modal views
provide consistency conditions that can be used to identify invalid functional tran-
sitions. Restriction predicates of relevant transitions are being strengthened using
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this pattern to satisfy the associated modal views. In the simplest case, the con-
juncts added to domain restriction predicates of transitions take the following form:
Component condition ∈ Possible conditions, where Component condition is the er-
ror state variable for the component, and Possible conditions is a set of error states
allowing the functional transition to happen. The actual restriction predicates are
project-specific. They may involve more than one component and refer to functional
variables.
4.6.2 Modes for functionality and fault tolerance
Modal views provide a tool for specifying modal behaviour. A modal view may contain
a mixture of fault tolerant and functional behaviour as it is not always possible to
separate the two. Although a distinction between fault tolerance and functionality
can be made for a specific system, we treat the specification of modal views in a
generic way. The assumption/guarantee predicates of a mode define the nature of a
specific part of the system modal behaviour, and relationship between the system and
its environment, as well as between subsystems. Specifying assumption/guarantee
predicates is a modelling task and is specific to the system and the properties of
interest. However, we provide a general rule for specifying modes that is based on our
distinction between functional variables and error state variables.
We regard the assumption predicate as an abstraction of the system environment
that should refer to error state variables. The assumptions therefore state the com-
binations of available components that allow the system to provide its subsets of
functionality. The functionalities should refer to the logical state variables and are
contained in the guarantee predicates. Such a way of specifying the assumptions and
guarantees can be treated as a specification of the system fault tolerant behaviour.
The modal principle of providing certain functionality under the stated conditions
can be used for specifying the purely functional part of behaviour. For example, modes
can specify system operation that depends on the current logical state of one of its
components. Mode assumptions may also refer to a functional decision (represented
by a state variable) that is made by a higher-level management component. In such
cases, the views represent the functional behaviour of the system.
Although the two kinds of modal specifications can coexist in a single refinement
chain, they are usually mixed as the choice of system mode typically depends on both
component error and functional states.
4.6.3 Behaviour restriction by modal views
The modal views provide additional proof obligations. Certain model elements can
be inferred from an associated view. Such inferred elements can be offered to a user
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as a suggestion during modelling. The specific element that is inferred in the method
is the fault tolerance part of the transition domain restriction predicate.
This step is applicable to state-based methods that allow definitions of safety
properties. The properties in combination with modal views are used to help users
to define correct behavioural model. The modal views must also support the target
formal method and use the safety properties as part of their proof obligations. In
the description of this step, we use invariants as safety properties, and refer to modal
consistency conditions defined for Event-B in Section 3.4.2.
We assume that the view is used to model the fault tolerant behaviour of the
system in a way described by the method: the mode assumptions refer to the error
state conditions of the components depicting the environment, and the guarantee
describes the functionality provided by the system under the stated environment
condition.
For a particular state transition, the EVT A proof obligation of the modal views
can be used to infer the domain restriction predicate. The proof obligation has the
following simplified form:
I(v) ∧H(v) =⇒ Ad(v) (4.2)
where I(v) is a model invariant, H(v) is a transition domain restriction, and Ad(v)
represents the disjunction of all relevant assumptions (see EVT A in Section 3.4). We
assume the restriction predicate consists of two parts:
H(v) = Hf (v) ∧Ht(v) (4.3)
where Hf (v) is the functional part already specified by the developer, and Ht(v) is
the fault tolerance part that is to be inferred from the modal view.
In order to satisfy proof obligation (4.2), the fault tolerance part of the restriction
predicate would be Ht = Ad. However, Ad may also contain assumptions about func-
tionality, and generally is a disjunction of several modes. We assume that invariants
define a relationship between functional and error state variables that can be used to
simplify Ad. For such simplification, existing provers can be used to apply inference
rules to the following:
I(v) ∧Hf (v) =⇒ Ad(v) (4.4)
Invariant I(v) combined with the functional part of predicate Hf (v) can help in elim-
inating a substantial part of Ad(v) arriving at a simplified predicate:
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I(v) ∧Hf (v) =⇒ A′d(v) (4.5)
The resulting predicate A′d(v) can be suggested to the user as a possible fault tolerance
part of restriction predicate Ht(v) that will satisfy EVT A.
It is possible that the suggested predicate can make the whole restriction predicate
H(v) false. Such a case signifies a contradiction between the behavioural model and
the view. Proof obligation ENBL of the modal views becomes unprovable which may
serve as an indication of the contradiction.
4.6.4 Application in Event-B
We show the behaviour restriction step applied at step M3 of the airlock case study.
The M3 modal view of the airlock describes the modal behaviour of the system under
differing error and logical conditions. The modal view is shown in Figure 4.11. We
apply the behavioural split template to modes Door1, Door2 and Trapped: we split
each of the modes into two new modes. For example, mode Door2 closing restricts
the system to only operate with the second door, and only contains events that close
or stop the door but do not open it. Upon the door closure, the system switches to
mode Door2 that guarantees that the pressure is set to low and the door is closed,
and thus only allows operating the first door.
Normal
Door1
Door2
Trapped
Door1_closing
Door2_closing
Trapped_closing_door1 Degraded
Broken
Figure 4.11: Modal view of airlock M3 model
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Abstract mode Stop is split into two modes Broken and Degraded using the error
split template. The two modes differentiate between two different situations: the first
situation arises when the system stops upon the detection of a complete door failure,
the second situation is the safe stop due to the degraded state of both doors. The
two stop modes can also contain failure-free behaviour such as two modes of a safety
alarm although this is not modelled in the case study.
Let us focus on one of the events of the model and the modes in which it par-
ticipates. Event open1 initiates opening of the first door. It is associated with two
modes Normal and Door2. The system is in mode Normal when all components are
fully operational and, thus, the first door can be opened. The mode Door2 depicts a
situation when the second door is degraded and closed, and, thus, only the first door
can be opened. The first door cannot be opened in all other modes as it is unsafe to
do so. The A/G predicates of the two modes mentioned are shown on Snippet 4.5.
mode Normal =̂
Assumption: door1 cond = OK ∧ door2 cond = OK
Guarantee: TRUE
mode Door2 =̂
Assumption: door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door1 cond = OK ∧
pressure = LOW PRESSURE
Guarantee: pressure′ = LOW PRESSURE ∧ door2′ = CLOSED
Snippet 4.5: The modes of M3 that can open the first door
On the previous levels, the guard of event open1 only contained functional condi-
tions of M0 and a fault tolerance condition of M1 that states that the system must be
running in order to open and close its doors. At M3, the event is restricted by error
state conditions of components derived from the modal view.
Let us apply the general form of proof obligation EV T A to event open1 (we omit
the full invariant and the guard for brevity):
I ∧H =⇒ (door1 cond = OK ∧ door2 cond = OK)∨
(door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door1 cond = OK∧
∧pressure = LOW PRESSURE)
(4.6)
From the functional guard of the event defined at M0 we know that
pressure = LOW PRESSURE (4.7)
this simplifies the goal of (4.6):
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I ∧H =⇒ door1 cond = OK∧
(door2 cond = OK ∨ door2 cond = DEGRADED) (4.8)
From gluing invariant inv4 at M2 we know the following:
door1 cond = BROKEN ∨ door2 cond = BROKEN∨
(door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED∧
obj presence = FALSE)⇔ stopped = TRUE
(4.9)
By negating (4.9) and applying it to (4.8), we arrive at:
I ∧H =⇒ door1 cond = OK (4.10)
Thus, using the previously defined invariants and information available from the
modal view, we can suggest extending the guard of event open1 with door1 cond =
OK to satisfy the modal view. Such suggestion is inferred for every event in model
M3 given that the association between events and modes is consistent and satisfies
other proof obligations of modal views. The suggestions may contain both error state
and functional conditions. At the M3 step, we extend each of the functional events
that operate with the two doors and the chamber pump by additional guards inferred
from the associated modal view.
The current and all the previous steps facilitate the development of reactive system
behaviour that is proven to maintain the required safety properties. The following
two steps refine the abstract system model with implementation-level details. The two
steps follow the abstract reactive modelling and finalise the modelling with sequential
decomposition of the system.
4.7 Hardware
The component refinement and the behaviour restriction steps are performed in a
top-down manner until the reactive model of the system contains the required safety
properties. If the system interacts with the physical environment, then at the lowest
level the system must contain a means for such interaction. The functional and fault
tolerant behaviour obtained using the previous two steps can be further refined by
introducing hardware units such as sensors and actuators. This step is a special case
of the fault tolerant component refinement step that is applied at the lowest level of
abstraction. This step only includes the refinement of the fault tolerant part of the
system components. The functional refinement is done at the next step.
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4.7.1 Application of fault tolerant component refinement
The components defined during the previous steps are logical and may consist of a
number of hardware units. Each of the hardware units can fail and thus the system
needs to be aware of their error states. To properly represent the hardware at the
lowest level of abstraction, we apply the error state variable pattern:
For each hardware unit (sensors, actuators, or higher level hardware compo-
nent), specify a variable depicting the error state of the unit.
The hardware error state variables have to be linked to the abstract system com-
ponents. This is done by applying the error state invariant pattern:
Define a relation between the hardware error states and abstract component
error states.
The actual gluing invariants between the error states of the abstract components
and those of the hardware units are project-specific. It is possible for the error state
of a hardware unit to contribute to a number of abstract components. The level
of abstraction used for hardware components is also project-specific. The system
behaviour can rely on complex hardware subsystems. In this case, levels of abstraction
for functionality and errors can be different.
4.7.2 Application in Event-B
At the M4 step of the airlock development, we refine one of the doors into its hard-
ware units. As required by ENV4, each door is equipped with four such units.
We model the error states of each of the sensors and the actuator by a boolean
variable as shown on Snippet 4.6. The error states of the abstract door compo-
nent need to be refined by error states of the hardware units. Gluing invariant
inv door1 sensors conditions BROKEN links the abstract BROKEN state with
appropriate combinations of the motor and the sensors. Likewise, other two states
OK and DEGRADED are refined and can be found in Appendix A. The events
that had their guards or actions referencing the door error state variables have to
be refined in terms of sensor and actuator error states. As the functional behaviour
has been restricted previously by the the behaviour restriction pattern, most of the
functional and all the detection events are refined.
The refinement of the second door component by its four hardware units is equiv-
alent to that of the first door and is omitted for brevity.
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invariants
inv door1 pos cond: door1 pos cond ∈ BOOL
inv door1 closed cond: door1 closed cond ∈ BOOL
inv door1 opened cond: door1 opened cond ∈ BOOL
inv door1 motor cond: door1 motor cond ∈ BOOL
inv door1 sensors conditions BROKEN: door1 cond = BROKEN ⇔
door1 motor cond = FALSE ∨ (door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
Snippet 4.6: Error states of sensors and actuators at M4
4.8 Control Cycle
A typical control system operates in a cycle with a certain (fixed or dynamic) fre-
quency. During its operation, the control system reads the values of the sensors,
performs the control algorithm, and produces commands for the actuators in order
to control the environment. The functional state of the sensors and actuators is also
a part of the system and represents the knowledge of the system about the physical
phenomena. The actual values of the physical phenomena are unknown to the system
and can only be inferred from the sensed data.
Up to this step, the system development followed the reactive style of modelling.
As a result of applying the previous steps of the method, the system consists of
high-level functional components and their error states represented by the low-level
sensors and actuators. The functional connection between the high-level logic and low-
level values of sensors and actuators cannot be expressed using data refinement and
reactive modelling as discussed in Section 4.1.6. This step offers a modelling solution
for extending the previously developed reactive system with a sequential control cycle.
The reactive part of the system takes place during the control algorithm step of the
cycle. Sequential decomposition of the reactive model is a part of implementation -
the step does not help to specify what the system does but it specifies how the system
operates.
The control cycle step is partly derived from our previous work on incorporating
FMEA into Event-B specifications [Lop+11]. We model four phases of the cycle
and provide patterns for filling each of the phases. The major difference from our
previous work lies in the level of abstraction at which we regard it as reasonable to
apply such a sequential decomposition. In the original work, we model the control
cycle at the abstract level and leave the control logic for further refinements. Here,
we advocate a top-down approach to modelling the functionality and extend it later
with implementation-level restrictions such as a control cycle. Thus, the control cycle
extension links with the previous steps and does not clutter the reactive model of the
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system. The patterns described in this section can also accommodate the outcomes
of the FMEA analysis, and thus the results of [Lop+11] can be reused for this work.
4.8.1 Control cycle pattern
Define a variable phase ∈ PHASE representing the current phase of the
control cycle. Define a set of four phase states that include the sensing phase, the
error detection phase, the control phase, and the prediction phase. Define four
transitions that represent the behaviour during phases correspondingly.
The control cycle pattern splits the operation of the system into four sequential steps.
During the sensing phase, the system reads the sensor values. During the second
phase, it applies the low-level error detection mechanisms. The third phase contains
the control algorithm, which is the reactive model of the system that was developed
previously. The control algorithm produces new logical components’ states and a set
of signals for the actuators. The new states and the actuator signals are used at the
final prediction phase to predict the sensor readings at the next iteration of the cycle.
The results produced by the prediction step are used by the detection mechanisms
during the next iteration.
The actual transitions for each of the phases are defined by the following four
patterns.
4.8.2 Sensing pattern
The error state variables of the system hardware units and their usage were already
defined during the previous development step (see Section 4.7). This pattern defines
the functional states of the hardware units:
Define a variable for each of the hardware units that would represent the
functional state of the unit. Non-deterministically assign a new value to the
variable during the sensing phase.
The values of the sensor variables represent the state of the sensors at the current
iteration after the sensing phase. We represent the system environment by assigning
non-deterministic values to the variables. The environment can be refined further dur-
ing later steps if necessary. We do not formally specify the environmental phenomena
such as laws of physics.
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4.8.3 Error detection pattern
The next phase of the control cycle compares the sensor readings, which were obtained
from the sensing phase, with the allowed range of values. The detection phase returns
the detected hardware error states that are then used by the control algorithm.
The first step to implementing the detection mechanism is defining the variables
necessary for correct refinement of the abstract model:
Define a variable for each of the hardware units that would represent the error
state as detected by the error detection phase. Assign new values to the variables
based on the sensor readings introduced by the sensing pattern, last known sensor
error states, and sensor values produced by the prediction pattern during the
previous iteration.
The detected error state variables are a copy of the sensor error state variables
defined by the hardware pattern (see Section 4.7). The new error state variables are
required for the error detection phase to ensure the correct refinement of the abstract
reactive model.
The newly defined variables are assigned new values by detection transition
cycle detect. The assignments represent the detection mechanisms used by the sys-
tem. We define several types of low-level error detection mechanisms based on the
sources of information for the detection:
• the sensor reading may be compared against the statically defined acceptable
range of values;
• the system may expect a certain value from the sensor reading that is based on
the previous iteration of the cycle;
• the sensor reading may be compared to the active redundant sensors.
There may be other types of error checks depending on the system, we do not
intend to cover all possible error detection mechanisms. Error detection at this level
of abstraction is done sequentially as opposed to the abstract error detection described
in Section 4.5.3.
4.8.4 Control phase patterns
We represent the control phase by the reactive behaviour of the system that is de-
veloped using the previous method steps. The reactive model of the system contains
transitions that change the hardware error states and represent the system fault tol-
erance. The results of the detection phase of the control cycle are used here to feed
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the obtained hardware error states to the reactive behaviour. Similarly, the sensor
readings are used by the functional part of the system to ensure that the sensor values
match the abstract logical state of the components.
The functional control phase pattern:
Restrict the functional transitions with additional domain restriction that spec-
ifies the sensor values necessary for the execution of the transition. The domain re-
striction has to be of the following form: sensor cond = TRUE⇒P (sensor value)
where sensor cond is the hardware error state variable, and P (sensor value) is a
predicate over the acceptable sensor values. The functional control phase pattern
ensures that the value of the sensor is only used when the sensor is in a working
condition hence the implication. The added restriction predicate models the relation
between the concrete-level hardware units and the abstract component states.
The fault tolerant control phase pattern ensures that the abstract error detection
is refined to use the information obtained from the detection phase:
Restrict the domain of error detection transitions to include the previously
detected hardware error states. Use the detected states as new values for abstract
error states.
At the abstract level, error detection transitions represented the environment as a
non-deterministic choice between different errors. This pattern restricts the detection
transitions by using the detected error states, thereby providing a place for imple-
menting the detection mechanisms.
During the control algorithm, the reactive behaviour of the system uses the sensor
readings and the error state variables to change its logical state and produce signals
for the actuators. The actuators are assumed to receive the signals instantly.
4.8.5 Prediction phase pattern
The last phase of the control cycle produces the expectations of the system about the
sensor states at the next iteration.
Define a prediction variable for each of the sensor values. Assign the predicted
value at the last phase of the control cycle.
Thus, the variables defined are a copy of the sensor value variables with the same
types. The prediction represents the assumptions about the environmental phenom-
ena, and the expectation of the system about the next state of its components. The
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prediction variables are then used at the detection phase by the error detection pat-
tern.
This is the last step of the method. After this step, the system is sufficiently
detailed and can be used for implementation. The implementation can be manual
or automated for a particular family of models that incorporate the control system
patterns. The resulting formal specification can also be used for test-case generation
to ensure correctness of the final code.
4.8.6 Application in Event-B
We exemplify the five patterns described in this section in Event-B and demonstrate
their application on the airlock case study. Firstly, we instantiate the control cycle
pattern by defining the four events of a control cycle as shown on Snippet 4.7. The
events represent the four control cycle phases as described in Section 4.8.1. This is
ensured by guards grd phase and actions act phase.
axioms
axm1: partition(PHASE, {ENV }, {DET}, {CONT}, {PRED})
invariants
inv phase: phase ∈ PHASE
inv1: door1 pos ∈ Z
inv2: door1 opened ∈ BOOL
inv3: door1 closed ∈ BOOL
inv4: door1 pos predicted ∈ Z
inv5: door1 opened predicted ∈ BOOL
inv6: door1 closed predicted ∈ BOOL
inv7: door1 motor ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
inv10: door1 pos cond detected ∈ BOOL
events
event cycle sense =̂
when
grd phase: phase = ENV
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act phase: phase := DET
act5 1: door1 pos :∈ Z
act5 2: door1 opened :∈ BOOL
act5 3: door1 closed :∈ BOOL
end
event cycle detect =̂
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when
grd phase: phase = DET
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act phase: phase := CONT
act5 1: door1 pos cond detected := bool(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(min door ≤ door1 pos ∧ door1 pos ≤ max door) ∧
(door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 opened = TRUE⇒
door1 pos = max door) ∧
(door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed = TRUE⇒
door1 pos = min door) ∧
(door1 pos = door1 pos predicted))
end
event open1 =̂ extends open1
when
grd phase: phase = CONT
grd pos: door1 pos cond = TRUE⇒ door1 pos < max door ∧
(door1 pos = min door⇒ door1 = CLOSED) ∧
(door1 pos > min door⇒ door1 = STOPPED)
grd closed: door1 closed cond = TRUE⇒
(door1 closed = TRUE⇒ door1 = CLOSED)
grd opened: door1 opened cond = TRUE⇒ door1 opened = FALSE
then
act phase: phase := PRED
act motor: door1 motor := 1
end
event degrade door1 =̂ refines degrade door1
when
grd phase: phase = CONT
grd degradation: (door1 pos cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 pos cond =
TRUE) ∨
(door1 closed cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 opened cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 motor cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE)
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd7: door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
grd glue: door1 motor cond detected = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond detected =
TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond detected = TRUE) ∨
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(door1 pos cond detected = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond detected = FALSE ∨door1 closed cond detected =
FALSE)))
with
pos cond : pos cond = door1 pos cond detected
opened cond : opened cond = door1 opened cond detected
closed cond : closed cond = door1 closed cond detected
motor cond : motor cond = door1 motor cond detected
then
act phase: phase := PRED
act5 0: door1 pos cond := door1 pos cond detected
act5 1: door1 closed cond := door1 closed cond detected
act5 2: door1 opened cond := door1 opened cond detected
act5 3: door1 motor cond := door1 motor cond detected
end
event cycle predict =̂
when
grd phase: phase = PRED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act phase: phase := ENV
act5 1: door1 pos predicted := door1 pos+ door1 motor
act5 2: door1 opened predicted := bool(
(door1 motor = 1 ∧ door1 pos = max door − 1) ∨
(door1 motor = 0 ∧ door1 opened = TRUE))
act5 3: door1 closed predicted := bool(
(door1 motor = −1 ∧ door1 pos = min door + 1) ∨
(door1 motor = 0 ∧ door1 closed = TRUE))
end
Snippet 4.7: Modelling the control cycle at M5
We apply the sensing pattern and define four variables representing the sensed
values of the hardware units. We only model the hardware units of the first door
as required by ENV4. Sensor door1 pos returns the position of the door that is
represented as an integer value (see inv1). Sensors door1 opened and door1 closed
are boolean sensors at the two extreme positions of the door (inv2 and inv3 cor-
respondingly). The signal for actuator door1 motor represents the direction of the
door movement: −1 for closing, 1 for opening, and 0 for stable position (inv7). The
sensing phase of the control cycle is represented by event cycle sense. It assigns ar-
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bitrary values to the sensor readings as we do not formally model the environmental
phenomena.
At the next phase, the system executes its error detection mechanisms represented
by event cycle detect. Snippet 4.7 shows an example of error detection for the posi-
tioning sensor of the first door. The error detection for the sensor includes the three
types of detection mechanisms, and ensures that once the sensor failure is detected,
the value will be kept during all subsequent iterations.
Once the hardware functional and error states are obtained, they are used dur-
ing control phase to execute the system functional and fault tolerant behaviour. For
example, we apply the functional control phase pattern and extend functional event
open1 with additional guards (grd pos, grd closed, and grd opened) stating the ex-
pected functional and error states. The event now also produces a signal to the motor
actuator by its action act motor. An example of applying the fault tolerant control
phase pattern is a refinement of detection event degrade door1 shown on Snippet 4.7.
The event now contains a number of guards that use the values obtained during the
error detection phase to refine the previously non-deterministic error detection. Event
actions directly assign the detected values to the error state variables defined during
reactive modelling. The refinement relation is formally ensured by providing new
detected values as event witnesses.
The last phase of the control cycle is the prediction phase. On Snippet 4.7, we show
the predictions of the next expected states of the three sensors in event cycle predict.
For example, sensor door1 pos is expected to change its value according to the signal
given to the motor, and return door1 pos+ door1 motor during the next iteration.
The application of the control cycle step finalises the modelling of the airlock
system, and provides placeholders in the model for further implementation.
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4.9 Summary of Patterns
We provide a summary of modelling patterns and modal view templates that are used
by the method in Table 4.1. The patterns are described in details in corresponding
sections of this chapter as provided in the table.
Name Section Description
Safe stop pattern 4.4.1 A starting point for modelling fault tolerant behaviour.
Introduced model elements are refined at later steps
Error state vari-
able pattern
4.5.1 Defines representation of components error state
Error state invari-
ant pattern
4.5.2 Links components error state at the current level with
the abstract component
Fault tolerant be-
haviour pattern
4.5.3 Defines behaviour of the environment and ensures the
appropriate system reaction
Behaviour restric-
tion pattern
4.6.1 Restricts the functional behaviour with fault tolerance
constraints
Control cycle pat-
tern
4.8.1 Introduces a control loop by sequentially decomposing
the model
Sensing pattern 4.8.2 Defines functional states of sensors and actuators, and
the sensing phase of the control loop
Error detection
pattern
4.8.3 Defines the error detection phase of the control loop and
variables that represent the detected error states of the
components
Functional con-
trol phase pattern
4.8.4 Links the reactive functionality with the sensor values
obtained during the sensing phase
Fault tolerant
control phase
pattern
4.8.4 Refines the abstract representation of errors by values
that were obtained during the detection phase
Prediction phase
pattern
4.8.5 Defines the prediction phase of the control loop and vari-
ables that represent expectations of the system about the
future functional states of components
Error split tem-
plate
4.5.4 Splits an abstract error transition (and associated recov-
ery and degraded modes) into two or more concrete errors
Behavioural split
template
4.5.4 Refines an abstract mode by a sequence of two modes,
introduces an intermediate mode
Graceful degrada-
tion template
4.5.4 Extends a system operation mode with a sequence of de-
graded modes
Table 4.1: Summary of proposed patterns
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4.10 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed a method for top-down development of fault tolerant
systems. The method focuses on a notion of fault tolerant component and provides
a modelling solution to connecting the refinement of component errors with system
functionality through behaviour restriction.
We described the modelling principles and assumptions that should be adhered
to during modelling. Based on the principles, we proposed a refinement strategy for
building reactive models of systems and further sequential decomposition leading to
implementation of control systems. We identified a number of patterns that support
the refinement strategy throughout the chapter, and provided a summary of all the
modelling patterns and modal view templates.
We demonstrated the proposed method on a medium-scale case study. The air-
lock system has been modelled using the Rodin development environment and the
associated plug-ins for Event-B model transformations and modal views modelling.
To evaluate the method and the tools, we model another case study from a different
domain that we describe in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5. Evaluation
The aim of this chapter is to report on evaluation of the method proposed in Chap-
ter 4. The evaluation process consists in applying the proposed steps of the method
to developing an industrial case study. By developing the system, we validate the
research hypotheses which we reprise in the following statements:
• The method supports and encourages top-down specification of fault tolerant
system behaviour with the purpose of correct design of system fault tolerance
in a refinement-based formal method
• The method provides a general refinement strategy which specifies the steps
that need to be taken to arrive at a correct model of a fault tolerant system
• The refinement strategy is derived from modelling principles and is supported
by modelling patterns
• The method provides facilities for explicit modelling of fault tolerance
• The method maintains the applicability of the formal method to modelling the
system functionality, and allows for smooth integration of functionality with
fault tolerant behaviour
To support the evaluation statements, we model the Attitude and Orbit Control
System (AOCS) case study. This is a medium-scale control system which was inde-
pendently developed by several industrial companies from the aerospace domain. One
of them is Space Systems Finland (SSF) [SSF] which was one of four industrial part-
ners of the DEPLOY project. We define our simplified requirements for the system
based on project deliverable [D3.1] and associated internal requirements documents.
The chapter is organised as follows. We introduce the requirements for the AOCS
system in Section 5.1, then we provide the relevant parts of the models and describe
the steps performed during modelling in Section 5.2, and we summarise our evaluation
in Section 5.3.
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5.1 Requirements for AOCS
In this section, we present the requirements for the AOCS system that we use during
the modelling process.
The Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) [D3.1] is a generic component of
a satellite onboard software operating in the following environment:
ENV1. The environment of the AOCS consists of the physical phenomena of
Newtonian dynamics applied to the object in orbit around the Earth, and other
phenomena measured by the payload instrument.
The main function of the AOCS is defined as follows:
FUN1. The AOCS is a control system which ensures the desired attitude and
orbit of a satellite. The control is necessary for the payload instrument to fulfil
its mission.
Due to the tendency of a satellite to change its orientation because of disturbances
from the environment, the attitude needs to be continuously monitored and adjusted.
An optimal attitude is required to support the needs of payload instruments. For
example, attitude control may ensure that an optical system of the spacecraft will
continuously cover the required area on the ground. To fulfil the mission the AOCS
is controlling a number of hardware units of the satellite:
ENV2. The AOCS is equipped with three hardware units: the Earth sensor
(ES) gives the distance and the orientation relative to the Earth, the GPS sensor
provides the GPS coordinates of the satellite, and the Payload instrument (PLI)
fulfils the mission of the satellite by reading the relevant information from the
environment.
The AOCS uses the ES and GPS hardware units to keep the satellite on a desired
trajectory. The operation of the AOCS is mode-based which is described by FUN2:
FUN2. The AOCS can operate in a number of system modes. Each system
mode is associated with a set of required unit modes. The ultimate function of the
AOCS is to acquire the best possible system mode where the payload instrument
is gathering its data.
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Off
Science
Nominal
all units: OFF
ES: ON
GPS: COARSE
PLI: OFF
ES: OFF
GPS: FINE
PLI: ON
Figure 5.1: AOCS system modes
In this case study, a satellite can be in three operational modes: Off, Nominal,
and Science. The satellite is in the Off mode from the moment separation from the
launcher is achieved. In this mode the AOCS is not operational; this mode is regarded
as a preparatory phase. From the Off mode, the AOCS progresses to modes where
more sensors are involved. The next mode to switch to is Nominal; in this mode the
ES and GPS units are switched on, and the satellite acquires and preserves a stable
attitude. The overall aim is to enter and stay in the Science mode where fine GPS
positioning is achieved and scientific instruments (PLI units) are reporting readings.
The described mode switching behaviour is a requirement that can be captured as a
diagram shown in Figure 5.1.
Similar to the airlock example, the AOCS also operates in a fragile environment:
ENV3. Any of the satellite units can fail to provide its service.
To tolerate such faults, the system hardware is provided with redundancy:
ENV4. Each unit is supported by a redundant cold spare which can be used
when the main unit fails.
The AOCS is expected to handle the control algorithm related errors (such as
attitude computation errors) and the unit errors (including all errors related to loss
of accuracy, invalid data, etc.). Such errors may happen at any moment of time
including the transition phase between modes.
FT1. Upon the detection of any unit error, the AOCS must degrade to a lower
mode in which the failed unit is not used. The failed unit must be replaced with
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its spare. When the spare unit fails, the AOCS is no longer permitted to operate
in those modes which use the failed type of unit.
For example, if both PLI units fail, the satellite can no longer operate in the
Science mode, and is forced to stay in the Nominal mode. At the moment of failure,
the system must degrade to a lower mode which is shown by backward transitions in
Figure 5.1.
The requirements for the AOCS case study are derived from one of the DEPLOY
project deliverables in space sector [D3.1]. The deliverable and related documents
contain an industrial description of the AOCS system. The industrial requirements
are simplified for clarity of the present work. Namely, the five modes of the original
system are reduced to three in the case study due to their generic representation
in the model. Attitude errors of the original system are not present in the case
study because they are treated in our method as a type of transition errors. We
further simplify the requirements by removing the concepts of mode, unit, and FDIR
managers. We believe that the mentioned concepts represent software components,
i.e. implementation, and should not be considered by our method.
Although AOCS is a control system, we do not intend to model the actual control
algorithm. We focus on high-level logic of modal and fault tolerant behaviour of the
system for evaluation purposes. The proposed case study was chosen and is adequate
for evaluation of the method for the following reasons:
• It contains realistic requirements derived from industrial documents
• AOCS is a critical system and, therefore, needs to tolerate faults during its op-
eration. Requirements include fault tolerance in a form of graceful degradation
which cross-cuts the functionality
• As shown later, all the method steps for modelling reactive fault tolerant systems
can be exemplified during modelling AOCS
• The system is mode-based, which allows us to evaluate the applicability of
Mode/FT Views
The case study is limited to modelling a particular component of a real system
specification. There may be certain relevant behaviour of the rest of the system that
is not modelled here. For example, we focus on the abstract development of reactive
modal behaviour of the AOCS and do not model the actual control algorithm. Also,
the case study does not fully demonstrate the usefulness of event guard suggestions
described in Section 4.6.3. This is due to inherently modal nature of the case study.
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Similar to the airlock case study, we assume that error detection procedures and
system state changes happen negligibly quick. Although in such a form, this assump-
tion does not typically hold in real systems, we believe it is sufficient in this case for
the purpose of demonstration of the proposed method.
5.2 AOCS modelling
During the development of the AOCS system, the steps and the patterns described
in Chapter 4 are used. Before modelling, we identify the refinement steps that need
to be performed based on the specified requirements.
M0
M1 View1
M2
M3
M4
View2
View3
View4
Abstract units functionality
Safe stop
Functional refinement
Modes
Functional refinement
Unit configurations
FT refinement
Behaviour restriction
Figure 5.2: AOCS case study models
As required by FUN2, we need to model system modes and associated unit modes.
The prominent solution would be to define modes and refine the more “abstract”
modal behaviour by units operation. What might seem to be the right way of re-
finement, however, would lead to complications at further levels during development.
Each of the system modes would need to be refined by each of the participating units,
e.g. both Nominal and Science modes would need to be refined by operation of the
GPS unit, which means there would be two artificial events representing essentially
the same unit behaviour. In terms of our method, such a refinement step would rep-
resent a state refinement which is hardly applicable for relating system modes with
unit modes. Instead, we treat the system modes as a behaviour restriction over units
operation. That is, units represent the abstract behaviour of the system which can
be restricted, and the phenomenon of system modes is a horizontal state expansion
which restricts the units’ operation. Therefore, we model units at an earlier step than
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we do modes. We conduct the same planning for the fault tolerant part of the system
behaviour: we further restrict the units operation by detecting and acting upon unit
errors. Following the method steps, unit errors need to refine the abstract system
failure, therefore, we need to introduce safe stop before we model unit errors. This
example shows the necessity of (informal) refinement planning.
Using our reasoning about the system components and behaviour which need to
be modelled, we define the refinement steps which are shown in Figure 5.2. The
model of the AOCS case study includes five Event-B machines and four modal views.
We start with modelling the abstract unit functionality at M0 which is described in
Section 5.2.1. Then we introduce a system safe stop at M1 which is briefly discussed
in Section 5.2.2. We conduct functional refinement at levels M2 and M3 and intro-
duce modes and unit reconfiguration which is discussed in Section 5.2.3. Model M4
refines the AOCS safe stop into unit errors, and uses them to restrict the functional
behaviour. We split the description of M4 into two sections: the fault tolerant com-
ponent refinement is discussed in Section 5.2.5 and the behaviour restriction step is
discussed in Section 5.2.6.
5.2.1 Functional model M0
The first model of the AOCS case study contains the abstract functionality of the
system. It corresponds to the failure-free step of the proposed development method.
The model defines the functional states of the three system units. The functionality
of each unit is abstractly modelled by two events: event work corresponds to the
unit operation, and event switch represents the switch of the unit between functional
states. Snippet 5.1 shows the two events for the ES unit. The units GPS and PLI are
represented similarly.
We omit modelling the actual control algorithm because such modelling should
be either postponed until later steps or modelled using continuous-time notations.
Therefore, events work for the three units contain no actions, they represent a mere
fact that the units perform something useful when in operation.
At this stage, the model only represents the ability of the units to perform their
function and switch between their modes which is required by ENV2. The model
corresponds to the failure-free functionality step of the method. The units operation
and switching between unit modes is the most abstract unrestricted functionality that
covers any possible combination of units. All further refinements introduce restrictions
in a form of disallowing certain units to operate or switch as a result of functional
and environmental causes.
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axioms
axm1: UNIT OFF = 0
axm2: UNIT ON = 1
axm3: GPS COARSE = 1
axm4: GPS FINE = 2
invariants
inv1: unitES ∈ {UNIT ON,UNIT OFF}
inv2: unitGPS ∈ {UNIT OFF,GPS COARSE,GPS FINE}
inv3: unitPLI ∈ {UNIT OFF,UNIT ON}
events
event ES work =̂
when
grd1: unitES = UNIT ON
then
skip
end
event ES switch =̂
any
newState
where
grd1: newState ∈ {UNIT ON,UNIT OFF}
grd2: newState 6= unitES
then
act1: unitES := newState
end
Snippet 5.1: AOCS model M0
5.2.2 Safe stop at M1
AOCS is a safe stop system in terms of the controlled units. When a unit fails in
such a way that the system can no longer operate, it switches to the stop mode which
depicts a safe mode where none of the three units are required.
At the M1 modelling step we apply the safe stop step described in Section 4.4.
The Event-B model is extended according to the safe stop pattern, and the modal
view of the system follows the safe stop template and contains two modes: Operation
and Stop. This step is required because we plan to refine the safe stop by unit errors
at one of the next refinement levels.
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5.2.3 Functional refinement at M2
At the next two steps M2 and M3 we restrict the unit switching events by modelling
the AOCS system modes of operation. First, we introduce the system modes and
transitions, and restrict the units operation by modal requirements. On the next level
we restrict the modes reconfiguration process by ensuring that the reconfiguration
takes place until all units switch to their appropriate modes. In terms of our method,
M2 contains a state refinement and a behaviour restriction step, and M3 contains a
behaviour restriction step towards system reconfiguration. The refinement steps M2
and M3 also demonstrate how the modal views are applied to modelling of functional
behaviour.
invariants
inv1: stable ∈ BOOL
inv2: mode ∈MODE
events
event goAdvance =̂
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: stable = TRUE
grd2: mode < SCIENCE
then
act1: mode := mode+ 1
act2: stable := FALSE
end
event downgrade =̂
any
newMode
where
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd par: newMode ∈MODE
grd1: mode > OFF
grd2: newMode < mode
then
act1: mode := newMode
act2: stable := FALSE
end
Snippet 5.2: Introducing AOCS system modes at M2
At M2 we introduce the system modes and the process of system reconfiguration.
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As shown on Snippet 5.2, we define two new events goAdvance and downgrade that
represent the initiation of the reconfiguration process. State variables mode and
stable describe the current mode of operation. When stable = FALSE, variable
mode contains the target mode for the reconfiguration. When stable = TRUE, the
system invokes the units functionality as required by a particular mode. So far, the
only functional property that M2 provides is the behavioural ability to switch between
modes. However, system modes do not define any formal relationship with unit modes
- the reconfiguration process is modelled in its unrestricted form.
In order to meet the requirement FUN2, we need to associate system modes with
appropriate subsets of units. We apply the behaviour restriction step to the functional
behaviour and restrict units operation to allowed subsets of modes. For example, unit
ES is required to switch on and work in the Nominal system mode and should be
switched off in any other mode (Snippet 5.3). This is a direct application of the
behaviour restriction pattern where instead of error state variables we use a part of
the functional behaviour (system modes).
events
event ES work =̂ extends ES work
when
grd mode: mode = NOMINAL
then
skip
end
event ES switch on =̂ refines ES switch
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitES = UNIT OFF
grd2: mode = NOMINAL
with
newState: newState = UNIT ON
then
act1: unitES := UNIT ON
end
Snippet 5.3: Adding functional modes at M2
The modal view of M2 reflects the introduced modes of operation as shown in
Figure 5.3. Three modes Off, Nominal and Science refine abstract mode Operation.
The assumptions of the modes are of form mode =< MODE >, where < MODE >
is substituted for specific mode constants accordingly. The modes refer to the appro-
priate unit events. For example, mode Nominal only allows operation for the ES and
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Off
Science
Nominal Stop
Figure 5.3: Modal view of AOCS M2 model
mode Nominal =̂
Assumption: mode = NOMINAL ∧ stopped = FALSE
Guarantee: stopped′ = FALSE
Events: GPS switch off, PLI switch off,ES switch on,GPS switch on,
ES work,GPS work, reconf finish
Snippet 5.4: The Nominal mode of the AOCS M2
GPS units but disallows the PLI unit to work or switch on (Snippet 5.4).
Each of the events of mode Nominal have to satisfy the appropriate proof obliga-
tions for that mode. Namely, the event guard needs to satisfy the mode assumption
as required by the EVT A proof obligation. The modal view in Figure 5.3 is used for
behavioural restriction of units’ operation, and we strengthen the guards of the unit
events as described in Section 4.6.3.
Note that the system normal operation on the view is equivalent to the diagram
from Figure 5.1 which represents the requirement. Thus, we show that an informal
requirement described in a simple diagram may be formalised using modal views and
incorporated into a formal (Event-B) modelling process.
5.2.4 Functional refinement at M3
This step refines the unrestricted reconfiguration process. Currently, the system
can initiate and finalise the reconfiguration arbitrarily, without considering the unit
modes. At this level we apply a behaviour restriction step to system modes. We
strengthen the events responsible for switching between system modes to ensure that
the reconfiguration initiates and finalises correctly.
We introduce a mapping between the modes and configurations of units. Specifi-
cally, we add invariants which map each of the modes to its associated units as shown
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on Snippet 5.5. Event reconf finish is extended with a guard which satisfies the
invariant and ensures that after reconfiguration the unit modes correspond to the
system mode. The guards of the switching events are extended to ensure that the
units can only switch on and off during the reconfiguration process (exemplified by
event ES switch on on the snippet).
invariants
inv modes1: mode = OFF ∧ stable = TRUE⇒
unitES = UNIT OFF ∧ unitGPS = UNIT OFF ∧ unitPLI = UNIT OFF
inv modes2: mode = NOMINAL ∧ stable = TRUE⇒
unitES = UNIT ON ∧unitGPS = GPS COARSE ∧unitPLI = UNIT OFF
inv modes3: mode = SCIENCE ∧ stable = TRUE⇒
unitES = UNIT OFF ∧ unitGPS = GPS FINE ∧ unitPLI = UNIT ON
inv modes4: unitES = UNIT ON ∨ unitGPS ∈ {GPS FINE,GPS COARSE} ∨
unitPLI = UNIT ON ⇒¬(stable = TRUE ∧mode = OFF )
events
event ES switch on =̂ extends ES switch on
when
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
end
event reconf finish =̂ extends reconf finish
when
grd mode off: mode = OFF ⇒ unitES = UNIT OFF ∧
unitGPS = UNIT OFF ∧ unitPLI = UNIT OFF
grd mode nominal: mode = NOMINAL⇒ unitES = UNIT ON ∧
unitGPS = GPS COARSE ∧ unitPLI = UNIT OFF
grd mode science: mode = SCIENCE⇒ unitES = UNIT OFF ∧
unitGPS = GPS FINE ∧ unitPLI = UNIT ON
end
event stop =̂ extends stop
when
grd units: unitES = UNIT ON ∨ unitGPS ∈ {GPS FINE,GPS COARSE} ∨
unitPLI = UNIT ON
end
Snippet 5.5: Introducing the unit configurations of AOCS modes at M3
We double-check the reconfiguration behaviour by constructing an elaborate modal
view of the system. The modal view shown in Figure 5.4 is refined using the be-
havioural split template introduced in Section 4.5.4. Each of the operational modes is
split into two modes: the stable mode ensures the unit configuration and provides the
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unit functionality, and the preceding mode provides the appropriate reconfiguration
functionality. Snippet 5.6 lists the two new modes which refine the abstract Nominal
mode. The new Nominal mode includes the work events of the ES and GPS units
and does not take part in reconfiguration. It guarantees that in this mode the units
ES and GPS are operational and the PLI is not used. Mode toNominal is responsible
for enabling the units as required by Nominal, however, it does not guarantee the
exact unit configuration until mode Nominal is achieved.
Off
Science
Nominal Stop
ReboottoNominal
toScience
Figure 5.4: Modal view of AOCS M3 model
mode toNominal =̂
Assumption: mode = NOMINAL ∧ stable = FALSE ∧ stopped = FALSE
Guarantee: stopped′ = FALSE
Events: GPS switch off, PLI switch off,ES switch on,GPS switch on,
ES work,GPS work
mode Nominal =̂
Assumption: mode = NOMINAL ∧ stable = TRUE ∧ stopped = FALSE
Guarantee: unitES′ = UNIT ON ∧ unitGPS′ = GPS COARSE ∧
unitPLI ′ = UNIT OFF
Events: ES work,GPS work
Snippet 5.6: The behavioural split of the Nominal mode at AOCS M3
This step partly covers the requirement FT1. The model contains the necessary
behaviour for downgrading when errors are detected. However, the actual errors are
not yet defined. To do that, we apply the fault tolerant component refinement step
at the last refinement level M4.
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5.2.5 Fault tolerant component refinement at M4
At steps M0-M3 the system represents a single component from the fault tolerance
perspective. Variable stopped depicts the state of the fault-tolerant system and has
to be refined further along with the refinement of functionality which is done at steps
M2 and M3.
The M4 step of the AOCS case study refines the abstract fault tolerant component
into its subcomponents. We apply the error state variable pattern and define an
integer variable with suffix cond for each of the three units as shown on Snippet 5.7.
These variables represent the unit error states in range {0, 1, 2} which contains a
number of available units of a particular type. Initially, the system has two units of
each type (one active and one cold spare), and upon detecting an error the variables
are decremented. When a unit error state becomes zero, the system can no longer use
that unit.
To map the newly defined unit error state variables to the abstract error state,
we apply the error state invariant pattern. The AOCS system is considered to be
operational when there are at least one ES unit and one GPS unit available. This is
captured by invariant inv glue.
The model now contains the representation of the unit error state, and we define
the errors which can cause the units to fail. We introduce abstract error detection
events by applying the fault tolerant behaviour pattern. The fault tolerant behaviour
of the system consists of two events: stop and degrade. Failures of the three units
of the system must refine one of the two events. Failures of the primary units are
all tolerable and therefore they refine event degrade. On the other hand, failures of
the secondary ES and GPS units lead to the system stop and, thus, they refine event
stop. Failure of the secondary PLI unit does not stop the system and, thus, it refines
event degrade. The two detection events for the ES unit are shown on Snippet 5.7.
This refinement step demonstrates abstract modelling and refinement of errors,
and ensures the error refinement principle of the method described in Section 4.1.7.
In the method, the system errors can be seen as meaningful annotations which are
attached to appropriate system reactions. By refining reactions into errors we ensure
that the system model is reactive and we are capable of expressing rich functional and
fault tolerance properties (the principle described in Section 4.1.6). This step also
ensures the implementable causality principle (Section 4.1.5). Indeed, the guards of
the events which represent unit errors do not “block” the environment from activating
the errors. They only contain sensible conditions for limiting the error activation such
as that a unit error cannot happen if the unit is switched off. The other modelling
principles are ensured by the second part of the M4 refinement step which is given in
the next section.
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invariants
inv ES cond: unitES cond ∈ {0, 1, 2}
inv GPS cond: unitGPS cond ∈ {0, 1, 2}
inv PLI cond: unitPLI cond ∈ {0, 1, 2}
inv glue: stopped = TRUE⇔ unitES cond = 0 ∨ unitGPS cond = 0
events
event ES break =̂ refines stop
when
grd1: unitES cond = 1
grd2: unitES = UNIT ON
grd3: unitGPS cond > 0
then
act1: unitES cond := 0
act2: stopped := TRUE
end
event ES downgrade =̂ refines downgrade
when
grd1: mode > OFF
grd2: unitES = UNIT ON
grd3: unitES cond = 2
grd4: unitGPS cond > 0
with
newMode: newMode = OFF
then
act1: mode := OFF
act2: stable := FALSE
act3: unitES cond := 1
end
event ES work =̂ extends ES work
when
grd3 0: unitES cond > 0
end
Snippet 5.7: Unit error states at M4
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5.2.6 Behaviour restriction at M4
We use the error state variables which are introduced in the previous section for
behaviour restriction by a modal view. The modal view of M4 is equal to that
of M3 in terms of modes and transitions; no new modes appear during the model
refinement. However, the mode assumptions are refined to include the new unit
error state variables. As shown on Snippet 5.8, the part of the abstract assumptions
stopped = FALSE is refined by unit error state conditions. Such refinement is also
supported by the gluing invariant that was added in the previous section via the error
state invariant pattern.
mode toNominal =̂
Assumption: mode = NOMINAL ∧ stable = FALSE ∧
unitES cond > 0 ∧ unitGPS cond > 0
Guarantee: stopped′ = FALSE
Events: GPS switch off, PLI switch off,ES switch on,GPS switch on,
ES work,GPS work
mode Nominal =̂
Assumption: mode = NOMINAL ∧ stable = TRUE ∧
unitES cond > 0 ∧ unitGPS cond > 0
Guarantee: unitES′ = UNIT ON ∧ unitGPS′ = GPS COARSE ∧
unitPLI ′ = UNIT OFF
Events: ES work,GPS work
Snippet 5.8: The assumption refinement at M4 FT view
The new mode assumptions force the participating events to refine their guards
and actions to satisfy the modal view proof obligations. For example, we extend
event ES work with a guard unitES cond > 0 to ensure that the unit is used only
when at least one of the ES units is available (Snippet 5.7). Event ES break is also
extended and now contains the following among its guards: unitGPS cond > 0. This
might seem as a violation of the causality rule, however, such a guard is necessary
for satisfying the EVT A proof obligation. It does not violate any of the method
principles, and states that an error in the secondary ES unit may only happen when
at least one GPS unit is available. Indeed, with two previously failed GPS units the
system would have already stopped and ES break would not be enabled.
This step supports the multi-view development and restricted modelling principles.
By using an additional view on the model, we add rigour to the development process.
Without such a view, it would be possible to remove some of the error events from
the model and still prove the correctness. The reason behind such an omission is
95
that the formal method does not guarantee the coverage of error transitions which, in
fact, only contain informal meaning. An additional view focuses attention on abstract
errors and system modal behaviour, and formally ensures that the model implements
the former.
5.3 Conclusions
Prior to modelling the AOCS system, we conducted a refinement planning activity
and identified the refinement steps for this particular system. The steps followed
the refinement strategy proposed in Chapter 4, and were adequate for the AOCS
requirements. During modelling, we have used all the modelling patterns for building
a reactive system, and one of the view templates of the method. Namely, we used
• the safe stop pattern from Section 4.4.1 at M1,
• the error state variable and invariant patterns from Section 4.5.1 and Sec-
tion 4.5.2 correspondingly at M4,
• the fault tolerant behaviour pattern from Section 4.5.3 at M4,
• the behaviour restriction pattern from Section 4.6.1 at M4,
• the behaviour split template from Section 4.5.4 at M3.
The patterns and the refinement strategy are derived by applying the method
principles. Thus, we argue that the refinement strategy is adequate for reactive system
modelling, is supported by a set of patterns, and can be used for creating verified
models of fault tolerant systems.
The AOCS development includes a number of modal views where we explicitly
defined the system modal behaviour from both the functional and fault tolerance
perspectives. Therefore, the method supports explicit modelling of fault tolerance as
a specific case of modal specifications.
By following the top-down strategy of the method, we arrived at a model of the
AOCS system which meets both functional and fault tolerance requirements. The
behaviour restriction step ensures that the functional behaviour and properties can
be modelled in full prior to introducing the environmental restrictions which is shown
at steps M0, M2 and M3. Thus, the method maintains the applicability of the formal
method to modelling the functionality. It advocates and facilitates early modelling of
fault tolerance which is smoothly integrated with functional behaviour.
The method provides facilities for top-down specification of fault tolerant systems
in a form of a set of principles, a refinement strategy which is supported by patterns,
and an additional modal and fault tolerance viewpoint on the system. As shown
96
throughout the evaluation chapter, these facilities can be effectively used to correctly
design fault tolerant systems in a refinement-based formal method.
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Chapter 6. Conclusions
This section summarises the contributions of the thesis, discusses the strengths and
weaknesses of the proposed method, and shows some of the possible directions of
future research.
6.1 Discussions and Directions of Further Research
The principles and modelling solutions of the proposed method are based on a num-
ber of assumptions. One of the assumptions is the availability of requirements for
the system prior to modelling (see Section 4.1). The proposed method supports a
top-down development process, and we expect to have a requirements document in
order to proceed with the modelling. However, the current engineering practices are
mostly iterative; many significant parts of requirements cannot be initially given with
enough details and are refined during development. This is especially true for such
aspects of systems as dependability and, in particular, fault tolerance. In order to es-
timate reliability and other dependability properties and, thus, define fault tolerance
requirements, one needs to obtain a specification and at least a high-level design of a
system. This implies that the proposed method shall be used iteratively in conjunction
with other currently used model-based design approaches (UML, AADL), reliability
analysis techniques (FMEA, FTA), and traditional software development steps (pro-
totyping, testing). Generally, iterative process requires additional re-modelling efforts
associated with the changes in requirements. This holds for the proposed method as
well; the step-wise process of formal refinement used in the method can only pre-
serve modelling and proof efforts associated with unchanged levels of abstraction. For
example, changes in low-level behaviour of the system will require re-modelling at
low levels of abstraction whereas abstract models would be preserved. In such cases,
the correctness of abstract refinement steps is maintained without extra efforts, and
the assumption about the defined requirements is guaranteed to hold at those steps.
A truly top-down application of the method may only be realised in the context of
verifying an existing design, i.e. produced using traditional (iterative or top-down)
methods for which requirements at this stage are fully defined.
Further issue related to the definition of assumptions is a classical notion of a model
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adequacy and abstraction of environment. As stated in the principle of environment
modelling in Section 4.1.4, a model must contain an adequate representation of the
system environment. However, the continuous, real-time and stochastic aspects of
many systems may have a significant impact on the modelling and verification process
as it is not always possible to define an adequate discrete state-based abstraction
of the underlying phenomena. Thus, the proposed method is limited to modelling
and verification of those properties and behaviours for which adequate state-based
abstractions can be defined. In the context of fault tolerance modelling, this means
that important properties of many fault tolerance mechanisms cannot be verified
using the proposed method and, more generally, using non-stochastic state-based
formal methods. For example, the essential property of N-modular redundancy, i.e.
the reduced failure rate of the system, cannot be captured in the method. The
model would necessarily contain a discrete form of such a technique. At the level of
abstraction supported by the method the system with and the system without NMR
would be equivalent from the fault tolerance perspective [TTL09].
We envision a number of possible extensions of the method that could widen
its applicability. One possible extension of the approach is to use formalisms with
stochastic choice semantics [HT10; Bal01] as opposed to the currently used demonic
choice semantics. This would allow developers to express rich fault tolerance prop-
erties that involve failure rates and other probabilistic estimations. These can be
based on fault assumptions derived directly from reliability analysis techniques. For
example, fault trees could be used for deriving formal relationship between subsequent
levels of abstraction when applying the error state invariant pattern.
Currently, the method focuses on modelling the system behaviour in reactive style
and postpones sequential decomposition. This ensures expressiveness of safety prop-
erties. We regard using the Use Case (Flow) language [Ili11; Ili12] as a potentially
promising direction of work for verifying local properties carried through sequences
of steps. This could add flexibility to the method in expressing sequential behaviour
and introduce additional type of views bringing benefits associated with multi-view
development.
At the architectural level, the method supports architectural structuring during
functional refinement. Such a structuring could be also derived from an architectural
description described in an existing well-established architecture description language
such as AADL [AADL] and Wright [All97], or in a model-based design language such
as UML [JBR99] and SysML [Gro].
The second part of the method that focuses on control system modelling intro-
duces implementation-level constructs such as a control loop and explicit hardware
read/write operations (see Section 4.8). Models containing these low-level constructs
can be used to obtain verified code using existing code generators such as [EB; MS11].
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The mentioned solutions could make a strong link between the proposed method and
existing engineering tools and constitute a complete development process.
An important aspect of the proposed development method is the reuse mechanism.
It is currently based on generic modelling patterns that are domain-independent (see
Section 4.9). We envision two possible directions of improvement in this area. The first
solution targets at facilitating reuse within a particular domain. The generic patterns
could be used to instantiate formal models from those expressed in domain-specific
languages (DSL). The main purpose for such an instantiation would be verification,
and the main system design could be done using a DSL.
The second solution is domain-independent and could provide an additional benefit
of proof reuse. A formal technique that can improve reuse of modelling decisions and
proofs can be based on generalisation and further instantiation of parts or complete
models. For example, the airlock case study can be generalised to an N-door “airlock”
representing an access control system. The system would provide access to N actors
according to the (externally) defined rules. Possible instantiations of such a system
could follow rules for a single reader / single writer access, mutual exclusion, or for
N out of M accessors. We believe that such an approach would be particularly useful
during the architectural development process where architects typically seek for and
use existing solutions in the form of patterns. However, the effort required for proofs
in such an approach might be bigger than that for domain-specific models; this is due
to the generality of models and properties being verified.
The proposed method is a top-down development method that is applicable to a
wide range of problem domains. It is especially beneficial for modelling systems with
a single source of control such as embedded systems. The method does not provide
means for model decomposition which is necessary when modelling distributed sys-
tems, business applications, and communication protocols. Such systems are typically
composed of communicating subsystems with distributed logic. In these domains, the
method can be applied at the system and subsystem levels separately. To formally
connect the two levels one can use existing decomposition techniques such as shared
variables, shared events, or modularisation for Event-B [Hoa+11].
6.2 Summary and Contributions
This thesis proposes a development method for formal modelling of fault tolerant sys-
tems. The method focuses on top-down modelling of abstract fault tolerant behaviour
with the purpose of verifying fault tolerance requirements.
The method provides modelling guidelines for building fault tolerant systems. The
guidelines consist of three constituents:
• Modelling principles postulate rules which must be obeyed during modelling
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• Refinement strategy specifies a sequence of refinement steps for arriving at a
correct model
• Modelling patterns support specific refinement steps and provide a reuse mech-
anism for building fault tolerant systems
The method allows developers to further refine an abstract fault tolerant system
into a control system.
We demonstrate the applicability of the method by instantiating patterns and
templates in Event-B and modelling two medium-scale case studies. The thesis con-
tributes to the following areas:
Adoption of formal methods
The proposed development method and its contributions mentioned above further the
adoption of formal methods. The method provides formal developers with a set of
modelling guidelines that cover three levels of application. The modelling principles
facilitate general understanding of using refinement-based formal methods with inter-
leaving semantics for modelling faults and fault tolerance. The refinement strategy
introduces a well-defined sequence of steps that need to be performed to arrive at a
meaningful model. The modelling patterns and the modal view templates support
engineers with generic modelling solutions and represent a reuse mechanism.
Modelling fault tolerance for systems dependability
The method facilitates modelling fault tolerance formally from the early stages of de-
velopment. Critical systems typically employ fault tolerance as an indistinguishable
part of their behaviour. The early consideration of fault tolerance in refinement-based
methods reduces the modelling efforts, and helps to ensure the overall dependability
of such systems.
Multi-view development
The method includes additional views on the models that capture fault tolerance and
modal features of the systems. The modal viewpoint adds rigour to the formal devel-
opment process through additional proof obligations. It also contributes to readability
of formal models by engineers. The views shorten the gap between requirements and
formal models by allowing modal and fault tolerance requirements to be expressed
diagrammatically.
Rigorous development
The necessity of having formal consistency between views and models brings extra
proof efforts. According to our estimations, application of modal views doubles the
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proof efforts for both case studies described in this work. The proving process gives
assurance in system behaviour, therefore, the approach adds rigour to the develop-
ment process.
Tool support
The method is tool supported. The modal viewpoint is implemented as a plug-in
for the Rodin environment which includes a diagram editor and a smooth integration
with prover facilities [WIFT]. The patterns of the method can be reused for a par-
ticular domain or application by using the Transformation Patterns plug-in [WIPT].
The patterns plug-in provides facilities for writing model transformations in a sim-
ple object-oriented language, and executing them on demand. Tool support further
facilitates the adoption of the approach and formal methods for building highly de-
pendable systems.
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Appendix A: Airlock Case Study Model
This appendix contains full Event-B models for the airlock system used as a case study
throughout Chapter 4. The development produced a total of 417 proof obligations,
356 of which were proven automatically, and 61 required interactive proof. A Rodin
project containing the proved models can be found in the Examples section at [WIFT].
A.1 Context C0
context c0
sets
DOOR STATE
constants
OPENED CLOSED OPENING CLOSING STOPPED
LOW PRESSURE HIGH PRESSURE
axioms
axm1: partition(DOOR STATE, {OPENED}, {CLOSED},
{OPENING}, {CLOSING}, {STOPPED})
axm2: LOW PRESSURE = 0
axm3: HIGH PRESSURE = 2
end
A.2 Machine M0
machine m0 sees c0
variables
door1 door2 pressure
invariants
inv1: door1 ∈ DOOR STATE
inv2: door2 ∈ DOOR STATE
inv3: pressure ∈ N
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inv4: door1 6= CLOSED⇒ pressure = LOW PRESSURE
inv5: door2 6= CLOSED⇒ pressure = HIGH PRESSURE
inv6: door1 = CLOSED ∨ door2 = CLOSED
inv7: pressure > LOW PRESSURE⇒ door1 = CLOSED
inv8: pressure < HIGH PRESSURE⇒ door2 = CLOSED
inv9: pressure ≥ LOW PRESSURE ∧ pressure ≤ HIGH PRESSURE
events
event INITIALISATION
then
act1: door1 := CLOSED
act2: door2 := CLOSED
act3: pressure := HIGH PRESSURE
end
event open1 =̂
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = LOW PRESSURE
grd3: door2 = CLOSED
then
act1: door1 := OPENING
end
event opened1 =̂
when
grd1: door1 = OPENING
then
act1: door1 := OPENED
end
event close1 =̂
when
grd1: door1 = OPENED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
then
act1: door1 := CLOSING
end
event closed1 =̂
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSING
then
act1: door1 := CLOSED
end
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event open2 =̂
when
grd1: door2 = CLOSED ∨ door2 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = HIGH PRESSURE
grd3: door1 = CLOSED
then
act1: door2 := OPENING
end
event opened2 =̂
when
grd1: door2 = OPENING
then
act1: door2 := OPENED
end
event close2 =̂
when
grd1: door2 = OPENED ∨ door2 = STOPPED
then
act1: door2 := CLOSING
end
event closed2 =̂
when
grd1: door2 = CLOSING
then
act1: door2 := CLOSED
end
event pump up =̂
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure < HIGH PRESSURE
then
act1: pressure := pressure+ 1
end
event pump down =̂
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure > LOW PRESSURE
then
act1: pressure := pressure− 1
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end
event stop1 =̂
when
grd1: door1 = OPENING ∨ door1 = CLOSING
then
act1: door1 := STOPPED
end
event stop2 =̂
when
grd1: door2 = OPENING ∨ door2 = CLOSING
then
act1: door2 := STOPPED
end
end
A.3 Machine M1
machine m1 refines m0 sees c0
variables
door1 door2 pressure stopped
invariants
inv1: stopped ∈ BOOL
events
event INITIALISATION
extended
then
act1: door1 := CLOSED
act2: door2 := CLOSED
act3: pressure := HIGH PRESSURE
act4: stopped := FALSE
end
event open1 =̂ extends open1
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = LOW PRESSURE
grd3: door2 = CLOSED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
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then
act1: door1 := OPENING
end
event opened1 =̂ extends opened1
when
grd1: door1 = OPENING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door1 := OPENED
end
event close1 =̂ extends close1
when
grd1: door1 = OPENED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door1 := CLOSING
end
event closed1 =̂ extends closed1
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door1 := CLOSED
end
event open2 =̂ extends open2
when
grd1: door2 = CLOSED ∨ door2 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = HIGH PRESSURE
grd3: door1 = CLOSED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door2 := OPENING
end
event opened2 =̂ extends opened2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door2 := OPENED
121
end
event close2 =̂ extends close2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENED ∨ door2 = STOPPED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door2 := CLOSING
end
event closed2 =̂ extends closed2
when
grd1: door2 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door2 := CLOSED
end
event pump up =̂ extends pump up
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure < HIGH PRESSURE
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: pressure := pressure+ 1
end
event pump down =̂ extends pump down
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure > LOW PRESSURE
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: pressure := pressure− 1
end
event stop =̂
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
end
event stop1 =̂ extends stop1
when
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grd1: door1 = OPENING ∨ door1 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door1 := STOPPED
end
event stop2 =̂ extends stop2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENING ∨ door2 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door2 := STOPPED
end
event stopped =̂
when
grd: stopped = TRUE
then
skip
end
end
A.4 Context C2
context c2 extends c0
constants
OK DEGRADED BROKEN DOOR CONDITION
axioms
axm1: DOOR CONDITION = {0, 1, 2}
axm2: BROKEN = 0
axm3: DEGRADED = 1
axm4: OK = 2
axm5: DOOR CONDITION ⊂ N
end
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A.5 Machine M2
machine m2 refines m1 sees c2
variables
door1 door2 pressure stopped door1 cond door2 cond obj presence
invariants
inv1: door1 cond ∈ DOOR CONDITION
inv2: door2 cond ∈ DOOR CONDITION
inv3: obj presence ∈ BOOL
inv4: door1 cond = BROKEN ∨ door2 cond = BROKEN ∨
(door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧
obj presence = FALSE)⇔ stopped = TRUE
events
event INITIALISATION
extended
then
act1: door1 := CLOSED
act2: door2 := CLOSED
act3: pressure := HIGH PRESSURE
act4: stopped := FALSE
act2 0: door1 cond := OK
act2 1: door2 cond := OK
act2 2: obj presence := FALSE
end
event open1 =̂ extends open1
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = LOW PRESSURE
grd3: door2 = CLOSED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door1 := OPENING
end
event opened1 =̂ extends opened1
when
grd1: door1 = OPENING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door1 := OPENED
end
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event close1 =̂ extends close1
when
grd1: door1 = OPENED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door1 := CLOSING
end
event closed1 =̂ extends closed1
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door1 := CLOSED
end
event open2 =̂ extends open2
when
grd1: door2 = CLOSED ∨ door2 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = HIGH PRESSURE
grd3: door1 = CLOSED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door2 := OPENING
end
event opened2 =̂ extends opened2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door2 := OPENED
end
event close2 =̂ extends close2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENED ∨ door2 = STOPPED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door2 := CLOSING
end
event closed2 =̂ extends closed2
when
grd1: door2 = CLOSING
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grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door2 := CLOSED
end
event pump up =̂ extends pump up
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure < HIGH PRESSURE
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: pressure := pressure+ 1
end
event pump down =̂ extends pump down
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure > LOW PRESSURE
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: pressure := pressure− 1
end
event break =̂ extends stop
any
d1c d2c
where
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: d1c ∈ DOOR CONDITION ∧ d1c ≤ door1 cond
grd2 1: d2c ∈ DOOR CONDITION ∧ d2c ≤ door2 cond
grd2 2: d1c = BROKEN ∨ d2c = BROKEN
grd2 3: door1 cond 6= BROKEN ∧ door2 cond 6= BROKEN
grd2 4: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒
obj presence = TRUE
then
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
act2 0: door1 cond, door2 cond := d1c, d2c
end
event stop1 =̂ extends stop1
when
grd1: door1 = OPENING ∨ door1 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
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act1: door1 := STOPPED
end
event stop2 =̂ extends stop2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENING ∨ door2 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door2 := STOPPED
end
event detect =̂
when
grd0: door1 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd1: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2: door1 cond = OK ∨ door2 cond = OK
grd5: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: obj presence :∈ BOOL
end
event degrade =̂
any
d1c d2c
where
grd0: stopped = FALSE
grd1: d1c ∈ DOOR CONDITION∧d1c ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}∧d1c ≤ door1 cond
grd2: d2c ∈ DOOR CONDITION∧d2c ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}∧d2c ≤ door2 cond
grd3: (door1 cond = OK ∧ d1c = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = d2c) ∨
(door2 cond = OK ∧ d2c = DEGRADED ∧ door1 cond = d1c)
grd4: d1c 6= DEGRADED ∨ d2c 6= DEGRADED ∨ obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door1 cond := d1c
act2: door2 cond := d2c
end
event stopped =̂ extends stopped
when
grd: stopped = TRUE
then
skip
end
event object leave =̂ extends stop
when
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grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧
obj presence = TRUE
then
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
act1: obj presence := FALSE
end
event stop on degrade =̂ extends stop
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∨ door2 cond = DEGRADED
grd2: obj presence = FALSE
grd4: door1 cond = OK ∨ door2 cond = OK
then
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
act1: door1 cond := DEGRADED
act2: door2 cond := DEGRADED
end
end
A.6 Machine M3
machine m3 refines m2 sees c2
variables
door1 door2 pressure stopped door1 cond door2 cond obj presence
events
event open1 =̂ extends open1
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = LOW PRESSURE
grd3: door2 = CLOSED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 1: door1 cond = OK
then
act1: door1 := OPENING
end
event opened1 =̂ extends opened1
when
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grd1: door1 = OPENING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: door1 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2 1: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2 2: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒
obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door1 := OPENED
end
event close1 =̂ extends close1
when
grd1: door1 = OPENED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: door1 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2 1: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2 2: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒
obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door1 := CLOSING
end
event closed1 =̂ extends closed1
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: door1 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2 1: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2 2: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒
obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door1 := CLOSED
end
event open2 =̂ extends open2
when
grd1: door2 = CLOSED ∨ door2 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = HIGH PRESSURE
grd3: door1 = CLOSED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: door2 cond = OK ∨ (door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧ obj presence = TRUE)
then
act1: door2 := OPENING
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end
event opened2 =̂ extends opened2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: door1 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2 1: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2 2: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒
obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door2 := OPENED
end
event close2 =̂ extends close2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENED ∨ door2 = STOPPED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: door1 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2 1: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2 2: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒
obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door2 := CLOSING
end
event closed2 =̂ extends closed2
when
grd1: door2 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: door1 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2 1: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2 2: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒
obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door2 := CLOSED
end
event pump up =̂ extends pump up
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure < HIGH PRESSURE
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: door1 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
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grd2 1: door2 cond = OK ∨ (door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧ obj presence = TRUE)
then
act1: pressure := pressure+ 1
end
event pump down =̂ extends pump down
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure > LOW PRESSURE
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: door1 cond = OK
then
act1: pressure := pressure− 1
end
event INITIALISATION
extended
then
act1: door1 := CLOSED
act2: door2 := CLOSED
act3: pressure := HIGH PRESSURE
act4: stopped := FALSE
act2 0: door1 cond := OK
act2 1: door2 cond := OK
act2 2: obj presence := FALSE
end
event break =̂ extends break
any
d1c d2c
where
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: d1c ∈ DOOR CONDITION ∧ d1c ≤ door1 cond
grd2 1: d2c ∈ DOOR CONDITION ∧ d2c ≤ door2 cond
grd2 2: d1c = BROKEN ∨ d2c = BROKEN
grd2 3: door1 cond 6= BROKEN ∧ door2 cond 6= BROKEN
grd2 4: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒
obj presence = TRUE
then
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
act2 0: door1 cond, door2 cond := d1c, d2c
end
event stop1 =̂ extends stop1
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when
grd1: door1 = OPENING ∨ door1 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door1 := STOPPED
end
event stop2 =̂ extends stop2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENING ∨ door2 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door2 := STOPPED
end
event degrade =̂ extends degrade
any
d1c d2c
where
grd0: stopped = FALSE
grd1: d1c ∈ DOOR CONDITION∧d1c ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}∧d1c ≤ door1 cond
grd2: d2c ∈ DOOR CONDITION∧d2c ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}∧d2c ≤ door2 cond
grd3: (door1 cond = OK ∧ d1c = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = d2c) ∨
(door2 cond = OK ∧ d2c = DEGRADED ∧ door1 cond = d1c)
grd4: d1c 6= DEGRADED ∨ d2c 6= DEGRADED ∨ obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door1 cond := d1c
act2: door2 cond := d2c
end
event detect =̂ extends detect
when
grd0: door1 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd1: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2: door1 cond = OK ∨ door2 cond = OK
grd5: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: obj presence :∈ BOOL
end
event stopped =̂ extends stopped
when
grd: stopped = TRUE
then
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skip
end
event object leave =̂ extends object leave
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧
obj presence = TRUE
then
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
act1: obj presence := FALSE
end
event stop on degrade =̂ extends stop on degrade
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door1 cond = DEGRADED ∨ door2 cond = DEGRADED
grd2: obj presence = FALSE
grd4: door1 cond = OK ∨ door2 cond = OK
then
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
act1: door1 cond := DEGRADED
act2: door2 cond := DEGRADED
end
end
A.7 Machine M4
machine m4 refines m3 sees c2
variables
door1 door2 pressure stopped door2 cond obj presence
door1 pos cond door1 closed cond door1 opened cond door1 motor cond
invariants
inv door1 pos cond: door1 pos cond ∈ BOOL
inv door1 closed cond: door1 closed cond ∈ BOOL
inv door1 opened cond: door1 opened cond ∈ BOOL
inv door1 motor cond: door1 motor cond ∈ BOOL
inv door1 sensors conditions OK: door1 cond = OK⇔
door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE
133
inv door1 sensors conditions DEGRADED: door1 cond = DEGRADED⇔
door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))
inv door1 sensors conditions BROKEN: door1 cond = BROKEN ⇔
door1 motor cond = FALSE ∨ (door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
events
event INITIALISATION
then
act1: door1 := CLOSED
act2: door2 := CLOSED
act3: pressure := HIGH PRESSURE
act4: stopped := FALSE
act2 1: door2 cond := OK
act2 2: obj presence := FALSE
act4 2: door1 pos cond := TRUE
act4 3: door1 closed cond := TRUE
act4 4: door1 opened cond := TRUE
act4 5: door1 motor cond := TRUE
end
event open1 =̂ refines open1
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = LOW PRESSURE
grd3: door2 = CLOSED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd cond: door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE
then
act1: door1 := OPENING
end
event opened1 =̂ refines opened1
when
grd1: door1 = OPENING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
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(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd4 3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door1 := OPENED
end
event close1 =̂ refines close1
when
grd1: door1 = OPENED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd4 3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door1 := CLOSING
end
event closed1 =̂ refines closed1
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
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(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd4 3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door1 := CLOSED
end
event open2 =̂ refines open2
when
grd1: door2 = CLOSED ∨ door2 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = HIGH PRESSURE
grd3: door1 = CLOSED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: door2 cond = OK ∨ ((door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧ obj presence = TRUE)
then
act1: door2 := OPENING
end
event opened2 =̂ refines opened2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
136
grd4 3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door2 := OPENED
end
event close2 =̂ refines close2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENED ∨ door2 = STOPPED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd4 3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door2 := CLOSING
end
event closed2 =̂ refines closed2
when
grd1: door2 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
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grd4 3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: door2 := CLOSED
end
event pump up =̂ refines pump up
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure < HIGH PRESSURE
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond = OK ∨ ((door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧ obj presence = TRUE)
then
act1: pressure := pressure+ 1
end
event pump down =̂ refines pump down
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure > LOW PRESSURE
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE
then
act1: pressure := pressure− 1
end
event break1 =̂ refines break
138
any
pos cond closed cond opened cond motor cond
where
grd types: pos cond ∈ BOOL ∧ closed cond ∈ BOOL ∧
opened cond ∈ BOOL ∧motor cond ∈ BOOL
grd degradation: (pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 pos cond = TRUE) ∨
(closed cond = FALSE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(opened cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(motor cond = FALSE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE)
grd4 0: door2 cond 6= BROKEN
grd4 1: ¬(door1 motor cond = FALSE ∨ (door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))
grd4 2: motor cond = FALSE ∨ (pos cond = FALSE ∧
(opened cond = FALSE ∨ closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 3: (door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))))
∧ door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
grd5: stopped = FALSE
with
d2c : d2c = door2 cond
d1c : d1c = BROKEN
then
act4 0: door1 pos cond := pos cond
act4 1: door1 closed cond := closed cond
act4 2: door1 opened cond := opened cond
act4 3: door1 motor cond := motor cond
act4 4: stopped := TRUE
end
event stop1 =̂ extends stop1
when
grd1: door1 = OPENING ∨ door1 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door1 := STOPPED
end
event stop2 =̂ extends stop2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENING ∨ door2 = CLOSING
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grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: door2 := STOPPED
end
event degrade door1 =̂ refines degrade
any
pos cond closed cond opened cond motor cond
where
grd types: pos cond ∈ BOOL ∧ closed cond ∈ BOOL ∧
opened cond ∈ BOOL ∧motor cond ∈ BOOL
grd degradation: (pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 pos cond = TRUE) ∨
(closed cond = FALSE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(opened cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(motor cond = FALSE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE)
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd7: door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
grd glue: motor cond = TRUE ∧
((pos cond = FALSE ∧ opened cond = TRUE ∧
closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(pos cond = TRUE ∧
(opened cond = FALSE ∨ closed cond = FALSE)))
with
d2c : d2c = door2 cond
d1c : d1c = DEGRADED
then
act4 0: door1 pos cond := pos cond
act4 1: door1 closed cond := closed cond
act4 2: door1 opened cond := opened cond
act4 3: door1 motor cond := motor cond
end
event degrade door2 =̂ refines degrade
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
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grd4 2: (door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))))⇒
obj presence = TRUE
grd4 3: door2 cond = OK
with
d2c : d2c = DEGRADED
d1c : (d1c = OK⇔ door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE) ∧
(d1c = DEGRADED⇔ (door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))))
then
act: door2 cond := DEGRADED
end
event stop on degrade door1 =̂ refines stop on degrade
any
pos cond closed cond opened cond motor cond
where
grd types: pos cond ∈ BOOL ∧ closed cond ∈ BOOL ∧
opened cond ∈ BOOL ∧motor cond ∈ BOOL
grd degradation: (pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 pos cond = TRUE) ∨
(closed cond = FALSE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(opened cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(motor cond = FALSE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE)
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door2 cond = DEGRADED
grd2: obj presence = FALSE
grd glue: motor cond = TRUE ∧
((pos cond = FALSE ∧ opened cond = TRUE ∧
closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(pos cond = TRUE ∧
(opened cond = FALSE ∨ closed cond = FALSE)))
then
act4 0: door1 pos cond := pos cond
act4 1: door1 closed cond := closed cond
act4 2: door1 opened cond := opened cond
act4 3: door1 motor cond := motor cond
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act2: stopped := TRUE
end
event stop on degrade door2 =̂ refines stop on degrade
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door2 cond = OK
grd2: obj presence = FALSE
grd3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))
then
act1: door2 cond := DEGRADED
act2: stopped := TRUE
end
event detect =̂ refines detect
when
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd1: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE) ∨
door2 cond = OK
grd5: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: obj presence :∈ BOOL
end
event stopped =̂ extends stopped
when
grd: stopped = TRUE
then
skip
end
event object leave =̂ refines object leave
when
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grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))
grd2: door2 cond = DEGRADED
grd3: obj presence = TRUE
then
act1: obj presence := FALSE
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
end
event break2 =̂ refines break
when
grd4 0: door2 cond 6= BROKEN
grd4 1: ¬(door1 motor cond = FALSE ∨ (door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))
grd4 3: (door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
grd5: stopped = FALSE
with
d2c : d2c = BROKEN
d1c : (d1c = OK⇔ door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE) ∧
(d1c = DEGRADED⇔ (door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))))
then
act4 1: door2 cond := BROKEN
act4 4: stopped := TRUE
end
end
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A.8 Context C5
context c5 extends c2
sets
PHASE
constants
ENV DET CONT PRED min door max door
axioms
axm1: partition(PHASE, {ENV }, {DET}, {CONT}, {PRED})
axm2: min door < max door
axm3: min door ∈ N ∧max door ∈ N
axm4: max door −min door > 1
end
A.9 Machine M5
machine m5 refines m4 sees c5
variables
door1 door2 pressure stopped obj presence door2 cond
door1 pos cond door1 closed cond door1 opened cond door1 motor cond
phase door1 motor door1 motor cond detected
door1 pos door1 pos predicted door1 pos cond detected
door1 opened door1 opened predicted door1 opened cond detected
door1 closed door1 closed predicted door1 closed cond detected
invariants
inv phase: phase ∈ PHASE
inv1: door1 pos ∈ Z
inv2: door1 opened ∈ BOOL
inv3: door1 closed ∈ BOOL
inv4: door1 pos predicted ∈ Z
inv5: door1 opened predicted ∈ BOOL
inv6: door1 closed predicted ∈ BOOL
inv7: door1 motor ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
inv10: door1 pos cond detected ∈ BOOL
inv11: door1 opened cond detected ∈ BOOL
inv12: door1 closed cond detected ∈ BOOL
inv13: door1 motor cond detected ∈ BOOL
events
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event INITIALISATION
extended
then
act1: door1 := CLOSED
act2: door2 := CLOSED
act3: pressure := HIGH PRESSURE
act4: stopped := FALSE
act2 1: door2 cond := OK
act2 2: obj presence := FALSE
act4 2: door1 pos cond := TRUE
act4 3: door1 closed cond := TRUE
act4 4: door1 opened cond := TRUE
act4 5: door1 motor cond := TRUE
act phase: phase := ENV
act5 1: door1 pos := 0
act5 2: door1 pos predicted := 0
act5 3: door1 opened := FALSE
act5 4: door1 opened predicted := FALSE
act5 5: door1 closed := TRUE
act5 6: door1 closed predicted := FALSE
act5 7: door1 motor := 0
end
event cycle sense =̂
when
grd phase: phase = ENV
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act phase: phase := DET
act5 1: door1 pos :∈ Z
act5 2: door1 opened :∈ BOOL
act5 3: door1 closed :∈ BOOL
end
event cycle detect =̂
when
grd phase: phase = DET
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act phase: phase := CONT
act5 1: door1 pos cond detected := bool(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(min door ≤ door1 pos ∧ door1 pos ≤ max door) ∧
(door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 opened = TRUE⇒
door1 pos = max door) ∧
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(door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed = TRUE⇒
door1 pos = min door) ∧
(door1 pos = door1 pos predicted))
act5 2: door1 closed cond detected :=
bool(door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧ (door1 closed = door1 closed predicted))
act5 3: door1 opened cond detected :=
bool(door1 opened cond = TRUE∧(door1 opened = door1 opened predicted))
act5 4: door1 motor cond detected := bool(door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos = door1 pos predicted)∨(door1 closed = door1 closed predicted)∨
(door1 opened = door1 opened predicted)))
end
event cycle predict =̂
when
grd phase: phase = PRED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act phase: phase := ENV
act5 1: door1 pos predicted := door1 pos+ door1 motor
act5 2: door1 opened predicted := bool(
(door1 motor = 1 ∧ door1 pos = max door − 1) ∨
(door1 motor = 0 ∧ door1 opened = TRUE))
act5 3: door1 closed predicted := bool(
(door1 motor = −1 ∧ door1 pos = min door + 1) ∨
(door1 motor = 0 ∧ door1 closed = TRUE))
end
event open1 =̂ extends open1
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = LOW PRESSURE
grd3: door2 = CLOSED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd cond: door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd phase: phase = CONT
grd pos: door1 pos cond = TRUE⇒ door1 pos < max door ∧
(door1 pos = min door⇒ door1 = CLOSED) ∧
(door1 pos > min door⇒ door1 = STOPPED)
grd closed: door1 closed cond = TRUE⇒
(door1 closed = TRUE⇒ door1 = CLOSED)
grd opened: door1 opened cond = TRUE⇒ door1 opened = FALSE
then
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act1: door1 := OPENING
act phase: phase := PRED
act motor: door1 motor := 1
end
event opened1 =̂ extends opened1
when
grd1: door1 = OPENING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd4 3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
grd phase: phase = CONT
grd pos: door1 pos cond = TRUE⇒ door1 pos = max door
grd closed: door1 closed cond = TRUE⇒ door1 closed = FALSE
grd opened: door1 opened cond = TRUE⇒ door1 opened = TRUE
then
act1: door1 := OPENED
act phase: phase := PRED
act motor: door1 motor := 0
end
event close1 =̂ extends close1
when
grd1: door1 = OPENED ∨ door1 = STOPPED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
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grd4 2: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd4 3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
grd phase: phase = CONT
grd pos: door1 pos cond = TRUE⇒ door1 pos > min door ∧
(door1 pos = max door⇒ door1 = OPENED) ∧
(door1 pos < max door⇒ door1 = STOPPED)
grd closed: door1 closed cond = TRUE⇒ door1 closed = FALSE
grd opened: door1 opened cond = TRUE⇒
(door1 opened = TRUE⇒ door1 = OPENED)
then
act1: door1 := CLOSING
act phase: phase := PRED
act motor: door1 motor := −1
end
event closed1 =̂ extends closed1
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd4 3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
grd phase: phase = CONT
grd pos: door1 pos cond = TRUE⇒ door1 pos = min door
grd closed: door1 closed cond = TRUE⇒ door1 closed = TRUE
grd opened: door1 opened cond = TRUE⇒ door1 opened = FALSE
then
act1: door1 := CLOSED
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act phase: phase := PRED
act motor: door1 motor := 0
end
event open2 =̂ extends open2
when
grd1: door2 = CLOSED ∨ door2 = STOPPED
grd2: pressure = HIGH PRESSURE
grd3: door1 = CLOSED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd2 0: door2 cond = OK ∨ ((door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧ obj presence = TRUE)
grd phase: phase = CONT
then
act1: door2 := OPENING
act phase: phase := PRED
end
event opened2 =̂ extends opened2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd4 3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
grd phase: phase = CONT
then
act1: door2 := OPENED
act phase: phase := PRED
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end
event close2 =̂ extends close2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENED ∨ door2 = STOPPED
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd4 3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
grd phase: phase = CONT
then
act1: door2 := CLOSING
act phase: phase := PRED
end
event closed2 =̂ extends closed2
when
grd1: door2 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd4 3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
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grd phase: phase = CONT
then
act1: door2 := CLOSED
act phase: phase := PRED
end
event pump up =̂ extends pump up
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure < HIGH PRESSURE
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: door2 cond = OK ∨ ((door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED ∧ obj presence = TRUE)
grd phase: phase = CONT
then
act1: pressure := pressure+ 1
act phase: phase := PRED
end
event pump down =̂ extends pump down
when
grd1: door1 = CLOSED ∧ door2 = CLOSED
grd2: pressure > LOW PRESSURE
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd phase: phase = CONT
then
act1: pressure := pressure− 1
act phase: phase := PRED
end
event break1 =̂ refines break1
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when
grd phase: phase = CONT
grd degradation: (door1 pos cond detected = FALSE∧door1 pos cond = TRUE)∨
(door1 closed cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 opened cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 motor cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE)
grd4 0: door2 cond 6= BROKEN
grd4 1: ¬(door1 motor cond = FALSE ∨ (door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))
grd4 2: door1 motor cond detected = FALSE∨(door1 pos cond detected = FALSE∧
(door1 opened cond detected = FALSE∨door1 closed cond detected = FALSE))
grd4 3: (door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
grd5: stopped = FALSE
with
pos cond : pos cond = door1 pos cond detected
opened cond : opened cond = door1 opened cond detected
closed cond : closed cond = door1 closed cond detected
motor cond : motor cond = door1 motor cond detected
then
act phase: phase := PRED
act5 0: door1 pos cond := door1 pos cond detected
act5 1: door1 closed cond := door1 closed cond detected
act5 2: door1 opened cond := door1 opened cond detected
act5 3: door1 motor cond := door1 motor cond detected
act5 4: stopped := TRUE
end
event stop1 =̂ extends stop1
when
grd1: door1 = OPENING ∨ door1 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd phase: phase = CONT
grd pos: door1 pos cond = TRUE⇒(min door < door1 pos∧door1 pos < max door)
grd closed: door1 closed cond = TRUE⇒ door1 closed = FALSE
grd opened: door1 opened cond = TRUE⇒ door1 opened = FALSE
then
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act1: door1 := STOPPED
act phase: phase := PRED
act motor: door1 motor := 0
end
event stop2 =̂ extends stop2
when
grd1: door2 = OPENING ∨ door2 = CLOSING
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd phase: phase = CONT
then
act1: door2 := STOPPED
act phase: phase := PRED
end
event degrade door1 =̂ refines degrade door1
when
grd phase: phase = CONT
grd degradation: (door1 pos cond detected = FALSE∧door1 pos cond = TRUE)∨
(door1 closed cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 opened cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 motor cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE)
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd7: door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
grd glue: door1 motor cond detected = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond detected = FALSE∧door1 opened cond detected = TRUE∧
door1 closed cond detected = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond detected = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond detected = FALSE ∨door1 closed cond detected =
FALSE)))
with
pos cond : pos cond = door1 pos cond detected
opened cond : opened cond = door1 opened cond detected
closed cond : closed cond = door1 closed cond detected
motor cond : motor cond = door1 motor cond detected
then
act phase: phase := PRED
act5 0: door1 pos cond := door1 pos cond detected
act5 1: door1 closed cond := door1 closed cond detected
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act5 2: door1 opened cond := door1 opened cond detected
act5 3: door1 motor cond := door1 motor cond detected
end
event degrade door2 =̂ extends degrade door2
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd4 2: (door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))))⇒
obj presence = TRUE
grd4 3: door2 cond = OK
grd phase: phase = CONT
then
act: door2 cond := DEGRADED
act phase: phase := PRED
end
event stop on degrade door1 =̂ refines stop on degrade door1
when
grd phase: phase = CONT
grd degradation: (door1 pos cond detected = FALSE∧door1 pos cond = TRUE)∨
(door1 closed cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 opened cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 motor cond detected = FALSE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE)
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door2 cond = DEGRADED
grd2: obj presence = FALSE
grd glue: door1 motor cond detected = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond detected = FALSE∧door1 opened cond detected = TRUE∧
door1 closed cond detected = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond detected = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond detected = FALSE ∨door1 closed cond detected =
FALSE)))
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with
pos cond : pos cond = door1 pos cond detected
opened cond : opened cond = door1 opened cond detected
closed cond : closed cond = door1 closed cond detected
motor cond : motor cond = door1 motor cond detected
then
act phase: phase := PRED
act5 0: door1 pos cond := door1 pos cond detected
act5 1: door1 closed cond := door1 closed cond detected
act5 2: door1 opened cond := door1 opened cond detected
act5 3: door1 motor cond := door1 motor cond detected
act5 4: stopped := TRUE
end
event stop on degrade door2 =̂ extends stop on degrade door2
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door2 cond = OK
grd2: obj presence = FALSE
grd3: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))
grd phase: phase = CONT
then
act1: door2 cond := DEGRADED
act2: stopped := TRUE
act phase: phase := PRED
end
event detect =̂ extends detect
when
grd4 0: door1 motor cond = TRUE
grd4 1: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE))
grd1: door2 cond ∈ {OK,DEGRADED}
grd2: (door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧ door1 closed cond = TRUE ∧
door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧ door1 motor cond = TRUE) ∨
door2 cond = OK
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grd5: stopped = FALSE
grd phase: phase = CONT
then
act1: obj presence :∈ BOOL
act phase: phase := PRED
end
event stopped =̂ extends stopped
when
grd: stopped = TRUE
then
skip
end
event object leave =̂ extends object leave
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))
grd2: door2 cond = DEGRADED
grd3: obj presence = TRUE
grd phase: phase = CONT
then
act1: obj presence := FALSE
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
act phase: phase := PRED
end
event break2 =̂ extends break2
when
grd4 0: door2 cond 6= BROKEN
grd4 1: ¬(door1 motor cond = FALSE ∨ (door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))
grd4 3: (door1 motor cond = TRUE ∧
((door1 pos cond = FALSE ∧ door1 opened cond = TRUE ∧
door1 closed cond = TRUE) ∨
(door1 pos cond = TRUE ∧
(door1 opened cond = FALSE ∨ door1 closed cond = FALSE)))) ∧
door2 cond = DEGRADED⇒ obj presence = TRUE
grd5: stopped = FALSE
grd phase: phase = CONT
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then
act4 1: door2 cond := BROKEN
act4 4: stopped := TRUE
act phase: phase := PRED
end
end
157
Appendix B: AOCS Case Study Model
This appendix contains full Event-B models for the AOCS case study used in Chap-
ter 5 for method evaluation. The development produced a total of 381 proof obliga-
tions, 359 of which were proven automatically, and 22 required interactive proof. A
Rodin project containing the proved models can be found in the Examples section
at [WIFT].
B.1 Context C0
context c0
constants
UNIT ON UNIT OFF GPS COARSE GPS FINE
axioms
axm1: UNIT OFF = 0
axm2: UNIT ON = 1
axm3: GPS COARSE = 1
axm4: GPS FINE = 2
end
B.2 Machine M0
machine m0 sees c0
variables
unitES unitGPS unitPLI
invariants
inv1: unitES ∈ {UNIT ON,UNIT OFF}
inv2: unitGPS ∈ {UNIT OFF,GPS COARSE,GPS FINE}
inv3: unitPLI ∈ {UNIT OFF,UNIT ON}
events
event INITIALISATION
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then
act0: unitES := UNIT OFF
act1: unitGPS := UNIT OFF
act2: unitPLI := UNIT OFF
end
event ES work =̂
when
grd1: unitES = UNIT ON
then
skip
end
event ES switch =̂
any
newState
where
grd1: newState ∈ {UNIT ON,UNIT OFF}
grd2: newState 6= unitES
then
act1: unitES := newState
end
event GPS work =̂
when
grd1: unitGPS ∈ {GPS COARSE,GPS FINE}
then
skip
end
event GPS switch =̂
any
newState
where
grd1: newState ∈ {UNIT OFF,GPS COARSE,GPS FINE}
grd2: newState 6= unitGPS
grd3: unitGPS = UNIT OFF ⇒ newState = GPS COARSE
then
act1: unitGPS := newState
end
event PLI work =̂
when
grd1: unitPLI = UNIT ON
then
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skip
end
event PLI switch =̂
any
newState
where
grd1: newState ∈ {UNIT ON,UNIT OFF}
grd2: newState 6= unitPLI
then
act1: unitPLI := newState
end
end
B.3 Machine M1
machine m1 refines m0 sees c0
variables
unitES unitGPS unitPLI stopped
invariants
inv stopped: stopped ∈ BOOL
events
event INITIALISATION
extended
then
act0: unitES := UNIT OFF
act1: unitGPS := UNIT OFF
act2: unitPLI := UNIT OFF
act stopped: stopped := FALSE
end
event ES work =̂ extends ES work
when
grd1: unitES = UNIT ON
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
skip
end
event ES switch =̂ extends ES switch
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any
newState
where
grd1: newState ∈ {UNIT ON,UNIT OFF}
grd2: newState 6= unitES
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: unitES := newState
end
event GPS work =̂ extends GPS work
when
grd1: unitGPS ∈ {GPS COARSE,GPS FINE}
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
skip
end
event GPS switch =̂ extends GPS switch
any
newState
where
grd1: newState ∈ {UNIT OFF,GPS COARSE,GPS FINE}
grd2: newState 6= unitGPS
grd3: unitGPS = UNIT OFF ⇒ newState = GPS COARSE
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: unitGPS := newState
end
event PLI work =̂ extends PLI work
when
grd1: unitPLI = UNIT ON
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
skip
end
event PLI switch =̂ extends PLI switch
any
newState
where
grd1: newState ∈ {UNIT ON,UNIT OFF}
grd2: newState 6= unitPLI
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grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act1: unitPLI := newState
end
event stop =̂
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
end
event stopped =̂
when
grd stopped: stopped = TRUE
then
skip
end
end
B.4 Context C2
context c2 extends c0
constants
OFF NOMINAL SCIENCE MODE
axioms
axm1: OFF = 0
axm2: NOMINAL = 1
axm3: SCIENCE = 2
axm4: MODE = {0, 1, 2}
end
B.5 Machine M2
machine m2 refines m1 sees c1
variables
unitES unitGPS unitPLI stable mode stopped
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invariants
inv1: stable ∈ BOOL
inv2: mode ∈MODE
events
event INITIALISATION
extended
then
act0: unitES := UNIT OFF
act1: unitGPS := UNIT OFF
act2: unitPLI := UNIT OFF
act stopped: stopped := FALSE
act1 0: stable := TRUE
act1 1: mode := OFF
end
event goAdvance =̂
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: stable = TRUE
grd2: mode < SCIENCE
then
act1: mode := mode+ 1
act2: stable := FALSE
end
event downgrade =̂
any
newMode
where
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd par: newMode ∈MODE
grd1: mode > OFF
grd2: newMode < mode
then
act1: mode := newMode
act2: stable := FALSE
end
event ES work =̂ extends ES work
when
grd1: unitES = UNIT ON
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd mode: mode = NOMINAL
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then
skip
end
event ES switch on =̂ refines ES switch
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitES = UNIT OFF
grd2: mode = NOMINAL
with
newState : newState = UNIT ON
then
act1: unitES := UNIT ON
end
event ES switch off =̂ refines ES switch
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitES = UNIT ON
grd2: mode ∈ {OFF, SCIENCE}
with
newState : newState = UNIT OFF
then
act1: unitES := UNIT OFF
end
event GPS work =̂ extends GPS work
when
grd1: unitGPS ∈ {GPS COARSE,GPS FINE}
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1 2: mode ∈ {NOMINAL, SCIENCE}
then
skip
end
event GPS switch on =̂ refines GPS switch
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitGPS < GPS FINE
grd2: mode ∈ {NOMINAL, SCIENCE}
with
newState : newState = unitGPS + 1
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then
act1: unitGPS := unitGPS + 1
end
event GPS switch off =̂ refines GPS switch
any
newState
where
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitGPS > UNIT OFF
grd2: newState ∈ {UNIT OFF,GPS COARSE}
grd3: newState < unitGPS
grd4: mode ∈ {NOMINAL,OFF}
then
act1: unitGPS := newState
end
event PLI work =̂ extends PLI work
when
grd1: unitPLI = UNIT ON
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd mode: mode = SCIENCE
then
skip
end
event PLI switch on =̂ refines PLI switch
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitPLI = UNIT OFF
grd2: mode = SCIENCE
with
newState : newState = UNIT ON
then
act1: unitPLI := UNIT ON
end
event PLI switch off =̂ refines PLI switch
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitPLI = UNIT ON
grd2: mode ∈ {NOMINAL,OFF}
with
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newState : newState = UNIT OFF
then
act1: unitPLI := UNIT OFF
end
event standby =̂
when
grd mode: mode = OFF
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
skip
end
event reconf finish =̂
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: stable = FALSE
then
act1: stable := TRUE
end
event stop =̂ extends stop
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
end
event stopped =̂ extends stopped
when
grd stopped: stopped = TRUE
then
skip
end
end
B.6 Machine M3
machine m3 refines m2 sees c2
variables
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unitES unitGPS unitPLI mode stable stopped
invariants
inv modes1: mode = OFF ∧ stable = TRUE⇒
unitES = UNIT OFF ∧ unitGPS = UNIT OFF ∧ unitPLI = UNIT OFF
inv modes2: mode = NOMINAL ∧ stable = TRUE⇒
unitES = UNIT ON ∧unitGPS = GPS COARSE ∧unitPLI = UNIT OFF
inv modes3: mode = SCIENCE ∧ stable = TRUE⇒
unitES = UNIT OFF ∧ unitGPS = GPS FINE ∧ unitPLI = UNIT ON
inv modes4: unitES = UNIT ON ∨ unitGPS ∈ {GPS FINE,GPS COARSE} ∨
unitPLI = UNIT ON ⇒¬(stable = TRUE ∧mode = OFF )
events
event INITIALISATION
extended
then
act0: unitES := UNIT OFF
act1: unitGPS := UNIT OFF
act2: unitPLI := UNIT OFF
act stopped: stopped := FALSE
act1 0: stable := TRUE
act1 1: mode := OFF
end
event goAdvance =̂ extends goAdvance
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: stable = TRUE
grd2: mode < SCIENCE
then
act1: mode := mode+ 1
act2: stable := FALSE
end
event downgrade =̂ extends downgrade
any
newMode
where
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd par: newMode ∈MODE
grd1: mode > OFF
grd2: newMode < mode
then
act1: mode := newMode
act2: stable := FALSE
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end
event ES work =̂ extends ES work
when
grd1: unitES = UNIT ON
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd mode: mode = NOMINAL
then
skip
end
event standby =̂ extends standby
when
grd mode: mode = OFF
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
then
skip
end
event ES switch on =̂ extends ES switch on
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitES = UNIT OFF
grd2: mode = NOMINAL
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
then
act1: unitES := UNIT ON
end
event ES switch off =̂ extends ES switch off
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitES = UNIT ON
grd2: mode ∈ {OFF, SCIENCE}
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
then
act1: unitES := UNIT OFF
end
event GPS work =̂ extends GPS work
when
grd1: unitGPS ∈ {GPS COARSE,GPS FINE}
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1 2: mode ∈ {NOMINAL, SCIENCE}
then
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skip
end
event GPS switch on =̂ extends GPS switch on
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitGPS < GPS FINE
grd2: mode ∈ {NOMINAL, SCIENCE}
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
then
act1: unitGPS := unitGPS + 1
end
event GPS switch off =̂ extends GPS switch off
any
newState
where
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitGPS > UNIT OFF
grd2: newState ∈ {UNIT OFF,GPS COARSE}
grd3: newState < unitGPS
grd4: mode ∈ {NOMINAL,OFF}
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
then
act1: unitGPS := newState
end
event PLI work =̂ extends PLI work
when
grd1: unitPLI = UNIT ON
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd mode: mode = SCIENCE
then
skip
end
event PLI switch on =̂ extends PLI switch on
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitPLI = UNIT OFF
grd2: mode = SCIENCE
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
then
act1: unitPLI := UNIT ON
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end
event PLI switch off =̂ extends PLI switch off
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitPLI = UNIT ON
grd2: mode ∈ {NOMINAL,OFF}
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
then
act1: unitPLI := UNIT OFF
end
event reconf finish =̂ extends reconf finish
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: stable = FALSE
grd mode off: mode = OFF ⇒
unitES = UNIT OFF ∧unitGPS = UNIT OFF ∧unitPLI = UNIT OFF
grd mode nominal: mode = NOMINAL⇒
unitES = UNIT ON∧unitGPS = GPS COARSE∧unitPLI = UNIT OFF
grd mode science: mode = SCIENCE⇒
unitES = UNIT OFF ∧ unitGPS = GPS FINE ∧ unitPLI = UNIT ON
then
act1: stable := TRUE
end
event stop =̂ extends stop
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd units: unitES = UNIT ON ∨ unitGPS ∈ {GPS FINE,GPS COARSE} ∨
unitPLI = UNIT ON
then
act stopped: stopped := TRUE
end
event stopped =̂ extends stopped
when
grd stopped: stopped = TRUE
then
skip
end
end
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B.7 Machine M4
machine m4 refines m3 sees c2
variables
unitES unitGPS unitPLI mode stable unitES cond unitGPS cond unitPLI cond stopped
invariants
inv ES cond: unitES cond ∈ {0, 1, 2}
inv GPS cond: unitGPS cond ∈ {0, 1, 2}
inv PLI cond: unitPLI cond ∈ {0, 1, 2}
inv unitPLI cond mode: unitPLI cond = 0 ∧ unitES cond > 0 ∧
unitGPS cond > 0⇒mode ∈ {OFF,NOMINAL}
inv units2: mode = NOMINAL ∧ stopped = FALSE⇒
unitES cond > 0 ∧ unitGPS cond > 0
inv units3: mode = SCIENCE ∧ stopped = FALSE⇒
unitES cond > 0 ∧ unitGPS cond > 0 ∧ unitPLI cond > 0
inv glue: stopped = TRUE⇔ unitES cond = 0 ∨ unitGPS cond = 0
inv glue1: stopped = FALSE⇔ unitES cond > 0 ∧ unitGPS cond > 0
events
event INITIALISATION
extended
then
act0: unitES := UNIT OFF
act1: unitGPS := UNIT OFF
act2: unitPLI := UNIT OFF
act stopped: stopped := FALSE
act1 0: stable := TRUE
act1 1: mode := OFF
act3 0: unitES cond := 2
act3 1: unitGPS cond := 2
act3 2: unitPLI cond := 2
end
event goAdvance =̂ extends goAdvance
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: stable = TRUE
grd2: mode < SCIENCE
inv nominal: mode+ 1 = NOMINAL⇒
unitES cond > 0 ∧ unitGPS cond > 0
inv science: mode+ 1 = SCIENCE⇒
unitES cond > 0 ∧ unitGPS cond > 0 ∧ unitPLI cond > 0
then
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act1: mode := mode+ 1
act2: stable := FALSE
end
event ES break =̂ refines stop
when
grd1: unitES cond = 1
grd2: unitES = UNIT ON
grd3: unitGPS cond > 0
then
act1: unitES cond := 0
act2: stopped := TRUE
end
event GPS break =̂ refines stop
when
grd1: unitGPS cond = 1
grd2: unitGPS ∈ {GPS COARSE,GPS FINE}
grd3: unitES cond > 0
then
act1: unitGPS cond := 0
act2: stopped := TRUE
end
event ES work =̂ extends ES work
when
grd1: unitES = UNIT ON
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd mode: mode = NOMINAL
grd3 0: unitES cond > 0
then
skip
end
event standby =̂ extends standby
when
grd mode: mode = OFF
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitES cond > 0 ∧ unitGPS cond > 0
then
skip
end
event ES switch on =̂ extends ES switch on
when
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grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitES = UNIT OFF
grd2: mode = NOMINAL
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
grd3 0: unitES cond > 0
then
act1: unitES := UNIT ON
end
event ES switch off =̂ extends ES switch off
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitES = UNIT ON
grd2: mode ∈ {OFF, SCIENCE}
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
then
act1: unitES := UNIT OFF
end
event GPS work =̂ extends GPS work
when
grd1: unitGPS ∈ {GPS COARSE,GPS FINE}
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1 2: mode ∈ {NOMINAL, SCIENCE}
grd3 0: unitGPS cond > 0
then
skip
end
event GPS switch on =̂ extends GPS switch on
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitGPS < GPS FINE
grd2: mode ∈ {NOMINAL, SCIENCE}
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
grd3 0: unitGPS cond > 0
then
act1: unitGPS := unitGPS + 1
end
event GPS switch off =̂ extends GPS switch off
any
newState
where
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grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitGPS > UNIT OFF
grd2: newState ∈ {UNIT OFF,GPS COARSE}
grd3: newState < unitGPS
grd4: mode ∈ {NOMINAL,OFF}
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
then
act1: unitGPS := newState
end
event PLI work =̂ extends PLI work
when
grd1: unitPLI = UNIT ON
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd mode: mode = SCIENCE
grd3 0: unitPLI cond > 0
then
skip
end
event PLI switch on =̂ extends PLI switch on
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitPLI = UNIT OFF
grd2: mode = SCIENCE
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
grd3 0: unitPLI cond > 0
then
act1: unitPLI := UNIT ON
end
event PLI switch off =̂ extends PLI switch off
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: unitPLI = UNIT ON
grd2: mode ∈ {NOMINAL,OFF}
grd2 0: stable = FALSE
then
act1: unitPLI := UNIT OFF
end
event reconf finish =̂ extends reconf finish
when
grd stopped: stopped = FALSE
grd1: stable = FALSE
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grd mode off: mode = OFF ⇒
unitES = UNIT OFF ∧unitGPS = UNIT OFF ∧unitPLI = UNIT OFF
grd mode nominal: mode = NOMINAL⇒
unitES = UNIT ON∧unitGPS = GPS COARSE∧unitPLI = UNIT OFF
grd mode science: mode = SCIENCE⇒
unitES = UNIT OFF ∧ unitGPS = GPS FINE ∧ unitPLI = UNIT ON
then
act1: stable := TRUE
end
event stopped =̂ extends stopped
when
grd stopped: stopped = TRUE
then
skip
end
event ES downgrade =̂ refines downgrade
when
grd1: mode > OFF
grd2: unitES = UNIT ON
grd3: unitES cond = 2
grd4: unitGPS cond > 0
with
newMode : newMode = OFF
then
act1: mode := OFF
act2: stable := FALSE
act3: unitES cond := 1
end
event GPS downgrade =̂ refines downgrade
when
grd1: mode > OFF
grd2: unitGPS > UNIT OFF
grd3: unitGPS cond = 2
grd4: unitES cond > 0
with
newMode : newMode = OFF
then
act1: mode := OFF
act2: stable := FALSE
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act3: unitGPS cond := 1
end
event PLI downgrade =̂ refines downgrade
when
grd1: mode = SCIENCE
grd2: unitPLI = UNIT ON
grd3: unitPLI cond = 2
grd4: unitES cond > 0 ∧ unitGPS cond > 0
with
newMode : newMode = NOMINAL
then
act1: mode := NOMINAL
act2: stable := FALSE
act3: unitPLI cond := 1
end
event PLI break =̂ refines downgrade
when
grd1: mode = SCIENCE
grd2: unitPLI = UNIT ON
grd3: unitPLI cond = 1
grd4: unitES cond > 0 ∧ unitGPS cond > 0
with
newMode : newMode = NOMINAL
then
act1: mode := NOMINAL
act2: stable := FALSE
act3: unitPLI cond := 0
end
end
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